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Subject	  Matter	  	   This	   DTRA-­‐sponsored	   research	   examines	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   emerging	   infectious	  disease	   (EID)	   surveillance	   programs;	   it	   also	   provides	   lessons	   learned	   for	   U.S.	   military	   medical	  research	  laboratories	  collaborating	  with	  developing	  countries.	  It	   is	  the	  third	  study	  in	  a	  series	  that	  began	  with	  a	  comparison	  of	   Indonesia,	  Cambodia,	  and	   the	  Naval	  Area	  Medical	  Research	  Unit	  2	   in	  the	   context	   of	   EID	   surveillance	   and	   viral	   sovereignty	   (published	   by	   the	   author	   as	   “Emerging	  Infectious	  Disease	  Surveillance	  in	  Southeast	  Asia:	  Cambodia,	  Indonesia,	  and	  the	  Naval	  Area	  Medical	  Research	  Unit	  2,”	  Asian	  Security,	  8(2),	  (July	  2012):	  164-­‐187).	  The	  second	  study	  compared	  Mexico’s	  handling	  of	  H1N1	  in	  2009	  with	  U.S.	  handling	  of	  H1N1	  in	  1976	  (currently	  under	  revise	  and	  resubmit	  with	  Politics	  and	  the	  Life	  Sciences).	  This	  third	  report	  comprises	  four	  case	  studies:	  Kenya	  (U.S.	  Army	  Medical	  Research	  Unit-­‐K	  or	  USAMRU-­‐K),	  Peru	  (U.S.	  Naval	  Area	  Medical	  Research	  Unit-­‐6	  or	  NAMRU-­‐6),	  Thailand	  (Armed	  Forces	  Research	  Institute	  of	  Medical	  Sciences	  or	  AFRIMS),	  and	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  Border	  (Early	  Warning	  Infectious	  Disease	  Surveillance	  or	  EWIDS).	  It	  provides	  policy	  makers	  tools	  for	   improving	   the	   effectiveness	  of	  new	  or	   existing	  EID	   surveillance	  programs.	  Moreover,	   it	   offers	  host	  countries	  the	  opportunity	  to	  incorporate	  ideas,	  provide	  opinions,	  and	  debate	  the	  management	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  constraints	  facing	  their	  programs.	  	  






Case	  Study	  1:	  Kenya	  
	   In	   the	   past	   three	   decades,	   there	   have	   been	   recurrent	   outbreaks	   of	   emerging	   infectious	  diseases	  in	  the	  East	  African	  Community	  (EAC)	  region.	  These	  outbreaks	  include	  Viral	  Hemorrhagic	  Fevers,	  Marburg	   fever,	  Ebola,	   and	  Rift	  Valley	  Fever.	  Clearly,	  EIDs	  are	  a	  great	  economic	  burden	   to	  any	  country.	  Besides	  the	  loss	  of	  human	  lives	  and	  animals,	  EIDs	  also	  have	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  cross-­‐border	  trade,	  which	  depresses	  economic	  growth	  for	  the	  affected	  country	  and	  negatively	  affects	  the	  entire	  region.	  EIDs	  have	  further	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  health	  experts	  and	  policy	  makers	  in	  the	  region	  due	   to	   the	   recent	   increase	   in	  human	  and	  animal	  mobility	   following	   the	  signing	  of	   the	  EAC	  Common	  Market	  in	  2010.	  As	  an	  example,	  the	  December	  2006	  -­‐	  May	  2007	  Rift	  Valley	  Fever	  outbreak	  in	  Kenya,	  Tanzania,	  and	  Burundi	  cost	  more	  than	  200	  human	  lives	  and	  the	   lives	  of	  an	  unidentified	  number	  of	  wildlife	  and	  domestic	  animals.	  This	  outbreak,	  in	  turn,	  affected	  the	  region’s	  beef	  industry.	  Kenya	  was	  chosen	  as	  a	  case	  study	  because	  it	  is	  the	  only	  other	  country	  in	  Africa	  besides	  Egypt	  that	  hosts	  a	  U.S.	  military	  medical	  research	  laboratory	  (USAMRU-­‐K).	  Furthermore,	  Kenya	  is	  the	  economic	  leader	  of	  the	  five	  EAC	  Partner	  States	  (which	  also	  includes	  Uganda,	  Tanzania,	  Rwanda	  and	  Burundi)	  with	  over	  40%	  of	  the	  EAC’s	  GDP,	  so	  its	  ability	  to	  deal	  with	  EIDs	  has	  significant	  implications	  for	  the	  entire	  region.	  	  The	   study	   uncovered	   a	   number	   of	   key	   challenges	   across	   political,	   economic,	   and	   cultural	  dimensions.	   Six	   major	   political	   challenges	   were	   apparent:	   political	   instability,	   decentralization,	  competition	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  bureaucracy,	  donor-­‐driven	  research	  projects,	  and	  corruption.	   Four	   economic	   challenges	   emerged:	   inadequate	   funds,	   insufficient	   remuneration	   for	  civil	  servants,	  poor	  infrastructure,	  and	  rural-­‐urban	  disparities.	  Finally,	  four	  key	  cultural	  challenges	  were	   identified:	   stigmatization,	   religious	   beliefs	   and	   reliance	   on	   traditional	   medicine,	   hostility	  towards	   minority	   groups,	   and	   protocol	   observation.	   Together,	   these	   challenges	   are	   daunting	   in	  their	  overall	  impact	  on	  EID	  surveillance	  in	  Kenya,	  but	  awareness	  of	  such	  challenges	  by	  USAMRU-­‐K	  and	   other	   external	   actors	   will	   only	   help	   improve	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   their	   in-­‐country	   work	   and	  their	  relationship	  with	  Kenya.	  
	  
Case	  Study	  2:	  Peru	  
	  	   Compared	  to	  the	  other	  countries	  in	  this	  report,	  Peru	  has	  strong	  international	  relationships,	  but	   struggles	   with	   overlapping	   functions	   between	   internal	   agencies;	   this	   occasionally	   limits	  cooperation,	   especially	  when	   programs	   overlap.	   For	   example,	   the	   government	   of	   Peru	   has	   three	  similarly	   functioning	   health	   institutions,	  which	   complicates	   efficient	   surveillance	   capacity.	  Health	  Experts	   are	   concerned	   that	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Health	   is	   doing	   the	   same	   task	   as	   the	   armed	   forces,	  wasting	  resources	   instead	  of	  using	   them	  to	   improve	  the	  state	  of	  diagnostic	   labs.	  NAMRU-­‐6	  puts	  a	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  publications	  (as	  part	  of	  its	  three	  P’s:	  publications,	  products,	  and	  partnerships),	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which	   may	   not	   align	   with	   what	   the	   host	   country	   desires	   (as	   was	   apparent	   with	   NAMRU-­‐2	   in	  Indonesia).	  Like	  a	  university	  environment,	  it’s	  publish	  or	  perish.	  	  	   Additionally,	   this	  case	  study	  uncovered	  limited	  surveillance	  capabilities	   in	  Peru,	  especially	  in	  rural	  areas.	  Although	  cultural	  diversity	  and	  educating	  locals	  are	  typical	  barriers	  that	  surveillance	  experts	  experience,	  decentralization	  exaggerates	   these	   factors:	   there	   is	  a	  notable	   lack	  of	   technical	  capacity	  and	  an	  absence	  of	  resources	  outside	  the	  capital	  city	  of	  Lima.	  The	  country	  does	  have	  a	  cadre	  of	   experienced	   health	   experts,	   but	   infrastructure	   and	   deficient	   conditions	   keeps	   them	   from	  realizing	   their	   potential.	   These	   frustrations	   have	  manifested	   themselves	   in	   strikes,	   where	   health	  officials	  argue	  that	  while	  military	  wages	  have	  risen,	  no	  efforts	  have	  gone	  towards	  increasing	  wages	  for	   doctors,	   public	   health	   officials,	   or	   epidemiologists.	   Consequently,	   Peru	   has	   lost	   many	   of	   its	  knowledgeable	  health	  experts	  to	  other	  countries	  that	  will	  pay	  them	  a	  better	  salary.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  Prime	   Minister	   of	   Cambodia	   banned	   the	   use	   of	   wage	   incentives	   in	   its	   civil	   service	   because	   the	  military	  (allegedly)	  could	  not	  share	  the	  same	  benefit,	  creating	  a	  poverty	  of	  equality	  instead.	  	  
	  
Case	  Study	  3:	  Thailand	  
	  	   This	  case	  study	  evaluates	  past	  efforts	   to	  manage	  emerging	   infectious	  diseases	   in	  Thailand	  and	  gives	  recommendations	  on	  ways	   in	  which	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Health,	  AFRIMS,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  CDC	   can	   improve	   future	   collaboration.	   Specifically,	   it	   focuses	   on	   the	   Thai	   government’s	   2003	  decision	   to	   wait	   three	   months	   to	   announce	   that	   there	   was	   a	   Highly	   Pathogenic	   Avian	   Influenza	  outbreak.	   Thailand	   has	   significant	   resources,	   expertise,	   and	   capabilities,	   but	   the	   connection	  between	   regional	   and	   international	   networks	   is	   tenuous.	   The	  majority	   of	   interviewees	   said	   that	  overlapping	  missions,	  miscommunications,	  and	  mistrust	   in	   the	   international	  community	  were	   the	  typical	   impediments.	  These	   contributed	   to	   slow	   response	   times	   from	  Thai	   government	   regarding	  sudden	   outbreaks.	   This	   report	   recommends	   that	   international	   organizations	   (such	   as	   the	  World	  Health	   Organization)	   use	   their	   neutral	   status	   and	   resources	   to	   link	   regional	   and	   international	  networks	  and	  improve	  surveillance	  systems.	  Most	  importantly,	  it	  recommends	  that	  when	  creating	  new	  programs,	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  host	  country	  must	  be	  paramount.	  	  
	  
Case	  Study	  4:	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  Border	  
	   This	  case	  study	  was	  unique	  in	  that	  it	   looked	  at	  a	  regional	  system	  instead	  of	  a	  specific	  host	  country;	  it	  recommendations	  ways	  for	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  and	  the	  U.S.	  military	  to	  be	  proactive	  and	  effective	   when	   providing	   funding	   and	   other	   resources	   to	   Mexico.	   The	   primary	   constraints	  mentioned	  in	  the	  report	  were:	  political	  insecurity	  and	  violence	  from	  drug	  cartels,	  which	  prohibited	  U.S.	  government	  officials	   in	  Texas	  and	  California	  from	  entering	  the	  country;	  difficulty	  transferring	  resources	   and	   reagents	   across	   borders;	   and	   poor	   laboratory	   capacity	   in	  most	   regions	   of	  Mexico.	  Mexico’s	   strengths	   were	   technological	   knowhow,	   specifically	   its	   web-­‐based	   platform,	   which	  allowed	   partners	   to	   share	   information	   and	   instantly	   receive	   outbreak	   notices.	   Although	   the	  majority	   of	   partners	   have—or	   are	   in	   the	   process	   of	   implementing	   their	   own—Declarations	   of	  
[10]	  
	  
Cooperation	   (States	   are	   not	   allowed	   to	   enter	   into	   treaties	   per	   the	   U.S.	   Constitution),	   there	   is	   a	  debate	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  relationships	  will	  stay	  intact	  after	  EWIDS	  funding	  ends	  (already	  the	  case	  in	  all	  states	  except	  for	  California).	  
	  
Conclusion	  	  	  	   Each	   country	   faces	   unique	   political	   and	   economic	   challenges,	   but	   they	   all	   encountered	  similar	   communication	   problems;	   the	   source	   of	   these	   problems	   varied	   and	   were	   the	   result	   of	  agency	   shortcomings,	   structural	   deficiencies	   (decentralization),	   or	   international	   barriers.	  Moreover,	   most	   interviewees	   reported	   conflict	   between	   parties	   when	   civilian	   and	   military	  responsibilities	  overlapped.	  To	   improve	  communication	  between	  agencies,	  experts	  recommended	  assigning	  a	  local	  principal	  investigator	  to	  each	  project.	  This	  would	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  host	  country	  priorities	  stay	  in	  focus.	  Furthermore,	  all	  case	  studies	  recommend	  developing	  a	  surveillance	  system	  in	  a	  way	  which	  allows	  locals	  to	  take	  ownership	  of	  the	  project.	  This	  approach	  is	  particularly	  important	   in	   certain	   Kenyan	   districts,	   because	   local	   experts	   are	   more	   proficient	   in	   managing	  cultural	   grievances	   and	   avoiding	   the	   conflict-­‐ridden	   rural	   areas.	   More	   advanced	   developing	  countries,	  like	  Thailand,	  have	  extensive	  resources	  because	  they	  have	  already	  created	  a	  network	  of	  local	   individuals	  who	   are	   experts	   in	   effective	   surveillance	   and	   are	   committed	   to	   improving	   their	  country’s	  capacity.	  	  The	  Mexico	  study	  recommends	  using	  technology	  to	  build	  a	  community	  network,	  embedding	  cooperation	   into	   the	   surveillance	   system:	   If	   a	   high-­‐profile	   health	   experts	   leaves,	   the	   remaining	  members	   can	   reconnect	   with	   new	   individuals	   through	   the	   web-­‐based	   system.	   Peru,	   another	  relatively	  advanced	  developing	  country,	  has	   the	   technical	   capacity	   to	  have	  a	  web-­‐based	  platform;	  however,	  it	  is	  legally	  limited	  in	  what	  it	  can	  share	  through	  NAMRU-­‐6.	  Lastly,	  experts	  recommended	  using	  lessons	  learned	  from	  other	  countries—and	  from	  regions	  within	  the	  host	  country—to	  improve	  surveillance	  systems.	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CASE	  STUDY	  1:	  KENYA*	  	  
Introduction	  
	   In	   the	   East	   African	   Community	   (EAC)	   region,	   there	   have	   been	   recurrent	   outbreaks	   of	  emerging	   infectious	   diseases	   in	   the	   past	   three	   decades.	   These	   include	   Viral	   Hemorrhagic	   Fevers	  (such	   as	   a	   recent	   case	   of	   yellow	   fever	   in	   Uganda),	   Marburg	   fever,	   Ebola	   (in	   Uganda	   in	   July	   and	  August	  2012,	  and	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  in	  August	  and	  September	  2012),	  and	  Rift	  Valley	  Fever	  (in	  Kenya	  in	  2006/2007	  and	  Tanzania	  and	  Burundi	  in	  2007).	  The	  increasing	  mobility	  of	   humans	   and	   animals	   has	   put	   EID	   surveillance	   at	   the	   forefront	   for	   health	   experts	   and	   policy	  makers	  in	  the	  African	  region.	  Although	  the	  loss	  of	  animal	  and	  human	  lives	  is	  the	  primary	  concern,	  epidemics	  also	  have	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  cross-­‐border	  trade.	  This	  is	  a	  clear	  detriment	  to	  economic	  growth	   and	   development	   for	   the	   affected	   country	   and	   for	   the	   entire	   region.	   For	   instance,	   the	  December	   2006	   -­‐	   May	   2007	   Rift	   Valley	   Fever	   outbreak	   experienced	   in	   Kenya,	   Tanzania,	   and	  Burundi	   cost	   the	   lives	   of	   more	   than	   200	   humans	   and	   an	   unidentified	   number	   of	   wildlife	   and	  domestic	   animals	   in	   the	   region,	   which	   in	   turn	   affected	   the	   region’s	   beef	   industry.1	   In	   fact,	   EID	  surveillance	  is	  so	  important	  to	  economic	  well-­‐being	  that	  preventing	  and	  managing	  epidemics	  was	  a	  topic	  of	  conversation	  when	  signing	  the	  EAC	  Common	  Market	  in	  2010.2	  	  Kenya	   is	   an	   important	   player	   in	   EID	   surveillance	   because	   it	   is	   the	   only	   other	   country	   in	  Africa	  other	  than	  Egypt,	  which	  hosts	  the	  U.S.	  Naval	  Area	  Medical	  Research	  Unit	  3,	  that	  hosts	  a	  U.S.	  military	  medical	  research	  laboratory	  (the	  United	  States	  Army	  Medical	  Research	  Unit-­‐Kenya).	  Kenya	  is	  an	  interesting	  subject	  of	  investigation	  in	  the	  EAC	  region,	  because	  it	  is	  the	  most	  developed	  of	  the	  five	   EAC	   Partner	   States	   (Kenya,	   Uganda,	   Tanzania,	   Rwanda	   and	   Burundi);	   Kenya’s	   ability—or	  inability—to	  deal	  with	  EIDs	  has	  profound	  implications	  for	  the	  entire	  EAC	  region.3	  This	  study	  looks	  at	  the	  roles	  played	  by	  international	  institutions	  (such	  as	  USAMRU-­‐K)	  as	  well	  as	  local	  institutions	  in	  the	   surveillance	   of	   EIDs.	   It	   also	   reveals	   the	  major	   challenges—political,	   economic,	   and	   cultural—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  Inputs	  to	  this	  case	  study	  were	  provided	  by	  Grace	  Njeri	  with	  backstop	  by	  Angela	  Archambault	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  Sophal	  Ear.	  1	  East	  African	  Community,	  "Regional	  Plan	  of	  Action	  for	  the	  Prevention	  and	  Control	  of	  Human	  and	  Animal	  Transboundary	  Diseases	  in	  East	  Africa:	  2007-­‐2012,"	  3.	  2	  East	  African	  Common	  Market,	  “Common	  Market	  Protocol,”	  38.	  The	  EAC	  Common	  Market	  aims	  at,	  among	  other	  things,	  enhancing	  trade	  among	  the	  five	  member	  states	  by	  removing	  all	  barriers	  to	  trade	  and	  granting	  the	  region	  the	  four	  freedom	  of	  movement:	  movement	  of	  persons	  and	  workers,	  goods,	  capital	  and	  services.	  But	  of	  the	  five	  Partners	  States,	  Kenya	  is	  the	  most	  lenient	  and	  its	  borders	  the	  most	  porous.	  3	  European	  Commission,	  “Generalized	  System	  of	  Preferences:	  Everything	  but	  Arms,”	  1.	  Whereas	  Kenya	  is	  categorized	  as	  a	  developing	  country,	  the	  other	  four	  EAC	  Partner	  States	  are	  categorized	  as	  least	  developed	  countries	  (LDCs).	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faced	   by	   these	   institutions	   in	   their	   surveillance	   work.	   The	   results	   of	   this	   research	   are	   a	   tool	   to	  strengthen	  EID	   surveillance	   in	  Kenya;	   this	   should	   occur	   by	   establishing	   a	   collaborative	   approach	  between	  the	  Kenyan	  government	  and	  international	  players.	  
	  
Background	  and	  Context	  	  	  
Kenya’s	  Healthcare	  Sector	  in	  Brief	  
	   The	  majority	   of	   Kenyans	   are	   vulnerable	   to	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   diseases	   due	   to	   the	   country’s	  unique	  geographical	  and	  climatic	  conditions.	  Located	  in	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  region,	  Kenya	  has	  large	  chunks	   of	   arid	   and	   semi-­‐arid	   lands,	   as	  well	   as	  malaria-­‐prone	   regions	   along	   the	   coast	   and	   in	   the	  western	   provinces.	   Children	   are	   particularly	   at	   risk,	   with	   childhood	   illnesses	   resulting	   in	   high	  mortality	   rates	   that	   are	   easily	   preventable	   or	   controlled	   with	   a	   better-­‐quality	   water	   supply	   and	  improved	   sanitation	   practices.	  Moreover,	   high	   levels	   of	   insecurity	   and	   frequent	   conflicts	   that	   are	  endemic	  to	  the	  region	  have	  transformed	  the	  country	  into	  a	  haven	  for	  refugees	  from	  Somalia,	  Sudan,	  and	  Ethiopia,4	  which	  puts	  the	  local	  population	  at	  further	  risk.5	  	  Historically,	   the	   priority	   of	   the	   Kenyan	   government,	   through	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Health,	   was	  communicable	   diseases.6	   Nevertheless,	   the	   country	   recently	   experienced	   a	   high	   incidence	   of	  injuries	  and	  non-­‐communicable	  diseases	  (NCDs)	  such	  as	  heart	  complications	  and	  diabetes	  (and	  the	  associated	   high	  mortality	   rates).	   In	   addition,	   tuberculosis	   (TB)	   resurfaced	   as	   a	  major	   cause	   of	   ill	  health,	   while	   Rift	   Valley	   Fever	   and	   cholera	   continued	   to	   burden	   Kenya’s	   healthcare	   system.	  Although	   the	  country	  has	  undertaken	  significant	  efforts	   to	   reduce	   the	  prevalence	  of	  HIV	  over	   the	  past	  decade,	  the	  infection	  rate	  remains	  static.	  	  Despite	   the	   enormous	   burdens	   on	   Kenya’s	   healthcare	   sector,	   the	   government	   has	   made	  significant	   progress	   towards	   reducing	   mortality	   and	   morbidity	   rates.	   The	   government	  accomplished	   reductions	   with	   two	   concurrent	   programs:	   the	   Millennium	   Development	   Goals	  (MDGs)	   and	   the	   country’s	   long-­‐term	   development	   agenda,	   Vision	   2030.	   The	   objective	   of	   these	  programs	  was	   “to	   provide	   an	   equitable	   and	   affordable	   healthcare	   system	   of	   the	   highest	   possible	  quality.”7	   Moreover,	   the	   Kenyan	   government	   does	   not	   work	   alone	   in	   achieving	   its	   public	   health	  goals;	   there	   are	   many	   players	   in	   the	   country’s	   healthcare	   sector,	   including	   faith-­‐based	  organizations,	   non-­‐governmental	   organizations	   (NGOs),	   the	   private	   sector,	   and	   international	  organizations.	   One	   such	   international	   organization	   is	   the	   United	   States	   Army	   Medical	   Research	  Unit–Kenya	  (USAMRU-­‐K).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Society	  for	  International	  Development,	  “Greater	  Horn	  of	  Eastern	  Africa	  (GHEA)	  Outlook	  #25:	  Human	  trafficking	  in	  the	  GHEA,”	  7.	  As	  of	  September	  2011,	  Kenya	  hosted	  more	  than	  452,000	  refugees,	  the	  majority	  of	  whom	  were	  of	  Somali	  origin,	  at	  Dadaab	  camp,	  the	  largest	  refugee	  camp	  in	  the	  region.	  5	  Society	  for	  International	  Development,	  “Greater	  Horn	  of	  Eastern	  Africa,”	  3.	  	  6	  Information	  obtained	  from	  Government	  Official	  1	  on	  5/15/12	  at	  11AM	  in	  Nairobi,	  Kenya.	  	  7	  Ministry	  of	  Medical	  Services	  (2008).	  Reversing	  the	  trends:	  The	  second	  National	  Health	  Sector	  
Strategic	  Plan	  of	  Kenya	  2008-­‐2012.	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USAMRU-­‐K	  and	  Its	  Role	  in	  EID	  Surveillance	  	  
	   USAMRU-­‐K,	   also	   known	   as	   the	   Walter	   Reed	   Project,	   was	   formed	   provisionally	   at	   the	  invitation	   of	   the	   Kenyan	   government	   in	   1969;	   it	   was	   permanently	   established	   in	   1973	   with	   its	  headquarters	  in	  Nairobi.	  It	  is	  overseen	  by	  the	  Walter	  Reed	  Army	  Institute	  of	  Research	  (WRAIR)	  and	  is	   part	   of	   an	   international	   network	   of	   laboratories,	   including	   the	   U.S.	   component	   of	   the	   Armed	  Forces	   Research	   Institute	   of	   Medical	   Sciences	   in	   Thailand.	   It	   collaborates	   with	   key	   local	   and	  international	  institutions	  including:	  the	  MoPHS,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Medical	  Services;	  the	  Kenya	  Medical	  Research	   Institute	   (KEMRI),	   USAMRU-­‐K’s	   official	   host;	   the	   U.S	   Agency	   for	   International	  Development	   (USAID);	   the	   Centers	   for	   Disease	   Control	   and	   Prevention	   (CDC);	   the	  World	   Health	  Organization,	  and	  many	  others.8	  	  USAMRU-­‐K	  includes	  the	  Narobi-­‐based	  Department	  of	  Emerging	  Infectious	  Diseases	  (DEID)	  and	  a	  number	  of	  satellite	  surveillance	  sites	  across	  the	  country	  and	  the	  continent.	  DEID	  executes	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Global	  Emerging	  Infections	  Surveillance	  and	  Response	  System	  (DoD	  GEIS).	  USAMRU-­‐K	  DEID	  was	  established	  in	  1998	  through	  a	  cooperative	  arrangement	  with	  KEMRI,	  but	  the	  program	  has	  been	  expanded	  to	  other	  African	  countries	  such	  as	  Uganda,	  Tanzania	  and	  Cameroon.	  9	  The	  motivation	  for	  establishing	  DEID	  was	  to	  improve	  surveillance	  and	  outbreak	  response	  capacities	  in	   the	  majority	   of	   sub-­‐Saharan	  African	   countries.	   Prior	  underreporting	   in	   these	   countries	   limited	  the	   detection	   of	   disease	   outbreaks.	   USAMRU-­‐K	   DEID	   carries	   out	   research	   and	   surveillance	   in	  influenza,	   arbovirology,	   viral	   hemorrhagic	   fever,	   acute	   febrile	   illnesses,	   leishmaniasis,	   enteric	  diseases,	   sexually	   transmitted	   diseases,	   rodent	   borne	   viruses,	   health	   demographics,	   and	  malaria	  drug	   susceptibility.10	   The	   capability	   of	   DEID	   to	   conduct	   field	   research,	   predict	   outbreaks,	   and	  respond	  to	  pandemics	  is	  attributed	  to	  its	  robust	  surveillance	  network.	  	  USAMRU-­‐K	  also	  engages	   in	  extensive	  capacity	  building	  for	   local	  researchers	  and	  scientists	  in	  host	  countries	  to	  enhance	  disease	  surveillance	  and	  research	  infrastructure.	  For	  example,	  before	  2006,	   Kenya	   lacked	   the	   laboratories	   and	   infrastructure	   for	   detecting	   influenza	   (or	   influenza-­‐like	  illness).	   DEID	   assisted	   the	   Kenyan	   government	   by	   funding	   the	   National	   Influenza	   Center,	   which	  primarily	   conducts	   influenza	   surveillance.	   Since	   then,	   the	   program	   has	   grown	   and	   it	   now	   serves	  Somalia	   and	   the	   Seychelles	   islands.11	   USAMRU-­‐K	   recognizes	   the	   need	   to	   gain	   trust	   by	   working	  closely	   with	   host	   governments;	   this	   trust	   enables	   effective	   surveillance	   and	   other	   research	   and	  related	  activities.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  2010	  profile	  report	  stated,	  “in	  any	  community,	  wherever	  you	  go,	  you	  need	   the	  good	  will	  of	   the	  government	   to	  be	  able	   to	  operate.”12	  A	  Kenyan	  government	  official	  reinforced	  this	   idea	  when	  he	  spoke	  about	  USAMRU-­‐K’s	  desire	  to	  work	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	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  Mission.”	  9	  The	  institution	  is	  actually	  located	  within	  KEMRI’s	  Nairobi	  campus.	  10	  USAMRU-­‐K-­‐DEID,	  “Overview.”	  	  11	  Department	  of	  Emerging	  Infectious	  Diseases,	  “USAMRU-­‐K:	  DEID	  2010	  Profile,”	  10.	  12	  Department	  of	  Emerging	  Infectious	  Diseases,	  “USAMRU-­‐K:	  DEID	  2010	  Profile,”	  43.	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Health	  and	  Sanitation	  (MoPHS);	  “we	  felt	  we	  had	  a	  problem,	  USAMRU-­‐K	  had	  the	  expertise	  to	  fix	  it,	  so	  we	  allowed	  them	  to	  participate	  in	  activities	  that	  are	  beneficial	  to	  our	  citizenry.”13	  	  
	  
Literature	  Review	  
	   Despite	   devoting	   huge	   resources	   towards	   EIDs,	   they	   continue	   to	   plague	   populations	   and	  encumber	   the	   public	   health	   system.	   The	   EID	   burden	   is	   especially	   concerning	   in	   developing	  countries	  that	  lack	  resources	  and	  capabilities.	  Many	  factors	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  EIDs	  including	   globalization,	   increased	   cross-­‐border	   mobility,	   rural-­‐urban	   migration	   (which	   leads	   to	  congestion	   in	  urban	  areas),	  poor	  nutrition,	  drug	  resistance,	  and	  population	  pressures	  resulting	   in	  settlement	  of	  rural	  or	  uninhabited	  areas.14	  These	  diseases	  are	  difficult	  to	  destroy	  and	  do	  not	  respect	  boundaries.	  The	   answer	   to	   the	   growing	  problems	   caused	  by	  EIDs	   is	   in	   active	   surveillance,	  which	  requires	   public	   health	   officials	   go	   into	   the	   field	   and	   gather	   data	   directly.15	   This	  method	   is	  more	  accurate	   and	   extensive,	   but	   it	   can	   be	   challenging	   to	   implement,	   because	   it	   is	   costly	   and	   time	  consuming.	  	  The	  global	   community’s	   response	   towards	  EIDs	  has	   always	  been	   to	   control,	   prevent,	   and	  treat	  diseases.	  However,	  detecting	  emerging	  outbreaks	  is	  difficult	  and	  time	  consuming	  because	  the	  international	   community	   is	   “dependent	   on	   local	   physicians	   to	   diagnose	   cases,	   on	   laboratories	   to	  isolate	  and	  serotype	  the	  organism,	  [and]	  on	  the	  notification	  systems	  to	  inform	  the	  state	  and	  federal	  agencies.”16	  Despite	  strong	  international	  support	  (both	  in	  monetary	  and	  non-­‐monetary	  terms),	  EID	  surveillance	   in	   developing	   countries	   remains	   substandard.	   A	   pandemic	   preparedness	   plan	   is	  needed	   to	   to	   address	   these	   gaps.	   There	   also	   must	   be	   a	   clear	   expectation	   that	   all	   participating	  organizations	  establish	  and	  uphold	  veterinary	  standards	  and	  international	  health	  regulations	  (IHR).	  Likewise,	  participating	  organizations	  should	  adopt	  a	  long-­‐term	  commitment	  to	  the	  host	  country.17	  Other	  challenges	  affecting	  EID	  surveillance	   include	  under-­‐developed	  surveillance	  capacity,	   the	   ill-­‐functioning	  public	  health	  sector,	  and	  donor	  interference.	  
	  
Underdeveloped	  Surveillance	  Capacity	  	  According	  to	  Robbins,	  “Sixty	  percent	  of	  emerging	  infectious	  diseases	  that	  affect	  humans	  are	  zoonotic	  …	  and	  more	  than	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  those	  originate	  in	  wildlife.”18	  In	  the	  book,	  The	  Viral	  Storm:	  
The	  Dawn	   of	   a	  New	  Pandemic	   Age,	  Wolfe	   recommends	   that	   deadly	   animal	   viruses	   are	   hunted	   by	  creating	  a	  “system	  focused	  on	  small	  set	  of	  sentinels,	  key	  populations	  that	  would	  allow	  us	  to	  monitor	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  14	  Kombe	  and	  Darrow.	  “Revisiting	  emerging	  infectious	  diseases:	  The	  unfinished	  agenda,”	  113-­‐122.	  15	  United	  States	  General	  Accounting	  Office,	  “Emerging	  Infectious	  Diseases:	  National	  Surveillance	  System	  Could	  be	  Strengthened,”	  3.	  16	  Broome,	  “Effective	  Global	  Responses	  to	  Emerging	  Infectious	  Diseases,”	  358.	  17	  Australian	  Government,	  “Pandemics	  and	  Emerging	  Infectious	  Disease	  Framework,”	  8.	  	   	  18	  Reports	  estimate	  as	  high	  as	  80%	  of	  the	  human	  pathogens	  have	  zoonotic	  origin.	  
[15]	  	  
viral	   chatter	  with	   the	   resources	  we	   currently	   have.”19	  While	   information	   gathering	   is	   important,	  obtaining	   specimens	   in	   remote	   locations	   is	   logistically	   problematic	   and	   makes	   identification	  difficult.	  Locating	  livestock,	  determining	  quality	  of	  living	  conditions,	  and	  identifying	  areas	  that	  are	  ecologically	  changing	  are	  all	  useful	   to	   improving	  EID	  surveillance	  systems.20	  A	  report	  “found	  a	  99	  percent	   correlation	   between	   country	   levels	   of	   protein-­‐energy	   malnutrition	   and	   the	   burden	   of	  zoonosis.”21	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  individuals	  can	  barely	  provide	  medical	  care	  for	  themselves,	  there	  is	  a	  good	  chance	  that	  the	  numbers	  of	  sick	  livestock	  are	  under	  reported.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  capacity	  for	  animal	  surveillance	  in	  many	  developing	  countries	  has	  been	  low	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  specific	  government	  policies	  and	  legal	  frameworks,	  poor	  financial	  and	  non-­‐financial	  resources,	  weak	  reporting	  systems,	  and	  insufficient	  cooperation	  between	  animal	  and	  human	  public	  health.	   In	   China,	   for	   instance,	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   clinical	   laboratories	   do	   not	   provide	   timely	   and	  high-­‐quality	   microbiology	   services	   due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   skilled	   laboratory	   technicians	   and	   testing	  supplies.22	  The	  status	  of	  laboratories	  in	  the	  East	  African	  region	  is	  equally	  poor.	  At	  the	  district	  level,	  they	  are	  only	  capable	  of	  carrying	  out	  slide	  examination	  of	  malaria,	  tuberculosis,	  general	  blood	  tests	  and	  routine	  urine	  and	  stool	  analysis.	  One	  study	  looked	  at	  4,000	  health	  facilities	  in	  Kenya	  and	  found	  that	   public	   health	   venues	   had	   a	   54%	   reporting	   rate.23	   This	   outcome	   is	   a	   crucial	   for	   animal	  surveillance,	   particularly	   laboratory	   networking	   and	   communication,	   which	   remain	   poor	   in	   the	  majority	  of	  developing	  areas.	  	  Murphy	  suggests	  that	  health	  experts	  should	  alter	  their	  strategy	  and	  “involve	  more	  of	  a	  field	  and	   laboratory	   research	   enterprise	   than	   [traditional]	   surveillance	   and	   reference	   diagnosis	  enterprise.”24	   In	   his	   opinion,	   it	   would	   make	   systems	   more	   adaptable	   so	   countries	   could	   adjust	  conditions	   if	   necessary.	   In	   another	   review,	   experts	   from	   universities	   and	   research	   centers	   in	  California	  recommend	   looking	  at	  historical	  data	   to	   fully	  understand	   the	  pathogen	  cycle	   through	  a	  process	  called	  origins	   initiative.	   In	   their	  opinion,	  studying	  a	  more	  diverse	  group	  of	  species	  would	  help	  surveillance,	  because	  it	  would	  provide	  a	  “better	  understanding	  of	  how	  diseases	  have	  emerged;	  new	   laboratory	   models	   for	   studying	   public	   health	   threats;	   and	   perhaps	   clues	   that	   could	   aid	   in	  predictions	  of	  future	  disease	  threats.”25	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  Wolfe,	  The	  Viral	  Storm:	  The	  Dawn	  of	  a	  New	  Pandemic	  Age,	  181.	  	  20	  Robbins,	  “The	  Ecology	  of	  Disease,”	  1.	  	  21	  MacMillan,	  “New	  ILRI	  study	  maps	  hotspots	  of	  human-­‐animal	  infectious	  diseases	  and	  emerging	  disease	  outbreaks,”	  1.	  22	  Feng	  and	  Varma,	  “Gaps	  remain	  in	  China’s	  ability	  to	  detect	  emerging	  infectious	  diseases	  despite	  advances	  since	  the	  onset	  of	  SARS	  and	  Avian	  flu,”	  127-­‐135.	  	  23	  CORE	  Group,	  “Rapid	  Qualitative	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Malaria	  Control	  Environment	  in	  Kenya,”	  12.	  24	  Murphy,	  “Emerging	  Zoonoses,”	  435.	  	  25	  Wolfe	  et	  al.,	  “Origins	  of	  Major	  Human	  Infectious	  Diseases,”	  283.	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Ill-­‐Functioning	  Public	  Health	  Sector	  	  Some	  challenges	  facing	  the	  public	  health	  sector	  in	  developing	  countries	  include	  low	  ratios	  of	  healthcare	   professionals	   to	   patients,	   inadequate	   healthcare	   facilities,	   low	   public	   sector	  remuneration,	   and	   lack	   of	   accessibility	   to	   facilities.	   These	   challenges	   make	   it	   difficult	   for	   the	  government	  to	  address	  the	  population’s	  needs.	  Providing	  basic	  services	  become	  especially	  difficult	  when	  “systems	  are	  under	  pressure	  (due	  to	  funding	  squeezes),	  are	  rapidly	  changing	  (as	  new	  private	  health	  providers	  enter	  the	  scene),	  and	  where	  disease	  are	  new	  and	  emerging	  (as	  with	  zoonoses).”26	  Yach	  and	  Bettcher	  argue	   that,	   in	   the	  globalizing	  world,	  building	   international	  norms	  and	  national	  health	   legislation	   is	  necessary	  so	   that	   instruments	  are	   in	  place	  not	  only	   to	  help	  public	  health,	  but	  also	  to	  ensure	  host	  countries	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  desired	  outcomes.27	  Bond	  suggests	  that	  international	  institutions	   focus	  on	  building	  private	   and	  public	  health	   “infrastructure,	   especially	   in	   surveillance,	  research,	  and	  training;	  in	  the	  development	  and	  deployment	  of	  vaccines	  and	  antimicrobial	  drugs	  and	  the	  control	  of	  resistance;	  vector	  control;	  and	  research	  on	  personal	  and	  community	  health	  practices	  relevant	  to	  disease	  transmission.”28	  	  
	  
Donor	  Interference	  	  EID	  surveillance	  is	  a	  capital-­‐intensive	  undertaking,	  which	  means	  that	  it	  is	  a	  low	  priority	  for	  most	   developing	   countries’	   governments.	   The	   trend	  has	   always	  been	   that	   programs	  dealing	  with	  EID	   surveillance	   are	   almost	   exclusively	   funded	   by	   donor	   countries,	   international	   health	  organizations,	  and	  development	  agencies.	  Some	  common	  funders	  for	  the	  health	  sector	  include	  the	  World	  Bank,	  United	   States	  Agency	   for	   International	  Development	   (USAID),	   regional	   development	  banks	   (such	   as	   the	   African	   Development	   Bank),	   the	   Global	   Fund	   to	   fight	   AIDS,	   Tuberculosis	   and	  Malaria,	  the	  Bill	  &	  Melinda	  Gates	  Foundation,	  and	  the	  Clinton	  Foundation.	  Although	  donations	  and	  grants	  given	  to	  counteract	  biological	  threats	  are	  needed	  to	  strengthen	  infrastructure,	  the	  downside	  to	   international	   funds	   is	   that	   they	  often	  come	  with	  conditions.	   29	   It	  has	  been	  argued	   that	   “foreign	  investment	   reflects	   the	   interest	   of	   donor	   countries	   or	   mainstream	   trends	   in	   public	   health—interests	  that	  are	  not	  necessarily	  aligned	  with	  public	  health	  priorities	  of	  recipient	  countries.”30	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  Scoones,	  “Towards	  a	  One	  World,	  One	  Health	  Approach,”	  214.	  27	  Yach	  and	  Bettcher,	  “The	  Globalization	  of	  Public	  Health	  II:	  The	  convergence	  of	  Self-­‐Interest	  and	  Altruism,”	  739.	  	  28	  Bond,	  “Public/Private	  Sector	  Partnerships	  for	  Emerging	  Infections,”	  523.	  	  29	  Morens	  et	  al.,	  “The	  Challenge	  of	  Emerging	  and	  Re-­‐emerging	  Infectious	  Diseases,”	  248.	  30	  Coker	  et	  al.,	  “Emerging	  infectious	  diseases	  in	  Southeast	  Asia;	  regional	  challenges	  to	  control,”	  606.	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Methodology	  	  The	   literature	   review	   above	   identifies	   the	   gaps	   and	   concerns	   with	   existing	   disease	  surveillance	  institutions	  and	  policies,	  but	  it	  fails	  to	  explain	  a	  host	  country’s	  political	  and	  economic	  motives	   for	   conducting	   active	   surveillance.	   For	   this	   reason,	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	   field	   study	  was	   to	  portray	  the	  views	  and	  opinions	  of	  the	  surveillance	  policy	  makers	  and	  practitioners	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  Kenya.	   The	   research	   involved	   conducting	   intensive	   interviews	   with	   key	   officials	   and	  representatives	   from	   various	   health-­‐related	   organizations	   and	   institutions	   with	   the	   goal	   of	  identifying	  lessons	  and	  best	  practices	  for	  other	  developing	  countries	  to	  adopt.	  	  From	   7-­‐19	   May	   2012,	   the	   author	   conducted	   21	   individual	   and	   group	   interviews	   in	  Monterey,	   California	   and	   Nairobi,	   Kenya.	   For	   the	   Kenya-­‐based	   interviews,	   the	   author	   included	   a	  one-­‐page	   proposal,	   a	   biography,	   and	   research	   questions.	   The	   interviews	  were	   set	   up	   two	  weeks	  prior	   to	   the	   field	  visit.	  Each	   interviewee	  had	  a	   chance	   to	   review	   interview	  questions,	   gather	  data	  and	  reports,	  and	  research	  the	  author.	  While	  the	  author	  did	  review	  a	  set	  of	  questions,	  interviewees	  were	  free	  to	  expand	  on	  particular	  subjects	  of	  interest	  and	  decline	  to	  talk	  if	  they	  felt	  they	  could	  not	  provide	  an	  accurate	  response.	  	  
	  
Results	  	  These	   research	   questions	   evaluated	   current	   research	   projects,	   diagnostic	   labs,	   and	  surveillance	  systems.	  Overall,	  the	  author	  was	  able	  to	  gather	  feedback	  from	  over	  32	  experts	  (many	  in	  group	  settings)	  and	  reviewed	  15	  EID	  reports,	  studies	  and	  brochures.	  Table	  1.1	  below	  outlines	  a	  number	  of	  political,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	   indicators	   that	  were	   identified	  as	  potential	  and	  actual	  barriers	  to	  EID	  surveillance	  in	  Kenya.	  	  
	  Table	  1.1.	  Kenya:	  Key	  Issues	  Identified	  in	  Nairobi	  Interviews	  	  
Political	  Barriers	  
Percent	  of	  Interviews	  That	  Identified	  
Barriers	  Political	  instability	   2	  of	  18	  =	  11%	  Decentralization	   2	  of	  18	  =	  11%	  Competition	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	   4	  of	  18	  =	  22%	  Bureaucracy	   1	  of	  18	  =	  6%	  Donor-­‐driven	  research	  projects	   3	  of	  18	  =	  17%	  Corruption	   3	  of	  18	  =	  17%	  
Economic	  Barriers	  
Percent	  of	  Interviews	  That	  Identified	  
Barriers	  Inadequate	  funds	   11	  of	  18	  =	  61%	  Lower	  remuneration	  in	  the	  public	  sector	   4	  of	  18	  =	  22%	  Poor	  infrastructure	   10	  of	  18	  =	  56%	  
[18]	  	  
Rural-­‐urban	  disparities	   3	  of	  18	  =	  17%	  
Cultural	  Barriers	  
Percent	  of	  Interviews	  That	  Identified	  
Barriers	  Stigmatization	   1	  of	  18	  =	  6%	  Religious	  beliefs	  and	  reliance	  on	  traditional	  medicine	   14	  of	  18	  =	  78%	  Hostility	  towards	  minority	  groups	   1	  of	  18	  =	  6%	  Protocol	  observation	   3	  of	  18	  =	  17%	  
Note:	  Some	  interviews	  included	  more	  than	  one	  expert.	  
Source:	  Analysis	  of	  interviews	  conducted.	  	  Overall,	   the	   report	   concluded	   that	   political	   and	   economic	   indicators	   provided	   the	   most	  challenges,	   inadequate	   funds	   being	   the	   primary	   concern.	   In	   addition,	   the	   lacking	   resources	   are	  those	   that	  affect	   the	  host	  country.	  Kenya	  Government	  Official	  1	  stated	   it	  well	  when	  she	  said,	   “the	  one	  thing	  Kenya	   is	  doing	  right	   is	   that	  we	  are	  acknowledging	  that	   there	  are	  problems.	  We	  need	  to	  put	  programs	  into	  communicable	  diseases	  and	  preventative	  structures	  such	  as	  obesity,	  cancer,	  and	  diabetes.”	  	  
Specific	  Political	  Findings	  in	  Kenya	  
	  
Political	  Instability	  
	   First,	  political	  instability	  and	  violence	  in	  Kenya	  greatly	  hinders	  the	  ability	  for	  health	  experts	  and	   officials	   to	   conduct	   effective	   surveillance.	   Tensions	   surrounding	   a	   general	   election	   are	  hindrances	   to	   disease	   surveillance.	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   last	   general	   election	   in	  2007,	   the	   country	   witnessed	   an	   ethnically	   charged	   bloodbath,	   which	   resulted	   in	   the	   loss	   of	  thousands	   of	   lives,	   destruction	   of	   property,	   and	   a	   surge	   in	   the	   number	   of	   internally	   displaced	  persons.	  Such	  unfortunate	  events	   imply	   that	  health	  experts	  and	  officials	  cannot	   research	   in	  areas	  where	  high	  tensions	  cause	  underreporting	  in	  unsafe	  areas.	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  2	  was	  particularly	  concerned	   with	   tribal	   violence	   in	   the	   upcoming	   election	   (March	   2013).	   This	   resulted	   in	   a	  requirement	   for	   epidemiologists	   to	   be	   escorted	  by	   security	   guards.	   Predictably,	   this	   created	  new	  problems	   in	   the	   field,	   and	   added	   to	   the	   stresses	   on	   the	   organizations	   and	   institutions	   involved.	  Moreover,	   in	  such	  a	  situation,	  the	  local	  population	  may	  become	  fearful	  of	  the	  surveillance	  project,	  and,	  if	  they	  think	  it	  is	  aligned	  with	  the	  military,	  they	  might	  be	  unwilling	  to	  participate.	  	  
	  
Decentralization	  	  
	   The	   new	   Constitution	   of	   Kenya,	   promulgated	   in	   2010,	   calls	   for	   decentralization	   of	   the	  government	   through	   the	   devolution	   process.	   The	   perceived	   impact	   of	   decentralization	   was	   not	  consistent	  among	  interviewees.	  One	  set	  of	  interviewees	  believed	  that	  the	  devolution	  process	  would	  
[19]	  	  
not	   affect	   disease	   surveillance;	   they	   believed	   that	   if	   there	   was	   an	   impact,	   it	   would	   be	   an	  improvement	   because	   funds	   given	   to	   local	   governments	   would	   be	   dependent	   on	   the	   county’s	  population	   size.	  Moreover,	   they	   viewed	   the	  new	  Constitution	   as	   clearly	   delineating	   the	   roles	   and	  responsibilities	  of	  different	   levels	  of	   government	  and	  believed	   that	   institutional	  guidelines	  would	  prevent	   administrative	   challenges	   from	   arising.	   For	   example,	   Local	   Health	   Expert	   7	   stated	   his	  opinion;	  “devolution	  does	  not	  affect	  surveillance	  because	  KEMRI	  is	  independent	  and	  does	  not	  need	  to	   consult	  with	   county	   governments.	   There	   is	   high	   collaboration	   between	   the	   local	   governments	  and	  the	  institution.	  The	  only	  thing	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  change	  is	  the	  way	  finance	  is	  distributed	  from	  the	  central	  to	  local	  governments.”	  The	   other	   set	   of	   interviewees	   were	   concerned	   that	   decentralization	   would	   negatively	  impact	   health	   policy,	   especially	   if	   challenges	   arose	   when	   coordinating	   activities.	   For	   example,	  Government	  Official	  2	  argued	  that	  “the	  country	   is	   in	  the	  process	  of	  devolution,	  as	  provided	   in	  the	  new	   Constitution.	   Coordination	   between	   the	   central	   and	   local	   governments	   could	   be	   a	   challenge	  once	   the	   devolution	   process	   is	   fully	   implemented,	   which	   needs	   to	   be	   addressed.”	   Inadequate	  funding,	  overlapping	  efforts	  and/or	  a	  lack	  of	  coordination	  between	  central	  and	  local	  governments,	  all	   negatively	   affect	   a	   country’s	   capacity	   to	   manage	   an	   outbreak.	   Funding	   commitments	   and	  inability	   to	   provide	   resources	   to	   outbreak-­‐susceptible	   areas	   are	   the	   main	   concern,	   says	  International	  Health	  Expert	  1.	  The	  decentralization	  process	  can	  complicate	  the	  assistance	  process	  and	  provide	  incentives	  for	  local	  governments	  to	  request	  funding	  when	  they	  know	  it	  may	  be	  better	  spent	  elsewhere.	  	  	  
Competition	  Between	  the	  Government	  and	  International	  NGOs	  
	   Although	  a	  high	  level	  of	  collaboration	  is	  expected	  from	  state-­‐and-­‐non-­‐state	  actors,	  there	  is	  often	   stiff	   competition	   between	   them.	   For	   instance,	   when	   an	   NGO	   or	   international	   organization	  undertakes	   surveillance	   and	   comes	   across	   an	   interesting	   discovery,	   it	   is	   required	   to	   inform	   the	  government	  of	  its	  findings.	  Competition	  can	  then	  arise	  if	  either	  the	  host	  country	  or	  the	  international	  organization	   takes	   too	   much	   credit.	   Furthermore,	   citizens	   are	   often	   uninformed	   about	  developments	   in	   EID	   surveillance,	   because	   the	   decision	   to	   inform	   the	   public	   lies	   with	   the	  government,	  not	  the	  organization.	  Unfortunately,	  these	  types	  of	  data	  ownership	  issues	  are	  difficult	  to	  eliminate.	  Projects	   initiated	   by	   WRAIR	   through	   USAMRU-­‐K	   are	   a	   good	   illustration	   of	   competition	  between	   international	   organizations	   and	   government	   institutions.	   The	   lakeside	   city	   of	   Kisumu,	  Kenya,	  is	  prone	  to	  malaria,	  and	  is	  a	  hotspot	  for	  EID	  researchers.31	  International	  Health	  Expert	  2	  says	  the	   majority	   of	   malarial	   drugs	   in	   the	   country	   are	   tested	   in	   Kisumu.	   Given	   that	   USAMRU-­‐K	   has	  substantial	   resources	   and	   infrastructure,	   the	   quality	   of	   care	   it	   provides	   to	   the	   local	   residents	   far	  outperforms	   district	   hospitals.	   32	  While	  many	   of	   the	   interviewees	   see	   international	   assistance	   as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  USAMRU-­‐K,	  “Kisian	  MDR	  Laboratory.”	  32	  Ohrt	  et	  al.,	  “Establishing	  a	  malaria	  diagnostics	  centre	  of	  excellence	  in	  Kisumu,	  Kenya,”	  1.	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essential,	   in	   this	   instance	   it	   creates	  a	  negative	  atmosphere	  between	  USAMRU-­‐K	  and	  government-­‐based	  hospitals.	  USAMRU-­‐K	  is	  taking	  over	  their	  designated	  projects,	  explains	  International	  Health	  Expert	  2.	  Power	  struggles	  persist	  because	  the	  MoPHS	  desires	  funds	  to	  improve	  poor	  infrastructure,	  low	   compensation,	   and	   bolster	   international	   expertise;	   yet,	   they	   also	   desire	   full	   control	   of	   new	  initiatives	   and	   programs.	   However,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   USAMRU-­‐K	  works	   directly	   with	   the	  Kenyan	   government.	   Instead,	   international	   Health	   Expert	   2	   argued,	   “fear	   of	   inefficiencies	   in	   the	  government	   would	   make	   their	   work	   difficult;	   for	   instance,	   something	   that	   could	   be	   done	   in	   6	  months	  could	  end	  up	  taking	  3	  years.”	  	  In	  other	  instances,	  gaining	  the	  trust	  of	  the	  host	  country’s	  government	  could	  be	  problematic,	  particularly	   for	   new	  partnerships.	   In	  most	   cases,	   the	   government	   collaborates	  with	   specific	   non-­‐state	  or	   international	  organizations.	  This	   is	  how	   local	  Health	  Expert	  1	  explained	  his	  challenges	   in	  collecting	   research	   funds:	   “the	   government	   likes	   to	  work	  with	   partners	   it	   has	  worked	  with	   for	   a	  long	  time;	  hence	  it’s	  difficult	  for	  me	  to	  tell	  the	  government	  that	  I	  have	  these	  facilities	  that	  can	  help.”	  Local	   Health	   Expert	   10	   agreed	   that	   partnerships	   are	   too	   strong	   and	   feels	   that	   these	   tight	  connections	  prevent	   locals	   from	  getting	   the	   resources	   they	  need.	  Although	  Government	  Official	  1	  acknowledges	   these	   tight	   partnerships,	   she	   argued	   that	   these	   strong	   networks	   have	   enforced	  guidelines	   to	   ensure	   a	   quick	   response.	   For	   example,	   because	   epidemics	   are	   sensitive	   in	   nature,	  these	   organizations	   know	   that	   MoPHS	   needs	   to	   be	   contacted	   first	   and	   involved	   throughout	   the	  entire	  process.	  	  In	  addition,	  Government	  Official	  1	  would	  say	  that	  these	  partners	  have	  effectively	  solved	  past	  problems.	  Although	  USAMRU-­‐K	  serves	  the	  health	  needs	  of	  the	  military	  in	  Kenya,	  it	  also	  supports	  the	  civilian	  population.	  According	  to	  the	  International	  Health	  Expert	  2,	  USAMRU-­‐K	  has	  improved	  local	  surveillance	  by	  ensuring	  that	  officials	  do	  not	  wear	  military	  uniforms	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  public.	  “I	   would	   hate	   to	  make	   a	   local	   person	   I	   am	   talking	   to	   think	   he	   is	   talking	   to	   a	   soldier,”	   he	   added.	  Moreover,	   USAMRU-­‐K	   stopped	   using	   principal	   investigators	   (PIs)	   from	   the	   United	   States	   when	  providing	   surveillance	   or	   performing	   official	   business,	   and	   uses	   local	   PIs	   instead.	   International	  Health	  Expert	  4	  says	   that,	   currently,	   the	  majority	  of	   scientists	  are	   local.	   “At	  present,	   [USAMRU-­‐K]	  has	  300	  local	  scientists	   in	   its	  payroll,”	  says	  International	  Health	  Expert	  2.	  Using	   local	  PIs	  not	  only	  further	   cements	   the	   host	   country’s	   trust	   in	   USAMRU-­‐K,	   but	   also	   builds	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   local	  population.	  	  	  
Bureaucracy	  	  
	   The	   separation	   of	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Health	   into	   two	   different	   ministries,	   the	   Ministry	   of	  Medical	  Services,	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Health	  and	  Sanitation,	  represents	  another	  bureaucratic	  obstacle.	  The	  two	  ministries	  play	  similar	  roles,	  and	  there	  are	  disputes	  over	  which	  ministry	  should	  be	   in	   charge	  over	  what	   responsibilities.	  The	   separation	  of	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	   into	   two	  bodies	  also	  increased	  the	  number	  of	  government	  institutions	  requiring	  consultation	  before	  implementing	  a	  project.	  It	  has	  therefore	  become	  difficult	  for	  health	  institutions	  to	  obtain	  permits	  for	  research	  or	  surveillance.	   According	   to	   International	   Health	   Expert	   3,	   “there	   are	   many	   different	   government	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agencies,	   and	   each	   thinks	   it	  must	   provide	   a	   permit.”	   International	   Health	   Expert	   4	   explains	   that	  without	  the	  correct	  government	  contacts	  or	  the	  right	  connections	  to	  donor	  agencies,	  academics	  and	  scientists	  may	  struggle	  when	  implementing	  a	  project.	  A	  more	  transparent	  process	  would	  not	  only	  make	  grants	  more	  competitive,	  but	  also	  it	  would	  allow	  locals	  more	  practice	  in	  research	  writing.	  	  
	  
Donor-­‐driven	  research	  projects	  	  
	   It	   was	   very	   clear	   from	   the	   study	   that	   international	   organizations	   fund	   the	   majority	   of	  disease	   surveillance	   research	   studies.	   This	   provides	   a	   country	   with	   financial	   resources	   to	   allow	  viable	   surveillance,	   but	   also	   relies	   on	   donors	   to	   decide	   which	   health	   challenges	   to	   research	   or	  projects	   to	   implement,	   sometimes	  without	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   country’s	   needs.	   In	  Kenya,	   for	  instance,	  HIV/AIDS,	  malaria,	  and	  TB	  are	  heavily	  funded,	  but	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  children	  die	  every	  year	  from	  easily	  preventable	  and	  manageable	  illnesses	  such	  as	  pneumonia	  and	  diarrhea.	  	  International	   Health	   Expert	   3	   stated	   that	   this	   priority	   mismatch	   results	   in	   “a	   focus	   on	  diseases	   that	  matter	   least	   to	  developing	   countries,	  but	  matter	  most	   to	   the	  developed	  countries—more	  money	  is	  channeled	  into	  these	  diseases	  on	  a	  global	  front.”	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  6	  agrees	  and	  states	   that	   “It	   is	   sometimes	   hard	   to	   access	   some	   major	   public	   health	   goals	   because	   there	   is	   no	  interest.”	  There	  is	  a	  dire	  need	  to	  refocus	  on	  the	  diseases	  that	  matter	  most	  to	  developing	  countries.	  It	  will	  require	  the	  reorientation	  of	  the	  international	  community,	  with	  either	  a	  change	  in	  project	  focus	  or	  a	  relative	  decline	  of	  external	  funding.	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  international	  groups	  prioritize	  certain	  diseases	  and	  programs	  differently,	   there	  are	  efforts	   that	  can	  be	   taken	  by	  parties	   to	  create	  a	  more	  cooperative	  approach.	  International	  Health	  Expert	  3	  believes	  that	  there	  is	  progress	  in	  this	  area,	  and	  stated	   that	   donor	   organizations	   are	   increasingly	   open	   to	   changing	   strategies.	   Disease-­‐specific	  initiatives	   can	   be	   integrated	   through	   technology	   and	   consolidated	   into	   surveillance	   activities	   to	  ensure	   a	   more	   coherent	   global	   information	   system.	   This	   requires	   bridging	   the	   gaps	   between	  “primary	   care	   providers	   and	   the	   public	   health	   system,	   the	   human	   and	   animal	   communities,	   and	  public	  health	  experts	  and	  intelligence	  analysis.”	  	  
	  
Corruption	  	  
	   Like	   many	   developing	   countries,	   Kenya	   struggles	   with	   corruption.	   The	   corruption	   in	  Kenya’s	   health	   sector	   predictably	   involves	   funding,	   with	   the	   most	   recent	   scandal	   hitting	   the	  country’s	   largest	   public	   health	   insurance	   scheme,	   the	   Kenya	   National	   Hospital	   Insurance	   Fund	  (NHIF),	   in	  May	   2012.	   The	   scam	   advanced	  millions	   of	   Kenyan	   shillings	   (Ks85	   =	   U.S.$1)	   to	   clinics	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   lacked	   the	   capacity	   to	   offer	   health	   and	  medical	   services	   to	   Kenyans.33	  Undoubtedly,	   such	   corruption	   hinders	   government	   efforts	   to	   provide	   affordable	   and	   accessible	  health	  services	  to	  needy	  Kenyans.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Ndung’u,	  “Kibaki	  Demands	  Probe	  into	  NHIF	  Scandal,”	  1.	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But	   how	   does	   corruption	   affect	   EID	   surveillance?	   The	   opinion	   of	   three	   interviewees	  was	  that	  corruption	  has	   indirect	  effect	  on	  surveillance.	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  2	  believed	  that	  corruption	  could	  have	  been	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  Japan	  International	  Cooperation	  Agency	  discontinued	  funding	  and	  left	  the	  country.	  Government	  Official	  2	  argued	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  corruption	  on	  malaria	  surveillance	  has	  not	  yet	  had	  an	  impact	  since	  it	  is	  relatively	  new.	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  8,	  he	  said	  that	  “corruption	  is	  not	  directly	  affecting	  science	  but	  maybe	  indirectly,	  for	  example,	  it	   determines	   the	   budget	   allocated	   to	   the	   sector.	   However,	   things	   have	   improved	   in	   the	   last	   10	  years.”	   	  
Specific	  Economic	  Findings	  in	  Kenya	  
	  
Inadequate	  Funds	  	  
	   The	  majority	   of	   interviewees	   cited	   lack	   of	   adequate	   funding,	   especially	   when	   conducting	  EID	   surveillance	   of	   particular	   diseases	   that	   are	   unpopular	   worldwide,	   as	   the	   main	   economic	  challenge	   to	   EIDs	   surveillance	   in	   Kenya.	   “There	   is	   political	   will	   but	   inadequate	   funds,”	   explains	  Local	   Health	   Expert	   1.	   Local	   Health	   Expert	   9	   felt	   that	   Kenya,	   “has	   human	   [resources],	   but	   they	  would	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  do	  all	  what	  they	  do	  without	  support	  from	  the	  funders.”	  Local	  Health	  Expert	   6	   felt	   that	   donor	   support	   was	   necessary,	   but	   recommended	   that	   these	   international	  institutions	  create	  a	  long-­‐term	  plan	  when	  agreeing	  to	  collaborate	  with	  a	  laboratory.	  The	  equipment	  used	  in	  surveillance,	  much	  of	  which	  is	  provided	  by	  donors,	  requires	  burdensome	  maintenance	  costs	  and	   stresses	   the	   government	   and	   local	   organizations	   and	   institutions.	   Therefore,	   the	  Ministry	   of	  Health	   has	   adopted	   a	   placement	   system	   of	   procurement,	   whereby	   companies	   involved	   in	  purchasing	   equipment	   are	   charged	   with	   the	   responsibility	   of	   maintaining	   it,	   notes	   Government	  Official	  1.	  	  Funding	   shortages	   also	   indirectly	   hinders	   surveillance.	   In	   some	   cases,	   donors	   built	  laboratories	   and	  provided	   supplies,	   and	   then	   stopped	   supporting	   them,	   turning	   them	  over	   to	   the	  locals	  without	  an	  exit	  strategy.	  In	  many	  cases,	  these	  labs	  do	  not	  continue	  to	  be	  properly	  utilized	  and	  are	   described	   as	   “ghost	   labs.”	   Local	  Health	   Expert	   2	   explained	   the	   harsh	   economic	   environment;	  “the	  labs	  are	  there	  fully	  equipped	  but	  no	  one	  is	  using	  them	  because	  of	  lack	  of	  funds	  to	  purchase	  the	  supplies.”	  Instead,	  ghost	  labs	  are	  now	  used	  for	  training	  students.	  According	  to	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  7,	   the	   students	   pay	   for	   reagents.	   Another	   consequence	   of	   this	   funding	   challenge	   is	   revenue-­‐generation,	   whereby	   departments	   engage	   in	   activities	   that	   can	   generate	   revenue	   for	   continued	  research	  and	  surveillance.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  revenue	  generated	  in	  this	  manner	  is	  not	  equitable,	  so	  some	  departments	  gain	  while	  others	  lose.	  	  	  
Lower	  Salaries	  in	  the	  Public	  Sector	  
	   The	   issue	   of	   insufficient	   wages	   was	   mentioned	   frequently	   during	   the	   interviews.	   It	   is	  especially	   difficult	   to	   train	   individuals	   in	   rural	   regions,	   says	   International	   Health	   Expert	   3.	   As	   in	  
[23]	  	  
most	  developing	  countries,	  public	  sector	  health	  professionals	  paid	  much	   lower	  salaries	  than	  their	  private	   sector	  counterparts;	   the	  effect	   is	   “brain	  drain,”	  as	  workers	   in	   the	  public	   sector	   flee	   to	   the	  private	  sector	  in	  search	  of	  higher	  wages.	  Furthermore,	  while	  there	  are	  laboratory	  practice	  experts,	  many	  struggle	  with	  building	  reports	  to	  gather	  research	  funding,	  says	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  7.	  Fewer	  grants	  increase	  reliance	  on	  donor	  organizations	  and	  decrease	  the	  focus	  host	  country	  priorities.	  To	  improve	  the	  funding	  and	  wage	  situation,	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  6	  recommends	  “giving	  a	  small	  grant	  so	  that	  Kenyan	  scientists	  can	  return	  and	  reorient	  back	  into	  the	  system.”	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  9	  said	  that	  the	   government	   is	   aware	   of	   the	   issue	   and	   is	   developing	   a	   wage	   scale	   that	   would	   bring	  improvements,	  but	  it	  would	  probably	  not	  fix	  the	  entire	  problem.	  	  
Poor	  Infrastructure	  
	   The	  EID	  surveillance	  infrastructure	  in	  Kenya	  consists	  of	  laboratories,	  equipment,	  machines,	  and	   space	   for	   storing	   the	   equipment.	  Although	  Kenya	  has	   adequate	  numbers	  of	   biosafety	   level	   II	  and	   biosafety	   level	   III	   laboratories,	   the	   same	   cannot	   be	   said	   of	   other	   equipment	   and	   machines	  required	   for	   surveillance.	   For	   instance,	   Local	   Health	   Expert	   3	   revealed	   that	   the	   polio	   laboratory,	  which	  caters	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  entire	  Horn	  of	  Africa	  region,	  has	  only	  one	  incubator;	  however,	  the	  laboratory	   handles	  more	   than	   100	   samples	   on	   any	   given	   day.	   Local	  Health	   Expert	   4	  was	   uneasy	  when	   he	   reported	   that	   the	   Uninterruptible	   Power	   Supply	   (UPS)	   in	   his	   biosafety	   level	   IV	   (BSL-­‐4)	  laboratory	  had	  been	  down	  since	  last	  year.	  The	  BSL-­‐4	  laboratory	  relies	  heavily	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  regular	  power;	  if	  the	  generator	  turns	  off,	  scientists	  only	  have	  nine	  seconds	  to	  exit	  the	  secured	  safety	  lab,	  explains	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  4.	  Broken-­‐down	  equipment,	  like	  an	  UPS,	  poses	  serious	  risks.	  These	  risks	   include	   inadvertently	   contracting	   a	   disease;	   a	   worker	   could	   catch	   a	   virus	   due	   to	   lack	   of	  negative	  pressure	  in	  the	  lab.	  It	  was	  obvious	   that	   space	  was	  another	  major	  challenge	   in	  some	  of	   the	   institutions.	   In	  one	  case,	  freezers	  lines	  the	  corridors	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  storage	  space.	  In	  addition,	  the	  rooms	  and	  hallways	  were	  cluttered	  with	  students	  who	  were	  practicing	  or	  observing	  new	  laboratory	  techniques.	  A	  large	  group	  of	   individuals	   in	   such	   a	   small	   spot	   also	   increases	   the	   likelihood	  of	   accidents,	   and	  makes	   it	  impossible	   for	   all	   the	   scientists	   to	   be	   in	   the	   laboratory	   at	   once.	   Conditions	   imposed	   upon	   the	  institution	   by	   donors	   exacerbate	   the	   problem.	   Local	   Health	   Expert	   4	   stated	   that	   one	   donor	  requested	  their	  donated	  machines	  be	  kept	  in	  different	  rooms	  from	  a	  competing	  brand’s	  equipment,	  even	   if	   the	   equipment	   served	   the	   same	   purpose.	   Donor	   restraints	   and	   poor	   infrastructure	   keep	  laboratories	   from	   maintaining	   full	   capacity	   and	   could	   threaten	   safety	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   natural	  disaster,	  armed	  conflict,	  or	  a	  long-­‐term	  power	  outage.	  	  
Rural-­‐Urban	  Disparities	  	  
	   There	   are	   sharp	   differences	   in	   surveillance	   infrastructure;	   rural	   areas	   have	   a	   shortage	   of	  equipped	  facilities	  and	  skilled	  manpower.	  Trained	  health	  workers	  prefer	  working	  in	  resource-­‐rich	  communities	   that	  provide	  opportunities	   for	   themselves	   and	   their	   family	  members.	   “In	   the	  North,	  
[24]	  	  
you	  train	  them	  and	  they	  learn,	  but	  70%	  of	  them	  leave	  because	  of	  poor	  infrastructure	  and	  lifestyle,”	  says	  International	  Health	  Expert	  3.	   In	  addition,	  motivation	   levels	  spiral	  downwards	  when	  experts	  are	   disconnected	   from	   government	   officials	   and	   donors.	   Local	   Health	   Expert	   8	   adds	   that,	   “when	  infrastructure	   is	   lacking	   but	   the	   [human	   resources]	   are	   there,	   it	   creates	   fear;	   the	   people	   cannot	  deliver.”	   Inaccessible	   roads	   also	   conspire	   to	   make	   EID	   surveillance	   in	   such	   regions	   a	   major	  challenge,	   especially	   when	   security	   is	   an	   issue.	   Satellite	   labs	   predominantly	   exist	   in	   rural	   areas;	  however,	   these	   are	   largely	   owned	   by	   NGOs,	   which	   work	   in	   partnership	   with	   the	   government,	  explains	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  2.	  	  
Specific	  Cultural	  Findings	  in	  Kenya	  
	   After	   reviewing	   the	   findings,	   the	  majority	  of	   the	   interviewees	   felt	   that	   cultural	  barriers	   to	  EID	   surveillance	   were	   insignificant	   when	   compared	   to	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   sphere.	   The	  cultural	  concerns	  depended	  on	  the	  beliefs	  and	  practices	  of	  different	  populations.	  According	  to	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  8,	  Kenya	  is	  a	  multi-­‐ethnic	  society	  with	  42	  different	  ethnic	  groups.	  These	  groups	  differ	  in	  their	  beliefs	  and	  practices,	  some	  of	  which	  affect	  their	  health	  services	  in	  rural	  areas.	  Conducting	  effective	  surveillance	  in	  the	  rural	  areas	  is	  dependent	  largely	  on	  the	  “how”	  aspect,	  says	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  6;	  Success	  requires	  surveillance	  teams	  to	  work	  closely	  with	  the	   local	  administration.	  Close	  relationships	   provide	   local	   staff	   an	   advantage	   in	   breaking	   cultural	   barriers,	   which	   may	   keep	   a	  community	   resistant	   to	   EID	   surveillance.	   They	   can	   help	   inform	   the	   community,	   explain	   why	  surveillance	  is	  necessary,	  and	  ensure	  that	  the	  community	  is	  cooperative.	  	  
	  
Stigmatization	  
	   Kenya	   remains	  a	   relatively	   conservative	   society,	   and	  practices	   such	  as	  homosexuality	  and	  prostitution	   are	   shameful,	   even	   though	   there	   has	   been	   an	   increase	   in	   their	   prevalence.	   For	   this	  reason,	   facilities	   that	   cater	   to	   the	   special	   health	   needs	   of	   HIV/AIDS	   and	   TB	   patients,	   which	   are	  oftentimes	  associated	  with	   the	   risky	  practices	  above,	   are	  often	   inadequate.	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  4	  argues,	  “because	  of	  hostility	  and	  lack	  of	  acceptance,	  these	  people	  may	  not	  come	  out	  openly	  and	  seek	  medical	   services.”	   Moreover,	   stigmatization	   and	   lack	   of	   public	   health	   awareness	   may	   lead	   to	  underreporting,	  states	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  8.	  Improving	  public	  health	  awareness	  is	  crucial,	  because	  fear	  could	  influence	  an	  individual	  decisions	  to	  report,	  adversely	  affecting	  surveillance.	  	  Furthermore,	   a	   lack	   of	  medical	   understanding	   keeps	   locals	   from	   following	  protocols.	   “We	  are	  trying	  to	  get	  a	  medication	  with	  a	  shorter	  regimen	  because	  once	  people	  start	  feeling	  better,	  they	  will	  stop	  taking	  the	  medication,”	  says	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  8.	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  4	  agreed	  that	  there	  should	   be	   a	   shorter	   process,	   and	   that	  medication	   usage	   is	   a	   problem	  with	   almost	   all	   illnesses	   in	  Kenya.	  There	  is	  a	  “share	  what	  you	  have”	  approach;	  people	  may	  give	  part	  of	  their	  medication	  away	  when	  they	  feel	  better,	  or	  ask	  for	  more	  and	  then	  sell	  the	  drugs	  for	  food.	  By	  not	  taking	  the	  full	  dose	  of	  medication,	  individuals	  are	  risking	  their	  life	  and	  exposing	  other	  family	  and	  community	  members	  to	  drug-­‐resistant	  pathogens.	  
[25]	  	  
Religious	  Beliefs	  and	  Reliance	  on	  Traditional	  Medicine	  	  	   While	  Kenya	  might	  not	  have	  extensive	  financial	  capabilities,	  it	  is	  rich	  in	  the	  traditional	  herbs	  used	   by	   indigenous	   communities	   for	   medicinal	   purposes.	   Many	   communities	   have	   not	   yet	  embraced	  conventional	  medicine	  and	  instead	  rely	  on	  traditional	  medicine,	  says	  Local	  Health	  Expert	  5.	   Some	   religious	   beliefs	   even	   prohibit	   their	   followers	   from	   going	   to	   hospitals,	   even	   for	   serious	  healthcare	   services	   such	   as	   the	   immunization	   of	   children,	   states	   Local	   Health	   Expert	   3.	   Some	  religious	   groups	   prohibit	   drawing	   of	   blood,	   making	   surveillance	   difficult	   in	   such	   communities.	  Small—but	   important—cultural	   considerations,	   such	  as	   the	   removal	  of	   the	   coiled	   snake	   from	   the	  logo	  of	  KEMRI	  vehicles	  in	  the	  field,	  have	  helped	  allay	  concerns	  of	  devil	  worshipping:	  the	  sight	  of	  a	  Caduceus	  (two	  coiled	  snakes),	  common	  in	  medicine,	  foretells	  of	  death	  in	  the	  family.34	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   The	  study	  of	  Kenya’s	  EID	  surveillance	  system	  and	  the	  factors	  affecting	  the	  country’s	  health	  care	   provides	   important	   findings	   to	   help	   improve	   the	   health	   care	   system	   in	   other	   developing	  countries.	  The	  existence	  of	  USAMRU-­‐K	  in	  Kenya	  has	  strengthened	  local	  governmental	  institutions,	  but	  there	  is	  room	  for	  improvement	  in	  the	  laboratory	  capabilities	  and	  providing	  adequate	  salaries.	  Furthermore,	  the	  significant	  lack	  of	  domestic	  funding	  requires	  dependence	  on	  international	  donors	  and	  NGOs,	  and	  their	  associated	  agendas	  and	  restrictions.	  Furthermore,	  political	  and	  cultural	  factors	  create	   barriers	   to	   surveillance	   due	   to	   widespread	   corruption,	   regional	   instability,	   violence,	   and	  stigmas	  against	  the	  health	  officials	  or	  infected	  individuals.	  	  To	  further	  enhance	  surveillance	  success	  rates,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  involve	  the	  populace,	  either	  as	   part	   of	   the	   surveillance	   team	   or	   as	   security	   officers.	   “We	   need	   more	   evidence-­‐based	   policy.	  Kenyan	  researcher’s	  needs	  to	  be	   involved	  with	   lessons	   learned,”	  says	  Government	  Official	  2.	  Also,	  international	  donors	  need	  to	  focus	  their	  resources	  on	  the	  most	  pressing	  needs	  of	  the	  host	  country	  instead	   of	   advancing	   their	   own	   research	   priorities	   or	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   general	   international	  community.	  Instead	  of	  trying	  to	  reinvent	  programs	  and	  build	  expensive	  laboratories,	  efforts	  should	  go	   towards	   improving	   Kenya’s	   public	   health	   structure,	   so	   that	   they	   have	   the	   capabilities	   and	  resources	  to	  detect	  high	  burden	  diseases	  as	  well	  as	  EIDs	  at	  the	  district	  and	  provincial	  level.	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  Marsh	  et	  al.,	  “Beginning	  community	  engagement	  at	  a	  busy	  biomedical	  research	  programme:	  Experiences	  from	  the	  KEMRI	  CGMRC-­‐Wellcome	  Trust	  Research	  Programme,	  Kilifi,	  Kenya,”	  728.	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  Table	  1.2.	  Kenya:	  Date,	  Time	  of	  Interview,	  Generic	  Title	  and	  Code35	  
Date	  and	  Time	  of	  Interview	   Generic	  Title	  and	  Code	  5/15/12	  1100	   Government	  official	  1	  5/15/12	  1400	   Government	  official	  2	  5/15/12	  1600	   Local	  health	  expert	  1	  5/16/12	  1000	   Local	  health	  expert	  2	  5/16/12	  1030	   Local	  health	  expert	  3	  5/16/12	  1100	   Local	  health	  expert	  4	  5/16/12	  1200	   Local	  health	  expert	  5	  5/16/12	  1400	   Local	  health	  expert	  6	  5/17/12	  1000	   Local	  health	  expert	  7	  5/17/12	  1100	   Local	  health	  expert	  8	  5/17/12	  1200	   Local	  health	  expert	  9	  5/7/12	  1300	   Local	  Health	  Expert	  10	  5/15/12	  1500	   Local	  Health	  Expert	  11	  5/16/12	  0800	   Local	  Health	  Expert	  12	  5/16/12	  0830	   Local	  Health	  Expert	  13	  5/16/12	  1500	   International	  Health	  Expert	  1	  5/17/12	  0800	   International	  Health	  Expert	  2	  5/19/12	  0800	   International	  Health	  Expert	  3	  5/19/12	  1400	   International	  Health	  Expert	  4	  5/9/12	  1000	  (in	  Monterey)	   International	  Health	  Expert	  5	  5/18/12	  1100	   International	  Health	  Expert	  6	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  To	  protect	  personally	  identifiable	  information.	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CASE	  STUDY	  2:	  PERU†	  
	  
Introduction	  
	   Medical	  doctors	  and	  scientists	  have	   studied	   tropical	   and	  other	   infectious	  diseases	   in	  Peru	  since	  at	   least	  the	  19th	  Century.	  Scientists	   in	   locations	  such	  as	  Lima,	  Cusco,	  and	  Iquitos	  have	  broad	  experience	  examining	   infections	  of	   interest,	  given	  the	  wide	  variations	   in	   the	  country’s	  geography,	  climates,	   flora	  and	  fauna	  that	  create	  the	  conditions	  for	  their	  appearance.	  Notably,	  Health	  Expert	  1	  asserts	   that	   there	   are	   pre-­‐Hispanic	   records	   of	   tropical	   infections	   in	   Peru.	   Although	   scientists	   are	  concerned	   about	   all	   emerging	   and	   re-­‐emerging	   diseases,	   they	   predominantly	   concentrate	   on	  mycotic	   diseases,	   malaria,	   and	   dengue.	   Despite	   the	   strong	   presence	   of	   researchers	   and	  epidemiologists,	  these	  bio-­‐diverse	  ecological	  sites	  continue	  to	  inflict	  harm	  in	  both	  urban	  and	  rural	  regions.	   This	   report	   reviews	   surveillance	   efforts	   done	   by	   the	   Peruvian	   government	   and	  provides	  recommendations	   on	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   global	   community	   can	   assist	   Peru.	   Additionally,	   it	   will	  study	   EID	   surveillance	   from	   political	   and	   economic	   perspectives,	   and	   examine	   neighboring	  countries	   in	  Latin	  America,	  which	  receive	  assistance	   from	  the	  U.S.	  Naval	  Medical	  Research	  Unit-­‐6	  (NAMRU-­‐6).	  
	  
Background	  and	  Context	  	  
	   The	  EID	  study	  in	  Peru	  began	  with	  the	  case	  of	  Daniel	  Alcides	  Carrión’s	  martyrdom	  in	  1885.	  Carrión,	   a	   young	  medical	   doctor	   born	   in	   1857,	   injected	   himself	  with	  Bartonella	   bacteria	   to	   track	  symptoms	  of	  a	  disease	  that	  was	  prevalent	   in	  the	  Peru’s	  central	  Andes,	  and	  that	  he	  assumed	  to	  be	  non-­‐lethal.	   The	   condition,	   known	   as	   the	   “wart’s	   disease”	   coexisted	   with	   another	   lethal	   disease	  known	  as	  Oroya	  Fever.	  Carrión	  took	  a	  sample	  from	  a	  patient’s	  wart	  and	  injected	  himself	  with	  it	  to	  learn	   about	   the	   disease	   process.36	   Although	   Carrión	   thought	   that	   it	   would	   be	   non-­‐lethal,	   he	  contracted	  Oroya	  Fever.	  The	  disease	  killed	  him,	  but	  in	  the	  process	  he	  discovered	  that	  wart’s	  disease	  and	   Oroya	   Fever	   were	   the	   same	   thing.	   Carrión’s	   pioneering	   spirit	   motivates	   Peruvian	   medical	  doctors	  to	  do	  research	  in	  that	  field	  today.	  	  The	   Peruvian	   government	   supports	   three	   health	   care	   systems:	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Health	  (MINSA),	   the	  public	  health	  care	   insurance	  (Essalud),	  and	   the	  armed	   forces’	  hospitals	  and	  medical	  facilities.	  NAMRU-­‐6	  and	   the	  United	  States	  Agency	   for	   International	  Development	   (USAID)	   are	   the	  key	  international	  players	  that	  assist	  Peru	  in	  EID	  surveillance.	  According	  to	  Oliver	  and	  Chang-­‐Neyra,	  “experience	   in	   Latin	   America	   [shows]	   that,	   in	   terms	   of	   both	   technical	   effectiveness	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  †	  Inputs	  to	  this	  case	  study	  were	  provided	  by	  Álvaro	  Zapatel	  Malpartida	  with	  backstop	  by	  Angela	  Archambault	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  Sophal	  Ear.	  36	  Maguiña	  et	  al.	  “Bartonellosis	  (Carrión’s	  Disease)	  in	  the	  Modern	  Era,”	  772.	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sustainability,	   strengthening	  regional	  activities	  at	   the	  mission	   level	  may	  be	   the	  best	  use	  of	  USAID	  resources.”37	  NAMRU-­‐6	  has	  a	  slightly	  different	  mission;	  it	  is	  “to	  research,	  understand,	  and	  develop	  protective	   strategies	   against	   infectious	   diseases	   affecting	   uniformed	   service	   members	   and	   the	  general	   population	   in	   Peru	   and	   throughout	   Central	   and	   South	   America,	   while	   enhancing	   public	  health	   capacity	   through	   respectful	   cooperation	   with	   our	   collaborators.”38	   While	   NAMRU-­‐6	   has	  many	  partnerships	  overseas,	  they	  collaborate	  most	  often	  with	  U.S.	  and	  Peruvian	  universities,	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  (NGOs),	  USAID,	  the	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention	  (CDC),	  and	  the	  Pan	  American	  Health	  Organization	  (PAHO).	  	  
Literature	  Review	  
	   Peru’s	  most	  notorious	  case	  of	  a	  re-­‐emerging	  disease	  outbreak	  was	  the	  cholera	  epidemic	  of	  1991.	  Before	  that	  outbreak,	  cholera	  was	  last	  reported	  in	  Peru	  in	  1867	  and	  the	  Americas	  in	  1895.39	  At	  that	  time,	  there	  were	  321,334	  reported	  diarrhea	  cases	  in	  Peru	  in	  1991	  and	  2,906	  deaths	  due	  to	  cholera.40	  In	  the	  most	  recent	  outbreak,	  the	  media	  played	  an	  important	  role	  by	  educating	  citizens	  to	  consume	   vegetables	   properly,	   to	   avoid	   consuming	   raw	   fish,	   and	   seek	   medical	   treatment	   when	  needed.	   Nonetheless,	   there	  were	   several	  miscommunications	   between	   government	   agencies	   that	  prevented	  a	  better	  response	  to	  the	  epidemic.	  The	  outbreak	  of	  EIDs,	  such	  as	  cholera,	  played	  a	  large	  role	   in	   receiving	   the	   attention	   of	   policy	  makers,	   particularly	   in	   the	  U.S..	   In	   fact,	   after	   the	   cholera	  outbreak	   in	   1991,	   specialists	   criticized	   U.S.	   complacency	   regarding	   monitoring	   strategies	   and	  control	   of	   EIDs.	   Consequently,	   “the	   need	   to	   strengthen	   the	   surveillance	   and	   research	  infrastructures”	  was	  emphasized.	  	  Despite	   the	   good	   interactions	   between	   agencies	   such	   as	   NAMRU-­‐6	   and	   the	   Peruvian	  government,	   chronic	  diseases	  are	  becoming	  more	  common.	  According	   to	  Stuckler,	  80%	  of	  deaths	  that	   are	   the	   result	   of	   chronic	   diseases	   such	   as	   heart	   disease,	   cancer,	   respiratory	   diseases	   and	  diabetes	   will	   occur	   in	   low	   and	   middle	   income	   countries,	   where	   “these	   chronic	   diseases	   claim	  around	   80%	   more	   lives	   than	   they	   do	   the	   total	   of	   all	   infectious	   causes.”41	   Certainly,	   NAMRU-­‐6	  interactions	  with	  Peruvian	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  National	  Health	  Institute	  (Instituto	  Nacional	  de	  Salud	  in	  Spanish,	  abbreviated	  as	  INS)	  are	  not	  focused	  on	  the	  control	  of	  chronic	  diseases.	  However,	  a	  deeper	  interaction	  between	  them	  could	  enhance	  public	  health	  measures	  to	  reduce	  the	  incidence	  of	  chronic	  diseases	  and	  reduce	  the	  incidence	  of	  EIDs.	  According	   to	  Combating	  Tropical	   Infections,	   the	   level	   of	   international	   cooperation	   and	   the	  employment	  of	  new	  tools	  for	  diagnosis	  have	  reduced	  the	  prevalence	  of	  re-­‐emerging	  diseases	  such	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as	  leprosy	  (among	  others).42	  Yet,	  in	  South	  America,	  there	  are	  still	  some	  EIDs	  that	  are	  not	  effectively	  monitored.	   For	   example,	   Paul	   Reiter	   argues	   that	   breeding	   sites	   for	  Aedes	   aegypti	   (dengue	   fever)	  have	   not	   been	   adequately	   identified.43	   Clearly,	   the	   lack	   of	   monitoring	   capacities,	   combined	   with	  infrastructure	   problems	   and	   high	   population	   density,	   constitute	   the	   ideal	   conditions	   for	   an	   EID	  outbreak.	  Additionally,	   research	   done	   on	   cholera	   in	   Peru	   suggested	   that	   environmental	   phenomena	  such	   as	   El	   Niño	   may	   be	   correlated	   to	   cholera	   outbreaks.44	   Research	   done	   in	   Bangladesh	   on	   the	  subject	  was	  consistent	  with	  the	  findings	  in	  Peru.45	  Similar	  research	  done	  in	  two	  different	  locations	  in	   India	   also	   demonstrated	   that	   environmental	   conditions	   directly	   influence	   the	   dynamics	   of	  cholera	  epidemics.46	  Therefore,	  EIDs	  may	  be	  more	  prevalent	   in	   locations	   such	  as	  Peru	  where	   the	  environment	  creates	  the	  conditions	  for	  them	  to	  appear	  and	  thrive.	  Accordingly,	  Heymann	  argues	  that	  rural-­‐urban	  migration	  resulted	  in	  inadequate	  sanitation,	  crowded	  living	  conditions,	  and	  other	  problems	  associated	  with	  population	  growth.47	  In	  that	  context,	  EIDs	   found	   the	   ideal	   environment	   to	   flourish	  and	   infect	   a	   large	  population.	  Consequently,	   the	   re-­‐emergence	  of	  diseases	  such	  as	  yellow	  fever	  became	  notorious	  in	  South	  America	  and	  Africa,	  mainly	  due	   to	   bad	   sanitary	   conditions	   combined	   with	   environmental	   factors.	   Also,	   educational	   issues	  played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   consumers’	   behavior,	   given	   that	   people	   infected	   by	   an	   EID	   did	   not	  receive	  medical	   treatment	   from	  a	  doctor;	   hence,	   in	  most	   cases	   antibiotics	  were	  used	  without	   the	  proper	  prescription.48	  	  	  
Methodology	  	  
	   The	   following	   results	   are	   the	   product	   of	   several	   interviews	   conducted	   in	   26	   April-­‐3	  May	  2012.	   The	   interviews,	   conducted	   with	   several	   RAs,	   were	   with	   Peruvian	   government	   officials	  working	  in	  the	  public	  health	  sector,	  private	  sector	  researchers,	  NGOs,	  researchers	  affiliated	  to	  U.S.	  donor	   agencies,	   and	  U.S.	   government	   personnel	   in	   Peru.	   The	   interviews’	   objective	  was	   to	   clearly	  define	   the	   context	   in	   which	   EID	   surveillance	   has	   taken	   place	   in	   Peru	   in	   recent	   years	   and	   how	  relationships	   have	   developed	   between	   government	   agencies,	   private	   institutions,	   and	   foreign	  cooperation	  in	  charge	  of	  this	  mission.	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On	   several	   occasions,	   interviewees	   were	   consulted	   on	   the	   current	   status	   of	   Peruvian	  research	   facilities	   and	   on	   their	   relationships	   with	   foreign	   institutions	   such	   as	   NAMRU-­‐6.	  Furthermore,	   interviewees	   were	   also	   asked	   about	   the	   cultural	   constraints	   that	   complicated	  communications	  between	  institutions	  (either	  between	  public	  and	  private	  Peruvian	  institutions,	  or	  national	  and	  foreign	  institutions)	  in	  different	  regions	  of	  Peru.	  Similarly,	  to	  understand	  the	  extent	  to	  which	   institutions	   affect	   interactions,	   the	   weight	   of	   politics,	   decentralization,	   and	   transitions	   in	  government	   administrations	   were	   addressed.	   Likewise,	   interviewees	   were	   consulted	   about	  potential	   similarities	   and	   differences	   between	   the	   institutional	   interactions	   in	   Peru	   and	   those	   in	  Indonesia	  that	  led	  to	  problems	  between	  national	  and	  foreign	  researchers	  due	  to	  sovereignty	  issues.	  	  
	  
Results	  
	   The	  main	  objective	  of	  the	  study	  was	  to	  identify	  economic,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  barriers	  that	  hinder	  Peru’s	  public	  health	  sector	  capacity	  to	  successfully	  engage	   in	  EID	  surveillance.	  The	  author,	  with	  several	  RAs,	  conducted	  10	  individual	  interviews	  and	  three	  group	  interviews.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	   this	  project,	   approximately	  22	   specialists	  were	   interviewed	   from	   the	  public	   sector,	   the	  private	  sector,	  NGOs,	  and	  donor	  agencies	  in	  Lima	  and	  Iquitos.	  For	  Peru,	  key	  economic,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  factors	   influencing	  EID	   surveillance	  emerged	   from	   interviews.	  Table	  2.1	   lists	   the	  most	   commonly	  identified	   barriers	   in	   order	   of	   importance	   by	   frequency	   across	   interview.	   In	   each	   issue,	   several	  situations	  were	  explained,	  and	  the	  most	  relevant	  ones	  are	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper	  as	  follows.	  
	  
Table	  2.1.	  Peru:	  Key	  Issues	  Identified	  in	  Lima	  and	  Iquitos	  Interviews	  
Political	  Barriers	  	  
Percent	  of	  Interviews	  That	  
Identified	  Barriers	  Overlap	  in	  functions	  and	  inefficiency	  in	  processes	  	   6	  of	  20	  =	  30%	  Need	  for	  systematization	  at	  government	  institutions.	   5	  of	  20	  =	  25%	  Centralized	  health	  care,	  moving	  to	  more	  decentralized	  approach	   2	  of	  20	  =	  10%	  Interference	  of	  friend	  loyalties	  and	  corruption	  within	  government	  institutions.	  	   3	  of	  20	  =	  10%	  Lack	  of	  goal	  settings	  and	  planning	  in	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  (MINSA)	   5	  of	  20	  =	  5%	  
Economic	  Barriers	  
Percent	  of	  Interviews	  That	  
Identified	  Barriers	  Lack	  of	  funding	  at	  government	  institutions	   8	  of	  20	  =	  40%	  Difficulties	  in	  implementing	  software	  and	  technology	  in	  rural	  areas.	  	   5	  of	  20	  =	  25%	  Laboratories	  not	  fully	  equipped	  (definitely	  a	  pivotal	  problem	  in	  Iquitos)	  	   5	  of	  20	  =	  25%	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Lack	  of	  personnel	  due	  to	  insufficient	  funds.	  	   4	  of	  20	  =	  20%	  
Cultural	  Barriers	  
Percent	  of	  Interviews	  That	  
Identified	  Barriers	  Gap	  between	  western	  medicine	  and	  cultural	  practices	  in	  the	  Andes	  	   5	  of	  20	  =	  25%	  Lack	  of	  preventive	  healthcare	  	   5	  of	  20	  =	  25%	  Lack	  of	  personnel	  trained	  to	  assist	  indigenous	  peoples.	  	   4	  of	  20	  =	  20%	  Lack	  of	  education	  for	  people	  living	  in	  rural	  areas	  	   4	  of	  20	  =	  20%	  Traditional	  medicine	  often	  used	  first	  	   4	  of	  20	  =	  20%	  
Note:	  Some	  interviews	  included	  more	  than	  one	  expert.	  
Source:	  Analysis	  of	  interviews	  conducted.	  
	  
Specific	  Political	  Barriers	  in	  Peru	  
	  
Overlapping	  Functions	  
	   Health	   Expert	   2	   stressed	   the	   problems	   that	   arise	   when	   MINSA,	   Essalud,	   and	   NAMRU-­‐6	  overlap.	   Accordingly,	   the	   INS,	   the	   leading	  medical	   research	   facility	   for	   the	   study	   and	   research	   of	  EIDs	   in	   Peru,	   has	   several	   communication	   and	   interaction	   problems	   with	   other	   government	  institutions,	   such	  as	  MINSA	  and	  Essalud.	  Nonetheless,	   the	   source	   identified	  a	   sounder	   interaction	  between	   the	   INS	   and	   NAMRU-­‐6,	   since	   the	   former	   tends	   to	   facilitate	   samples	   and	   requests	   for	  assistance	   if	   it	   lacks	   the	   needed	   capacity	   to	   achieve	   a	   given	   result.	   For	   instance,	  Health	   Expert	   2	  asserted	   that,	   “in	  many	   cases,	   patients	   tend	   to	   go	   to	  private	   clinics	  with	  well-­‐known	  private	   labs	  that	   detect	   the	   EIDs,	   and	   afterwards	   report	   to	   the	   INS	   since	   the	   institution	   may	   lack	   of	   proper	  equipment	   and	   infrastructure	   available	   in	   the	  private	   sector.”	  Nevertheless,	  Donor	   Staff	   1	   argues	  that	   “private	   practices	   do	   not	   always	   report	   on	   suspicious	   symptoms”	   since	   it	   is	   optional	   in	   the	  private	   sector;	   however,	   government	   institutions	   are	   required	   to	   report	   on	   a	   regular	   basis.	  Consequently,	   several	   specialists	   interviewed	   agree	   that	   lack	   of	   coordination	   among	   health	  institutions	   in	   Peru	   is	   a	   problem,	   but	   they	   do	   recognize	   the	   good	   communications	   between	  Peruvian	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	   INS	   and	   foreign	   research	   facilities	   such	   as	   NAMRU-­‐6	   for	   EID	  surveillance.	  	  
Lack	  of	  Coordination	  
	   “There	   is	   insufficient	   coordination	   between	   government	   institutions	   and	   citizens,”	   asserts	  Staff	   Donor	   1.	   This	   perspective	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	   views	   of	   the	   other	   specialists	   interviewed.	  Across	   the	   public	   sector,	   health	   institutions	   encounter	   problems	   in	   systematizing	   processes	   and	  efficient	  EID	  control.	  Consequently,	  both	  private	  healthcare	   institutions	  and	  foreign	  agencies	  such	  as	   NAMRU-­‐6	   have	   supplied	   services	   and	   the	   logistics	   needed	   to	   overcome	   the	   structural	  inefficiencies	  in	  the	  Peruvian	  health	  care	  sector.	  Those	  inefficiencies	  are	  evident	  when	  government	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institutions	   interact	  with	  citizens	   in	  rural	  areas	  who	   lack	  of	   the	  means	   to	  report	  EIDs	  and	  have	  a	  difficult	  relationship	  with	   institutions	  such	  as	  MINSA.	  Health	  Experts	  1,	  2,	  and	  3	  all	  agreed	  on	  the	  government’s	  detachment	   from	  rural	  communities,	  which	   further	  complicates	   the	  communication	  problem.	   “Clearly,	   the	  MINSA	   has	   failed	   in	   relating	   to	   patients	   living	   in	   rural	   areas,”	   says	   Health	  Expert	   2.	   Accordingly,	   Health	   Expert	   1	   emphasizes	   MINSA’s	   recent	   attempts	   to	   accept	   cultural	  practices,	  such	  as	  vertical	  birth,	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  government	  institutions	  closer	  to	  people	  living	  in	  rural	  areas	  who	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  exposure	  to	  EIDs.	  In	   that	   sense,	   Peru	   Government	   Official	   1	   asserts	   that	   “there	   is	   a	   strong	   need	   for	   the	  standardization	   of	   practices	   among	   government	   institutions	   that	   may	   facilitate	   technological	  transfers.”	  Therefore,	  government	  officials,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  cited,	  agree	  on	  the	  need	  to	  systematize	  processes	  that	  may	  come	  with	  a	  greater	  interaction	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  alliances	  with	  other	  actors	  such	   as	   universities	   and	   the	   private	   sector.	   In	   fact,	   universities	   have	   been	   critical	   in	   assisting	  government	   institutions,	   and	   have	   cooperated	   extensively	   with	   NAMRU-­‐6	   to	   try	   to	   improve	  research	  practices.	   In	   the	  words	  of	  U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  1:	   “[NAMRU-­‐6	  has]	  worked	  well	  with	  local	   partners	   such	   as	   universities	   given	   that	   [they]	   have	   common	  perspectives	   and	   complement	  each	   other’s	   efforts.”	   Even	   though	   private	   institutions	   and	   research	   facilities	   are	   aware	   of	   the	  deficiencies,	   progress	   is	   still	   insufficient	   given	   the	   government’s	   setbacks	   with	   respect	   to	  organization	  and	  planning	  of	  a	  unified	  health	  care	  system	  for	  the	  whole	  country.	  Even	   though	   government	   research	   and	   surveillance	   practices	   overlap,	   both	   private	   and	  foreign	   institutions,	   such	   as	   NAMRU-­‐6,	   have	   succeeded	   in	   earning	   credibility	   and	   have	   become	  reliable	  with	   respect	   to	   research	   and	   capacity	   building.	   In	   that	   sense,	   U.S.	   Government	   Expert	   2	  asserted	   that	   the	   research	   facility	   has	   created	   a	   system	   that	   monitors	   and	   alerts	   possible	   EID	  outbreaks	  in	  Peru	  through	  the	  use	  of	  telephones	  and	  the	  internet.	  The	  system,	  named	  Vigila,	  is	  only	  available	   for	   the	  military.	  Yet,	   the	  official	   said	   that	  MINSA	  also	  has	  access	   to	   it—although	  he	  also	  said	  that	  “MINSA	  would	  not	  use	  the	  system	  since	  the	  Peruvian	  government	  would	  not	  like	  to	  make	  its	  own	  data	  public	  for	  security	  reasons.”	  	  When	   asked	   if	   the	  Peruvian	   government’s	   failure	   to	   use	   the	  Vigila	   system	  was	   a	   result	   of	  possible	   issues	  related	  to	  sovereignty,	  Health	  Expert	  2	  asserted	  that	  the	  INS,	  the	  reference	  lab	  for	  Peru,	  has	  to	  receive	  the	  reports	  before	  any	  other	  institution.	  Nonetheless,	  U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  2	  disregarded	   viral	   sovereignty	   as	   a	   concern	   for	   the	   public	   health	   sector,	   given	   the	   relevant	  partnerships	   between	   government	   institutions	   and	   international	   agencies	   funding	   them.	  Consequently,	  the	  aforementioned	  examples	  portray	  the	  positive	  relationship	  between	  government	  institutions	   and	   foreign	   institutions	   for	   EID	   surveillance,	   although	   problems	   do	   exist	   at	   the	  domestic	   level	  with	   coordination	   and	   reporting	   from	   the	  population	   to	   the	  Peruvian	   government	  officials.	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Following	  Surveillance	  Protocol	  Takes	  Time	  and	  Is	  Difficult	  	  
	   U.S.	   Government	   Expert	   4	   recognized	   that	   reporting	   and	   confirming	   the	   existence	   or	  prevalence	  of	  EIDs	  in	  regions	  outside	  of	  the	  capital	  of	  Lima	  tends	  to	  be	  a	  very	  slow	  process.	  “First,	  you	   have	   to	   find	   out	   that	   the	   observations	   fit	   the	   characteristics	   for	   a	   specific	   disease.	   Then	   the	  institution	  has	  to	  report	  to	  the	  agency	  and	  wait	  for	  it	  to	  answer	  with	  its	  conclusions.	  Finally,	  when	  the	  agency	  has	  confirmed	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  EID,	  then	  we	  [specialists]	  can	  do	  the	  diagnosis.”	  	  Problems	  with	  surveillance	  protocols	  are	  prevalent	  in	  other	  rural	  areas,	  particularly	  Iquitos.	  Peru	  Government	  Official	  3	   said	   “to	  adhere	   to	  NAMRU-­‐6	  standards,	   every	  10,000	  patients	   should	  have	   a	  proportion	  of	   eight	  doctors	   in	   Iquitos.”	  To	   comply	  with	   these	   standards	   there	  would	  be	   a	  need	  for	  80	  doctors,	  a	  current	  shortage	  of	  20	  doctors.	  This	  deficiency	  results	   in	  “doctors	  [having]	  less	   time	   for	   research	   and	   to	   do	   fieldwork	   since	   they	   don’t	   have	   the	   knowledge	   to	   confront	   the	  disease.”	   An	   official	   from	   a	   public	   health	   care	   institution	   in	   Iquitos	   asserts	   that	   regions	   such	   as	  Iquitos	  lack	  the	  proper	  equipment	  for	  diagnostics	  such	  as	  those	  related	  to	  EIDs	  surveillance.	  
	  
Conflicting	  Communications	  
	   Peru	   Government	   Official	   2	   also	   emphasized	   the	   difficulties	   in	   promoting	   a	   common	  position	  on	  policies	  across	  government	  institutions	  and	  government	  officials.	  “Food	  is	  an	  important	  vehicle	   in	   cholera	   transmission”	   (also	   very	   likely	   for	   other	   EIDs),	   therefore	   a	   strict	   government	  policy	   must	   be	   implemented.	   49	   Peru	   Government	   Official	   2	   said	   that	   during	   the	   Fujimori	  administration’s	  handling	  of	  the	  1991	  cholera	  outbreak,	  the	  minister	  of	  health	  publicly	  stated	  that	  Peruvians	  should	  refrain	  from	  eating	  raw	  fish	  in	  dishes	  such	  as	  ceviche,	  the	  unofficial	  national	  dish	  of	   Peru.	   Shortly	   thereafter,	   President	   Fujimori	   himself,	   to	   support	   fishing	   interests,	   ate	   ceviche	  publicly	  as	  proof	  that	  fish	  was	  safe.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  “the	  fish	  for	  that	  ceviche	  was	  brought	  from	  the	  deep	  sea,	  miles	  from	  the	  coast,	  and	  not	  from	  the	  near	  shores	  where	  average	  Peruvians	  tend	  to	  fish.	  Soon	  afterwards	  the	  health	  minister	  resigned,”	  says	  Peru	  Government	  Official	  2.	  This	  example	  shows	   the	  need	   for	  government	  officials	   to	   serve	  as	   role	  models	  and	  abide	  by	   the	  health	  policies	  that	   they	   recommend	   to	   the	   public.	   Fujimori	  was	   not	   alone	   in	   his	   exhibitionism;	   Prime	  Minister	  Thaksin	  Shinawatra	  of	  Thailand	  ate	   chicken	   in	   front	  of	   cameras	  early	  on	  during	  Thailand’s	   initial	  outbreak	  of	  Highly	  Pathogenic	  Avian	  Influenza.	  While	  politicians	  are	  more	  aware	  of	  their	  impacts,	  Peru	   Government	   Official	   2	   asserted	   that	   communications	   continue	   to	   be	   a	   hindrance	   among	  government	   officials	   at	   a	   national	   level.	   In	   addition,	   recent	   attempts	   to	   decentralize	   Peru	   may	  magnify	  these	  communication	  problems	  and	  disaffirmations	  between	  institutions.	  At	   the	   domestic	   level,	   communications	   between	   different	   government	   institutions	   are	  generally	  ineffective	  and	  filled	  with	  bureaucratic	  problems.	  Certainly,	  Health	  Expert	  2	  identified	  the	  detachment	   between	   medical	   doctors	   and	   policy	   makers	   to	   be	   a	   significant	   problem	   when	  controlling	   for	  EIDs.	   “The	  main	  problem	  with	  MINSA	   is…	   the	   lack	  of	   interest	   in	  participating	  and	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having	  a	  better	  knowledge	  of	  what	  goes	  on	  at	  the	  clinical	  side.	  Therefore,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  relate	  to	  patients,	  which	  leads	  them	  to	  make	  mistaken	  policies	  due	  to	  their	  lack	  of	  empathy	  with	  patients	  and	   medical	   doctors	   on	   site,”	   she	   argued.	   In	   that	   context,	   NAMRU-­‐6	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	  capacity-­‐building	  for	  Peruvian	  institutions.	  U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  1	  stated	  that	  U.S.	  facilities	  tend	  to	   work	   on	   a	   site	   for	   two	   to	   three	   years,	   “but	   NAMRU-­‐6	   has	   had	   good	   communications	   and	  interactions	   with	   its	   Peruvian	   counterparts	   which	   have	   made	   it	   possible	   for	   NAMRU-­‐6	   to	   do	  research.”	  	  
Decentralization	  
	   Attempts	   to	   decentralize	   the	   public	   health	   sector’s	   capacity	   and	   distribute	   its	   funds	   have	  produced	  mixed	   results	   for	   Peru.	   Fiscal	   decentralization	  maked	   autonomous	   regions	   responsible	  for	   their	   funds;	   however,	   the	   regions’	   capacity	   to	   make	   use	   of	   their	   budget	   depends	   on	   their	  management	   capacity	   and	   situation.	  Therefore,	   decentralization	  will	   be	   incomplete	   and	  will	   have	  mixed	  results	  if	  it	  fails	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  budgetary	  needs	  of	  the	  highest	  priority	  surveillance	  programs	  and	  the	  most	  at-­‐risk	  populations.	  	  An	   official	   from	   MINSA	   recognizes	   that	   there	   have	   been	   some	   improvements	   in	   the	  government-­‐led	   decentralization	   process.	   In	   fact,	   President	   Ollanta	   Humala’s	   government	   has	  emphasized	  consultation	  and	  negotiation	  processes	  with	  indigenous	  peoples	  for	  the	  use	  of	  land	  in	  addition	  to	  other	  decisions	  involving	  government	  and	  inhabitants	  of	  a	  specific	  location.	  “We	  need	  to	  allocate	  funds	  correctly	  with	  respect	  to	  specific	  specialties,”	  asserts	  U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  3.	  U.S.	  Government	   Expert	   4	   thinks	   that	   decentralization	  will	   improve	   as	   new	   initiatives	   are	   developed.	  MINSA	  redistributed	  unspent	  regional	  funds	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  give	  resources	  to	  areas	  that	  requested	  surveillance	  assistance.	  Although	  pushing	  local	  government	  officials	  to	  spend	  surveillance	  funds	  is	  important,	   it	   is	   unknown	   how	   key	   leaders	   will	   react.	   They	   may	   respond	   by	   managing	   their	  surveillance	   budgets	   more	   efficiently;	   however,	   this	   political	   initiative	   could	   also	   push	   them	   to	  spend	  unnecessary	  funds	  to	  ensure	  they	  receive	  money	  in	  years	  to	  come.	  
	  
NAMRU-­‐6	  and	  Peruvian	  Institutions	  
	   While	  interviewees	  varied	  in	  their	  opinions	  based	  on	  the	  role	  of	  NAMRU-­‐6	  as	  a	  partner	  with	  the	   Peruvian	   government,	   there	   was	   a	   general	   consensus	   in	   the	   importance	   of	   NAMRU-­‐6.	   The	  institution’s	   importance	   is	   based	   on	   its	   facilitation	   between	   international	   partners	   and	   the	  assistance	  in	  research	  and	  EID	  surveillance.	  Peru	  Government	  Official	  2	  pointed	  out	  that	  “there	  isn’t	  a	  negative	  view	  of	  NAMRU-­‐6	  at	  the	  government	  level.	  In	  fact,	  whenever	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  or	  an	  EID	  outbreak,	   Peruvian	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	   INS	   work	   together	   with	   NAMRU-­‐6	   to	   identify	   the	  problem.”	   Similarly,	   Health	   Expert	   3	   agreed	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   NAMRU-­‐6	   for	   Peruvian	  institutions.	   Therefore,	   she	   cannot	   foresee	   a	   future	   situation	   in	   which	   NAMRU-­‐6	   could	   have	  problems	  with	  health	  institutions	  such	  as	  MINSA.	  Furthermore,	  a	  specialist	  from	  a	  foreign	  research	  facility	  stated	  that	  while	  NAMRU-­‐6	  is	  mainly	  research-­‐oriented,	  it	  may	  do	  extra	  work	  if	  requested.	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“NAMRU-­‐6	   will	   not	   do	   diagnostics	   of	   any	   sort.	   However,	   it	   will	   assist	   on	   some	   analyses	   when	  needed	   although	   its	   main	   role	   is	   to	   do	   research	   and	   nothing	   else,”	   he	   said.	   Likewise,	   U.S.	  Government	   Expert	   6	   specified	   that	   NAMRU-­‐6	   does	   active	   surveillance	   while	   government	  institutions	  such	  as	  MINSA	  do	  passive	  surveillance.	  	  
	  
Specific	  Economic	  Barriers	  in	  Peru	  	  
	  
Infrastructure	  	  In	   Peru,	   institutional	   infrastructure	   is	   a	   constant	   problem.	   Geographic	   constraints	   and	  centralization	  continue	  to	  broaden	  gaps	  between	  Lima	  and	  other	  cities	  and	  rural	  areas.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	   governmental	   attempts	   to	   create	   a	   universal	   healthcare	   system	   have	   been	   partial	   failures,	  given	   the	   lack	   of	   equipment	   and	  personnel	   to	   assist	   individuals	   at	   the	   clinical	   level.	   In	   fact,	   Peru	  Government	   Official	   2	   stated	   that	   they	   “don’t	   have	   instrumental	   capacities	   to	   fully	   support	   a	  universal	   healthcare	   system	   in	   Peru.”	   Accordingly,	   Health	   Expert	   1	   stated	   that	   the	   hospital’s	   lab	  “doesn’t	  make	  diagnostics	  for	  migrant	  diseases.	  Therefore,	  we	  have	  to	  send	  the	  samples	  to	  the	  INS	  or	  NAMRU-­‐6.”	  It	  is	  true	  that	  hospitals	  protocol	  restricts	  hospitals	  from	  making	  diagnostics,	  but	  it	  is	  unclear	  if	  they	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  undertake	  this	  task.	  Health	  Expert	  2	  also	  stated	  that	  the	  “INS	  is	  the	  first	  reference	  laboratory	  for	  Peruvian	  Hospitals,	  but	  the	  INS	  may	  refer	  samples	  to	  NAMRU-­‐6	  if	  needed”.	  Meanwhile,	  deficiencies	   in	   infrastructure	  and	  public	  health	  care	   facilities	   arise	   from	   failed	  attempts	   to	   transfer	   know-­‐how	   in	   the	   construction	   and	   development	   of	   these	   structures.	   Peru	  Government	  Official	   1	   stated	   that	   “we	   [the	   INS]	  had	   several	  mistakes	  when	  we	  had	   to	   equip	   and	  build	  our	  facilities	  with	  the	  standards”	  needed	  to	  guarantee	  biosecurity	  measures.	  In	  that	  sense,	  the	  official	  stresses	  the	  need	  for	  experts	  to	  advise	  the	  development	  and	  construction	  of	  infrastructure	  projects.	  
	  
Human	  Resources	  and	  Personnel	  
	   Despite	   the	   lack	  of	   transfer	  of	  knowledge	  and	  expertise,	  Donor	  Staff	  1	   recognizes	   that	   the	  INS	  has	  successfully	  implemented	  laboratories	  in	  all	  regions	  in	  Peru	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  diagnose	  EIDs.	  However,	  human	  resources	  are	  scarce	  in	  those	  regions.	  “A	  solution	  to	  that	  problem	  would	  be	  to	   increase	   the	  budget	   for	   the	  health	  care	  sector,”	  points	  Peru	  Government	  Official	  1.	  His	  point	  of	  view	   is	   consistent	   with	   Peru	   Government	   Official	   2	   who	   asserts	   “medical	   doctors	   receive	   a	   low	  salary.	  On	  average,	  a	  medical	  doctor—who	  trains	  for	  approximately	  12	  years—is	  paid	  US$1,200	  per	  month	   at	   MINSA;	   nurses	   earn	   US$400	   per	   month	   on	   average.”	   Peru	   Government	   Official	   2	  recognizes	   the	   government’s	   need	   to	   invest	   in	   the	   health	   care	   sector	   to	   fully	   prepare	   its	  medical	  doctors	  and	  grant	  them	  proper	  working	  conditions.	  In	  fact,	  Health	  Expert	  1	  stated,	  “from	  32	  medical	  schools	  existing	   in	  Peru,	  only	  20	  have	  extensive	   training	  while	   the	   rest	  of	   them	  are	  not	  prepared	  enough	  to	  build	  their	  skills.”	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Furthermore,	  Donor	  Staff	  1	  stressed	  the	  need	  for	  a	  clearer	  career	  path	  in	  the	  public	  health	  sector	   to	  provide	  more	  opportunities	   to	  medical	  doctors	  entering	  government	   institution	  such	  as	  MINSA,	  Essalud,	  or	  INS.	  In	  August	  2012,	  Peruvian	  medical	  doctors	  working	  at	  Essalud	  instigated	  a	  national	  strike	  against	   the	  government,	  demanding	  higher	  salaries	  since	  these	  have	  not	   increased	  since	   the	  1990s.50	  Although	  Essalud	  doctors	  have	  resolved	   their	  dispute,	  MINSA	   is	  now	  on	  strike.	  The	   strike	   is	   the	   result	   of	   conflict	   escalation	   after	   several	   years	   of	   complaints	   and	   unsuccessful	  negotiations	  between	  medical	  doctors	  and	  the	  government.	  In	  regions	  far	   from	  Lima,	  such	  as	  Iquitos,	   the	   lack	  of	  available	  personnel	   is	  critical.	   In	   fact,	  U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  3	  pointed	  out	  that	  “[the	  hospital]	  had	  about	  6,000	  women	  giving	  birth	  and	  only	  two	  specialists	  available	  to	  assist	  them.	  The	  neighboring	  hospital	  had	  a	  similar	  situation,	  with	  2,000	  women	  giving	  birth	  and	  only	  ten	  specialists	  available	  to	  assist	  those	  births.”	  The	  official	  went	  on	   to	   explain	   that	   there	   are	   few	   incentives	   for	   medical	   doctors	   to	   work	   in	   hospitals	   located	   in	  regions	  such	  as	  Iquitos.	  Wages	  tend	  to	  be	  the	  same	  across	  all	  doctors	  regardless	  of	  the	  challenges	  specialists	  may	  face	  in	  terms	  of	  distance,	  access	  to	  these	  locations,	  stress,	  and	  working	  conditions.	  
	  
Specific	  Cultural	  Barriers	  in	  Peru	  
	   In	  countries	  such	  as	  Peru,	  cultural	  barriers	  complicate	  the	  interaction	  between	  patients	  and	  doctors	  since	  the	  former	  are	  hesitant	  to	  receive	  assistance	  from	  the	  latter.	  Western	  and	  traditional	  medicines	   are	   often	   antagonistic	   and	   patients	   prefer	   to	   receive	   traditional	   treatment	   instead	   for	  EIDs.	   For	   instance,	   through	   a	   research	   study	   made	   in	   Mexico,	   homeopathya—a	   form	   of	   non-­‐conventional	  medicine—was	  perceived	  as	   “a	  panacea	   for	  everything”51	   including	  not	  only	  regular	  infections	  or	  diseases,	  but	  also	  more	  complex	  problems	  such	  as	  cancer	  or	  cholera.	  Accordingly,	  the	  research	   interviewees	   highly	   regarded	   the	   good	   course	   of	   treatment	   between	   non-­‐conventional	  health	  specialists	  compared	  to	  regular	  medical	  doctors.	  	  People	   in	   rural	   or	   semi-­‐urban	   areas	   are	   more	   prone	   to	   receive	   assistance	   from	   non-­‐conventional	   doctors.	   In	   that	   sense,	   cultural	   barriers	   tend	   to	   explain	   the	   lack	   of	   trust	   between	  patients	   and	   medical	   doctors	   compared	   to	   that	   between	   doctors	   and	   non-­‐conventional	   health	  specialists.	   In	  Peru,	  medical	  doctors	   lack	   training	   in	   indigenous	   languages	   (such	  as	  Quechua)	  and	  traditional	  health	  care.	  As	  a	  result,	   the	   lack	  of	   those	   important	  components	   in	  health	  care	   lead	   to	  further	  miscommunications	  and	  obvious	   lack	  of	   trust	  between	   inhabitants	   in	  rural	  or	  semi-­‐urban	  areas	  and	  the	  medical	  doctors	  located	  there.	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  51	  Whiteford,	  “Homeopathic	  Medicine	  in	  the	  City	  of	  Oaxaca.	  Mexico:	  Patients’	  Perspectives	  and	  Observations,”	  74.	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Preventative	  Health	  Awareness/Education	  
	   There	  is	  a	  clear	   lack	  in	  government	  investment	  in	  public	  health	  policies	   in	  recent	  decades.	  Peru	  is	  only	  above	  Haiti	  for	  healthcare	  budget	  allocation	  in	  the	  Americas.52	  For	  that	  reason,	  30%	  of	  Peruvians	   lack	   access	   to	   health	   care,	   although	   they	   have	   access	   to	   traditional	   medicine,	   says	  Government	  Official	  1.	  The	  lack	  of	  health	  education	  is	  the	  main	  barrier	  for	  medical	  doctors	  to	  reach	  people	  in	  rural	  areas	  and	  properly	  monitor	  EIDs.	  For	  instance,	  Peru	  Government	  Official	  4	  argues,	  “approximately	   10%	   of	   the	   population	   would	   not	   accept	   certain	   medicines.”	   Accordingly,	   public	  health	   care	   institutions	   have	   failed	   in	   earning	   rural	   communities’	   confidence	   and	   trust.	   For	   that	  reason,	   in	   the	  eyes	  of	  Peru	  Government	  Official	  1,	   “some	  people	   living	   in	   rural	  areas	  do	  not	   trust	  Western	  medicine	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  vaccinations	  in	  public	  health	  campaigns.”	  Nonetheless,	  cultural	  differences	  may	   not	   be	   a	   significant	   problem	   in	   urban	   and	   semi-­‐urban	   areas.	   According	   to	   Staff	  Donor	  1,	  “Peruvians	  are	  used	  to	  modern	  health	  care	  at	  many	  socioeconomic	  sectors.	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  a	  willingness	  to	  accept	  health	  practices	  and	  preventive	  health	  education.”	  	  Peru	   Government	   Official	   1	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   health	   specialists	   with	   language	  knowledge	   besides	   Spanish	   and	   English.	   “The	   lack	   of	   specialists	   proficient	   in	   native	   languages	   is	  very	   problematic,”	   he	   said.	   Bilingual	   medical	   doctors	   in	   Spanish	   and	   Quechua	   are	   scarce,	  complicating	   the	   relationship	   between	   them	   and	   their	   patients,	   and	   reinforcing	   distrust	   and	   the	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  government	  for	  people	  living	  in	  rural	  areas.	  Experts	  interviewed	  agree	  on	  the	   need	   to	   build	  medical	   doctors’	   skills	   because	   through	   better	   interactions	  with	   their	   patients,	  they	  will	  succeed	  in	  providing	  public	  health	  care	  services	  and	  be	  more	  efficient	  in	  monitoring	  EIDs.	  Health	   Expert	   4	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   medical	   adaptation	   to	   specific	   circumstances	  surrounding	  traditional	  practices.	  For	  instance,	  the	  specialist	  said,	  “it	  is	  very	  complicated	  for	  us	  [the	  specialists	  and	  health	  workers]	  to	  communicate	  and	  make	  diagnosis	  in	  specific	  hospitals	  since	  there	  are	  no	  experts	  on	  specific	  EIDs	  in	  all	  locations.	  …	  Accordingly,	  we	  have	  to	  make	  specific	  food	  to	  fit	  each	  indigenous	  person’s	  diet.”	  Clearly,	  traditional	  practices	  create	  significant	  barriers	  for	  medical	  doctors	   to	   do	   appropriate	   research	   and	  monitor	   EIDs	   given	   the	   lack	   of	   resources	   and	   the	   extra	  effort	  needed	  to	  fit	  each	  traditional	  practice.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	   In	   conclusion,	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Peruvian	   government	   and	   research	   facilities	  such	   as	   NAMRU-­‐6	   is	   largely	   positive.	   Interviewees	   agreed	   that	   there	   is	   a	   substantial	   flow	   of	  information	   and	   good	   terms	   between	   Peruvian	   and	   foreign	   institutions,	   such	   as	   NAMRU-­‐6.	  Although	  Peruvian	  health	  experts	  partially	  recognize	  the	  country’s	  dependence	  on	  NAMRU-­‐6,	  they	  also	   realize	   that	   there	   is	   no	   competition	   between	   Peruvian	   institutions	   and	   NAMRU-­‐6;	   on	   the	  contrary,	  cooperation	  between	  indigenous	  health	  experts	  tends	  to	  be	  the	  norm.	  Peru’s	  public	  health	  sector	   has	   several	   problems	   to	   fix	   in	   order	   to	   more	   efficiently	   control	   EIDs.	   Yet,	   their	   1991	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experience	  with	  the	  cholera	  outbreak	  has	  given	  a	  good	  opportunity	  to	  reinforce	  research	  facilities	  and	   focus	   on	   research	   of	   EIDs	   through	   well-­‐known	   institutions	   such	   as	   the	   INS.	   If	   Peruvian	  authorities	  want	  to	  organize	  their	  resources	  and	  delegate	  to	  NAMRU-­‐6,	  they	  need	  better	  interaction	  with	  NAMRU-­‐6.	  While	   decentralization	   has	   been	   an	   effort	  with	   good	   intentions,	   several	   issues	   need	   to	   be	  solved	   to	  make	   it	   successful.	   Resources	   are	   still	   centralized	   in	   Lima	   and	  health	   facilities	   in	   other	  regions—either	  in	  the	  jungle	  or	  in	  the	  Andes—lack	  of	  funds	  to	  fully	  develop	  health	  care	  practices.	  This	  problem	  creates	  infrastructure	  deficiencies	  in	  rural	  areas	  with	  the	  greatest	  need	  for	  research	  but	   the	   least	   equipment	   and	   funds.	   In	   addition,	   conflicting	   communications	   and	   institutional	  overlapping	   confuses	   policy	   makers,	   which	   can	   further	   exacerbate	   the	   problem.	   Thus,	   Peruvian	  public	   health	   care	   institutions	   must	   synchronize	   efforts	   and	   improve	   interaction	   among	   one	  another	   to	   avoid	  miscommunication	   problems.	   Peru’s	   EID	   control,	   surveillance,	   and	   research	   are	  progressing	   effectively.	   However,	   there	   are	   several	   operational	   and	   management	   problems	   that	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  solved.	  Peruvian	  institutions	  and	  the	  central	  government	  need	  to	  mitigate	  the	  drawbacks	  to	  decentralization	  in	  Peru,	  especially	  as	  they	  related	  to	  EID	  surveillance.	  	  Finally,	  Peru’s	  cultural	  diversity	  has	  created	  significant	  barriers	  for	  medical	  doctors	  who	  try	  to	   control	   EIDs	   in	   rural	   areas.	   This	   is	   due	   to	   language	   diversity	   and	   difficult	   access	   to	   certain	  locations,	   but	   these	   tend	   to	   be	   mostly	   Peruvian	   issues	   with	   no	   significant	   effects	   on	   their	  interactions	  with	  foreign	  researchers.	  Therefore,	   further	   investment	   is	  needed	  to	  build	  skills	  such	  as	   learning	   native	   languages	   and	   assisting	   specialists	   in	   their	   adaptation	   process	  when	   inserting	  themselves	  in	  rural	  areas	  mostly	  inhabited	  by	  indigenous	  peoples.	  Accordingly,	  while	  some	  capacity	  building	  efforts	  exist,	  there	  are	  no	  incentives	  for	  specialists	  to	  relocate	  in	  depressed	  areas	  with	  the	  need	   for	   specific	  medical	   doctors.	   Both	   universities	   and	   post-­‐graduate	   institutions	   have	   to	   adapt	  their	  educational	  plan	  for	  medical	  doctors	  to	  fully	  train	  them	  so	  that	  they	  can	  acquire	  those	  skills.	  
[39]	  	  
Table	  2.2.	  Peru:	  Date,	  Time	  of	  Interview,	  Generic	  Title	  and	  Code53	  
Date	  and	  Time	  of	  Interview	   Generic	  Title	  and	  Code	  4/24/00	  1900	   Health	  Expert	  1	  4/21/12	  1100	   Health	  Expert	  2	  4/25/12	  1900	   Health	  Expert	  3	  4/27/12	  1100	   Health	  Expert	  4	  4/25/12	  1330	   Health	  Expert	  5	  4/26/12	  1330	   Health	  Expert	  6	  4/23/12	  1100	   U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  1	  4/23/12	  1100	   U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  2	  4/27/12	  1100	   U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  3	  4/27/12	  1630	   U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  4	  4/24/12	  1100	   U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  5	  4/24/12	  1400	   U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  6	  4/24/12	  1045	   U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  7	  4/27/12	  0800	   U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  8	  4/21/12	  1000	   Donor	  Staff	  1	  4/21/12	  0830	   Peru	  Government	  Official	  1	  4/21/12	  0730	   Peru	  Government	  Official	  2	  4/27/12	  0900	   Peru	  Government	  Official	  3	  4/27/12	  1100	   Peru	  Government	  Official	  4	  4/26/12	  0900	   Peru	  Government	  Official	  5	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  To	  protect	  personally	  identifiable	  information.	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CASE	  STUDY	  3:	  THAILAND‡	  
	  
Introduction	  	   Since	   1980,	   the	   U.S.	   Centers	   for	   Disease	   Control	   and	   Prevention	   (CDC)	   has	   expended	  significant	  resources	  building	  EID	  surveillance	  programs	   in	  Thailand.	   In	   the	   last	  decade,	  Thailand	  has	   had	   to	   respond	   quickly	   to	   pandemics	   such	   as	   SARS,	   H5N1,	   and	   H1N1.	   Recent	   globalization	  efforts,	  such	  as	  trade	  and	  international	  travel,	  have	  intensified	  the	  idea	  that	  infectious	  diseases	  have	  the	   potential	   to	   produce	   a	   worldwide	   outbreak.	   Understanding	   zoonotic	   disease	   is	   essential	   to	  developing	   surveillance	   programs	   because,	   “nearly	   two-­‐thirds	   of	   human	   pathogens	   are	   zoonotic	  and,	   of	   greater	   concern,	   nearly	   three-­‐quarters	   of	   emerging	   and	   re-­‐emerging	   disease	   of	   human	  beings	  are	  zoonosis.”54	  As	  Veterinary	  Health	  Expert	  1	  notes,	  this	  is	  because	  “most	  diseases	  tend	  to	  go	  to	  where	  people	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  environment;	  where	  they	  harvest,	  hunt,	  and	  consume.”55	  	  The	  best	  way	  to	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  emerging	  diseases	  is	  to	  look	  at	  “’the	  protective	  effects	  of	  nature	   intact”	  and	  detect	   the	  pathogen	  before	   it	   transfers	   from	  animals	  to	  humans.56	  Sadly,	   the	  majority	   of	   individuals	  who	   contract	   EIDs	   come	   from	  developing	   countries	   like	   Thailand.	   This	   is	  because	  poor	  populations	  experience	  environmental	   consequences	   from	  population	  growth,	   such	  as	   “urbanization,	   deforestation,	   and	   encroachment	   of	   wildlife.”57	   Although	   outbreaks	   have	   the	  potential	   to	   hurt	   local	   populations	   and	   their	   livestock,	   there	   is	   a	   global	   responsibility	   to	   react	   to	  conditions	   quickly,	   ensuring	   that	   disease	   does	   not	   spread	   through	   economic	   trade,	   tourism,	   and	  migration.	  	  This	  paper	  uses	  Thailand	  as	  a	  case	  study	  to	  understand	  EID	  surveillance	  in	  Southeast	  Asia.	  It	  looks	  at	  key	  international	  players,	  such	  as	  the	  U.S.	  Army	  component	  of	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  Research	  Institute	  of	  Medical	  Sciences	  (AFRIMS),	  and	  evaluates	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  EID	  surveillance	  in	  Thailand.	   Additionally,	   the	   report	   evaluates	   political,	   economic,	   and	   cultural	   barriers	   which	   can	  prohibit	  effective	  disease	  surveillance	  in	  developing	  countries.	  The	  primary	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	   assist	   both	   Thailand	   and	   key	   international	   players	   in	   improving	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   EID	  surveillance.	   An	   overlapping	   theme	   from	   all	   experts	   was	   that	   the	   best	   EID	   surveillance	   systems	  would	  be	  ones	  where	  both	   the	  host	   country	   and	   global	   institutions	  have	   an	   incentive	   to	   conduct	  capacity	  building.	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  from	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  54	  Coker	  et	  al,	  “Towards	  a	  Conceptual	  Framework	  to	  Support	  One-­‐Health	  Research	  for	  Policy	  on	  Emerging	  Zoonoses,”	  1.	  55	  Veterinary	  Health	  Expert	  1.	  56	  Robbins,	  “The	  Ecology	  of	  Disease,”	  1.	  57	  Coker	  et	  al.	  “Towards	  a	  Conceptual	  Framework,”	  326.	  
[41]	  	  
	  
Background	  and	  Context	  
	   The	   majority	   of	   health	   experts	   interviewed	   for	   this	   study	   mentioned	   three	   key	   disease	  detection	  partners	   in	  the	  U.S.-­‐Thailand	  context:	   the	  Thai	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Health	  (MOPH),	  which	  represents	  the	  Thai	  government;	   the	  CDC,	  which	  concentrates	  on	  the	  civilian	  sector;	  and	  AFRIMS,	  which	   manages	   the	   military	   sector	   with	   components	   from	   the	   Thai	   and	   U.S.	   armies.	   To	   fully	  comprehend	  the	  U.S.-­‐Thailand	  relationship	  with	  respect	  to	  EIDs,	  one	  must	  understand	  the	  AFRIMS	  role	   in	   developing	   surveillance	   sites.	   AFRIMS	   is	   unique	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   has	   a	   long-­‐standing	  affiliation	  with	  Thailand;	  it	  assisted	  the	  Southeast	  Asia	  Treaty	  Organization	  (SEATO)	  since	  the	  1958	  cholera	   epidemic.	   As	   the	   research	   mission	   changed	   from	   cholera	   towards	   tropical	   diseases,58	  SEATO	   Medical	   Research	   Laboratory	   was	   renamed	   and	   refocused	   numerous	   times	   until	   it	   was	  finally	  disestablished	   in	  1977.59	  AFRIMS	   took	  SEATO’s	  place	  as	   the	  main	   research	   laboratory	  and	  then	   began	   cooperating	  with	   the	   Royal	   Thai	   Army	  Medical	   Component	   (RTA-­‐AFRIMS)	   as	   a	   joint	  venture.60	  	  Despite	   that	   AFRIMS	   studies	   over	   29	   different	   pathogens,	   the	   majority	   of	   its	   research	  funding	  goes	  to	  malaria,	  dengue,	  and	  diarrheal	  diseases.	  AFRIMS’s	  mission	  is	  as	  follows:	  	  
To	  conduct	  basic	  and	  applied	  research	  for	  development	  of	  diagnostic	  tests,	  drugs	  and	  vaccines	  
for	  infectious	  diseases	  of	  military	  importance.61	  	  
	  
Other	  tasks	  include:	  
• Field	  site	  development	  
• Medical	  diplomacy	  and	  capacity	  building	  
• Disease	  surveillance	  and	  outbreak	  investigation	  	  
• Regional	  subject	  matter	  expert	  (PACOM,	  embassy,	  NGOs,	  GOs)	  
• Development	  of	  Mil-­‐Mil	  relationships/collaborations.62	  
	  Although	   improving	   local	   laboratory	   capacity	   in	   Thailand	   is	   important,	   AFRIMS’	   primary	   goal	   is	  currently	  (and	  historically)	  product	  development.	  As	  U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  1	  explains,	  half	  of	  the	  organization’s	   funding	   comes	   from	   the	   DoD,	   and	   there	   is	   an	   incentive	   to	   develop	   and	   evaluate	  products	  so	  the	  DoD	  can	  “protect	  the	  U.S.	  military	  from	  diseases	  that	  cannot	  be	  studied	  in	  the	  U.S.	  ...	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  Brown	  and	  Nitayaphan,	  “The	  Armed	  Forces	  Research	  Institute	  of	  Medical	  Sciences:	  Five	  Decades	  of	  Collaborative	  Medical	  Research,”	  477.	  	  59	  Armed	  Forces	  Research	  Institute	  of	  Medical	  Sciences,	  “Mission	  and	  History,”	  1.	  60	  Ibid.	  61	  For	  more	  information	  see	  http://bangkok.usembassy.gov/embassy/usamc/usamc-­‐afrims.html.	  	  62	  Powerpoint	  shared	  on	  5	  Jun	  2012	  titled	  “AFRIMS	  Command	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vaccines	  always	  come	  before	  surveillance.”63	  The	  need	  to	  create	  products	  was	  expressed	  in	  AFRIMS’	  50th	   anniversary	   reflection	   article,	  which	   found	   over	   500	  malaria	   publications	   produced	   in	   a	   50-­‐year	  period—because	  it	  was	  the	  leading	  infectious	  disease	  threat	  to	  U.S.	  deployments.64	  Group	   interests	   and	   missions	   do	   not	   always	   coincide	   with	   one	   another,	   so	   there	   are	  occasional	  strains	  within	  the	  relationship.	  The	  MOPH’s	  primary	  concern	  is	  protecting	  Thai	  citizens	  and	  promoting	  public	   health.	  There	   is	   little	   emphasis	  put	   towards	  publishing,	   something	   the	  U.S.	  side	   of	   AFRIMS	   emphasizes	   as	   part	   of	   the	   “Three	   Ps”	   (products,	   publications,	   and	   partnerships).	  Additionally,	   gaps	   occur	   with	   AFRIMS	   research	   because	   it	   grants	   funding	   for	   projects	   gradually	  instead	  of	  giving	  one	  lump	  sum.	  This	  prohibits	  the	  MOPH	  from	  using	  its	  extra	  resources	  to	  benefit	  locals.	  Thai	  Government	  Official	  3	  and	  U.S.	  Government	  Official	  1	  explain	  that	  more	  work	  needs	  to	  go	   towards	   working	   together	   on	   the	   “common	   problem”	   and	   maintaining	   continuity	   between	  projects.	  	  	  
Literature	  Review	  
	   Since	  the	  1958	  cholera	  epidemic,	  there	  have	  been	  a	  few	  situations	  that	  have	  contributed	  to	  defining	   the	   Thai	   MOPH’s	   positive	   relationship	   with	   AFRIMS	   and	   the	   international	   health	  community:	  the	  tsunami	  in	  2004/2005,	  Avian	  Influenza	  in	  2004,	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  epidemic,	  and	  H1N1	  in	  2009,	  when	  Thailand	  requested	  active	  surveillance	  assistance	  from	  outsiders.	  After	  the	  tsunami,	  three	  teams	  from	  the	  CDC	  and	  AFRIMS	  used	  a	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO)	  rapid	  assessment	  tool	   wherein	   “investigators	   collected	   data	   on	   hospital	   characteristics;	   damages	   to	   buildings	   and	  communication,	   electricity,	   water,	   and	   sewage	   systems;	   adequacy	   and	   conditions	   of	   health-­‐care	  personnel,	  medical	   supplies,	   and	  morgue	   facilities;	   and	  anticipated	  medical	  needs”	   to	   six	   infected	  provinces	   from	  December	  30,	  2004	   to	   January	  6,	  2005.65	   In	   the	  end,	   the	  Morbidity	  and	  Mortality	  Weekly	  Report	  (MMWR)	  determined	  that	  they	  were	  able	  to	  implement	  “active	  surveillance	  for	  20	  of	  the	  diseases	  plus	  wound	  infections	  and	  electric	  shock.”66	  Overall,	  the	  reports	  found	  that	  the	  MOPH,	  the	   CDC,	   and	   AFRIMS	  were	   effective	   in	   identifying	   disease	   clusters	   and	   responding	   rapidly.	   The	  report	   recommended	   that	   future	   funding	   is	   appropriated	   to	   sustainable	   projects	   such	   as	   public	  sanitation	  and	  maintaining	  laboratory	  capacity	  for	  infectious	  diseases.	  	  The	   Avian	   Influenza	   epidemic	   was	   slightly	   more	   controversial	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   took	  approximately	   three	   months	   for	   the	   Thai	   government	   to	   announce	   that	   H5N1	   had	   reached	  Thailand.	  Experts	  such	  as	  Safman	  felt	  that	  policy	  makers	  took	  this	  approach	  because	  of	  political	  and	  economic	   interests.	  The	  biggest	   reason	  was	   the	  Asian	  Financial	  Crisis	   in	  1997	   that	   “sent	   the	  Thai	  currency	  (the	  baht)	  into	  free	  fall,	  displaced	  tens	  of	  thousands	  workers,	  and	  undermined	  confidence	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in	   the	   country’s	   financial	  management.”	   67	   The	   2003	   SARS	   outbreak	  undoubtedly	   hurt	   Thailand’s	  tourist	   industry.	   Additionally,	   new	   government	   leadership	   reshaped	   political	   interests;	   Thaksin	  Shinawatra,	   a	   powerful	   entrepreneur	   who	   made	   billions	   of	   dollars	   in	   the	   telecommunications	  industry,	  became	  Prime	  Minister	  (2001-­‐2006),	  and	  is	  now	  a	  fugitive.	  He	  invested	  heavily	  in	  export-­‐oriented	  business	  and	  was	  a	  “strong	  backer	  of	  pro-­‐poor	  legislation	  such	  as	  low-­‐cost	  health	  care	  and	  direct	  government	  investment	  in	  rural	  areas.”68	  	  Thailand,	  along	  with	  other	  Southeast	  Asian	  countries,	  was	  reliant	  on	   labor	  markets	   in	   the	  agricultural	   sector,	   and	   as	   a	   result,	   questioned	   whether	   it	   should	   prioritize	   the	   avian	   influenza	  outbreak.	  If	  Thailand	  had	  announced	  H5N1,	  all	  infected	  flocks	  would	  have	  been	  culled	  and	  poultry	  trade	  would	  have	  been	  temporarily	  halted;	  a	  devastating	  implication	  considering	  that	  Thailand	  was	  one	   of	   the	   world’s	   major	   poultry	   exporters.	   Additionally,	   Thailand	   risked	   losing	   other	   markets	  linked	  with	   agriculture.	   Experts	   explained	   this	   further	  when	   they	   stated	   that	   international	   trade	  was	   not	   the	   only	   business	   being	   threatened;	   Thailand	   had	   specialized	   and	  was	   seen	   “as	   a	  major	  supplier	  of	  poultry	  genetics,	  poultry	  production	  inputs,	  and	  technical	  assistance.”69	  	  Structural	   challenges	   also	   played	   a	   part	   in	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   infectious	   disease	  surveillance	   systems.	  Experts	   felt	   that	  more	  effort	   should	  have	  been	  put	   towards	   identifying	   risk	  factors	  that	   impact	  the	  ecology	  of	  H5N1.	  For	  example,	  one	  study	  showed	  that	  there	  was	  a	  “strong	  association	  between	  the	  H5N1	  virus	  in	  Thailand	  and	  the	  abundance	  of	  free-­‐gazing	  ducks,	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  native	  chickens,	  cocks,	  wetlands	  and	  humans.”70	  Another	  Thailand	  community	  study	  “found	   that	  12%-­‐61%	  of	   rural	   residents	  had	  regular	  contact	  with	  backyard	  birds.”71	  More	  energy	  should	  have	  gone	  towards	  understanding	  how	  pathogens	  initially	  transmit	  in	  animals.	  By	  regulating	  the	  movement	  of	   free	  grazing	  ducks	   in	  rice	   fields,	  health	  experts	  would	  have	  been	  able	   to	  reduce	  the	   chance	   of	   transmission	   to	   terrestrial	   poultry.	   They	   could	   have	   also	   reduced	   the	   spread	   of	  pathogens	   resulting	   from	  migration.72	  Moreover,	   they	  would	   have	   been	   able	   to	   control	   H5N1	   by	  teaching	  “best	  practices”	  to	  the	  surveillance	  staff	  and	  by	  providing	  farmers	  education	  so	  that	  they	  could	  benefit	  from	  early	  virus	  warnings	  in	  their	  flocks.	  Slow	  responses	  showed	  that	  more	  emphasis	  is	  needed	  in	  building	  Thailand’s	  veterinary	  surveillance	  system.73	  	  AFRIMS	   has	   played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   providing	   resources	   when	   the	   MOPH	   lacks	   either	  laboratory	   or	   technical	   capacity.	   It	   created	   a	   web-­‐based	   surveillance	   system	   to	   monitor	   avian	  influenza.	   In	   the	   future,	   it	   hopes	   to	   link	   all	   systems	   (the	  MOPH,	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Agriculture,	   and	  AFRIMS	  supported	  projects)	  to	  ensure	  sharing	  of	  “data	  on	  zoonotic	  illnesses	  between	  ministries	  at	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the	  provincial	   and	  national	   level.”74	  This	  will,	   it	   is	  hoped,	   reduce	   some	  of	   the	  gaps	   and	  provide	  a	  quicker	   response.	   In	   the	   end,	   Thailand	   slaughtered	   over	   62	   million	   birds;	   this	   decreased	   the	  transmission	  rate	  from	  animals	  to	  humans.	  Within	  2	  months,	  the	  number	  of	  human	  cases	  decreased	  significantly;	   however,	   if	   Thailand	   had	   detected	   H5N1	   more	   quickly	   and	   responded	   more	  aggressively,	  more	   lives	  might	  have	  been	  saved.75	  As	  Tiensin	  and	  others	  note,	   “the	  delay	  between	  primary	  infection,	  first	  diagnosis,	  and	  finding	  the	  initial	  case	  allowed	  widespread	  dissemination.”76	  	  While	  some	  see	  the	  epidemic	  as	  managed	  poorly	  by	  Thai	  government,	  many	  of	  the	  authors	  expressed	  confidence	  in	  Thailand’s	  surveillance	  capabilities.	  Once	  the	  Thai	  government	  decided	  to	  take	  action	  and	  announce	  the	  outbreak,	  the	  MOPH	  and	  the	  WHO	  established	  a	  surveillance	  system	  to	   interview	  patients	   from	  health	   care	   facilities	  with	   influenza	   or	   pneumonia	   symptoms	   to	   see	   if	  they	  had	  been	  exposed	  to	  poultry	  in	  the	  last	  seven	  days.77	  Safman	  states	  that:	  	  Although,	   there	  were	   substantial	   number	   of	   human	   infections	   (a	   total	   of	   25	   cases	  resulting	   in	   17	   deaths)	   during	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   epidemic,	   by	   late	   2006	   Thai	  public	   health	   officials	   appear	   to	   have	   been	   successful	   in	   decoupling	   the	   spread	   of	  infections	  in	  humans	  from	  poultry	  outbreaks	  and	  since	  2007	  no	  human	  cases	  of	  the	  disease	  have	  been	  recorded.78	  	  	  In	   addition,	   the	  MOPH	   has	   taken	   significant	   efforts	   to	   create	   a	   health	   prevention	   campaign	   that	  emphasizes	  best	  practices	  when	  consuming	  chickens.	  A	   recent	   study	  showed	   that	  while	  high-­‐risk	  behavior	   remains	   in	   handling	   poultry,	   the	   MOPH	   was	   effective	   in	   reaching	   the	   most	   rural	  populations.79	   In	   the	   future,	   Rushton	   and	   others	   suggest	   that	  more	   resources	   should	   go	   towards	  improving	  micro-­‐level	   impacts	  so	   that	   there	   is	  an	  “understanding	  of	   the	  winners	  and	   losers	   in	  an	  outbreak	   situation.”80	  This	  will	   allow	  policies	   and	  actions	   to	  be	   created	   in	   a	  way	   that	   encourages	  collaboration	  among	  actors.	  	  Although	  Thailand	  was	  hesitant	  to	  announce	  avian	  flu,	   it	  was	  “one	  of	  the	  first	  countries	  to	  define	   HIV/AIDS	   as	   a	   national	   security	   threat.”81	   Preventative	   HIV/AIDS	   education	   was	   first	  introduced	   by	   the	   Royal	   Thai	   army	   in	   the	   late	   1980s,82	   and	   was	   later	   announced	   as	   a	   national	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priority	   by	   the	   government	   from	   1993	   to	   1997.83	   The	   MOPH	   and	   other	   government	   agencies	  created	   a	   preventative	   HIV	   campaign	   that	   announced	   free	   condoms	   to	   all	   and	   explicitly	  recommended	   that	   all	   men	   use	   protection	   when	   engaging	   in	   commercial	   sex.84	   It	   was	   not	   until	  1997,	   when	   the	   campaign	   ended,	   that	   HIV	   cases	   peaked	   in	   Thailand.	   Punyacharoensin	   and	  Viwatwongkasem	  speculate	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  reported	  cases	  was	  either	  connected	  with	  the	  Thai	  economic	   crisis	   and/or	   the	   cases	   had	   been	   previously	   underreported:	   “…several	   projects	   were	  either	   downscaled	   or	   suspended,	   and	   HIV/AIDS	   programs	   were	   not	   an	   exception.	   Domestic	  HIV/AIDS	   funding	   fell	   from	   almost	   2.2	   billion	   Baht	   in	   1997	   to	   less	   than	   1.5	   billion.”85	   If	   free	  preventative	  health	  campaigns	  had	  not	  been	  cut,	  more	   individuals	  may	  have	  continued	  using	  safe	  sex	  practices.	  The	   MOPH	   and	   the	   CDC	   now	   report,	   “…over	   500,000	   persons	   in	   Thailand	   are	   HIV	  infected.”86	  AFRIMS	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  strengthening	  existing	  HIV/AIDS	  laboratories	  in	  Thailand;	  it	   was	   able	   to	   provide	   resources	   when	   requested	   by	   the	  MOPH	   and	   training	   on	   “biosafety,	   GLP,	  research	   methodology,	   relevant	   immunological,	   molecular	   and	   virological	   tests,	   storage,	   specific	  assays,	   and	   data	   management.”87	   In	   addition	   to	   AFRIMS,	   HIV/AIDS	   laboratories	   have	   received	  support	   from	   other	   entities	   such	   as	   the	   CDC,	   non-­‐governmental	   organizations,	   the	   WHO,	   and	  universities.	   The	   CDC	   and	   MOPH	   states:	   “Nearly	   80%	   of	   public	   hospitals	   now	   participate	   in	  HIVQUAL-­‐T.	   As	   a	   result,	   quality-­‐of-­‐care	   indicators	   in	   those	   hospitals	   are	   on	   the	   rise.”88	   Intense	  collaboration	  between	  partners	  has	  expanded	  Thai	  capabilities,	  but	  the	  reports	  above	  suggest	  that	  improvements	  in	  confidentiality	  practices	  and	  technology	  practices	  are	  still	  necessary.	  In	   contrast,	   according	   to	   the	   CDC,	   “During	   2009-­‐2010,	   a	   total	   of	   234,050	   influenza	   cases	  were	  reported	  in	  Thailand.	  Of	  these,	  47,433	  were	  laboratory-­‐confirmed	  to	  be	  A(H1N1)pdm09	  virus	  infections;	  347	  deaths	  were	  associated	  with	  the	  confirmed	  cases.”89	  One	  author	  found	  that	  67%	  of	  provinces	  were	  missing	  key	  equipment,	  such	  as	  medical	  ventilators,	  while	  others	  had	  a	  surplus	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Perez-­‐Losada	  et	  al.,	  “Phylodynamics	  of	  HIV-­‐1	  from	  a	  Phase	  III	  AIDS	  Vaccine	  Trial	  in	  Bangkok,	  Thailand,”	  1.	  84	  Hanenberg	  et	  al.,	  “Impact	  of	  Thailand	  HIV-­‐Control	  Program	  as	  Indicated	  by	  the	  Decline	  of	  Sexually	  Transmitted	  Diseases,”	  245.	  	  85	  Punyacharoensin	  and	  Viwatwongkasem,	  “Trends	  in	  three	  decades	  of	  HIV/AIDS	  epidemic	  in	  Thailand	  by	  nonparametric	  backcalculation	  method,”	  1150.	  	  86	  Thailand	  MOPH	  and	  CDC,	  “Partners	  in	  Progress:	  Biennial	  Report	  2009-­‐2010,”	  16.	  HIVQUAL-­‐T	  is	  a	  program	  that	  uses	  NHSO	  guidelines	  to	  improve	  quality	  of	  care	  for	  HIV	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  the	  immune	  system	  (CD4	  count),	  viral	  load	  monitoring,	  opportunistic	  infection	  prevention,	  tuberculosis	  screening,	  and	  promotion	  of	  antiretroviral	  treatment	  adherence	  are	  now	  increasingly	  common	  at	  HIV	  clinics	  in	  Thailand,	  thanks	  to	  HIVQUAL-­‐T.”	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resources.90	   Some	   authors	   mentioned	   financial	   concerns	   prohibiting	   Thailand	   from	   providing	  complete	   care.	   For	   example,	   the	   WHO	   recommends	   that	   all	   countries	   carry	   a	   20%	   stockpile	   of	  antivirals;	  however,	  Thailand	  had	  approximately	  1%	  prior	  to	  the	  A/H1N1	  pandemic	  because	  it	  was	  not	  financially	  feasible	  to	  store	  such	  a	  large	  amount.91	  To	  manage	  the	  outbreak,	  Thailand	  developed	  a	   health	   campaign	   that	   focused	   on	   safe	   practices	   for	   preventing	   the	   spread	   of	   influenza.	   Control	  measures	   included	   self-­‐isolation	   of	   infected	   cases,	   delaying	   mass	   gatherings,	   five-­‐day	   school	  closures,	  educational	  pamphlets,	  hand	  washing,	  and	  animal	  handling	  hygiene.92	  	  In	  2010,	  Thailand	  provided	  antiviral	  medication	  for	  at-­‐risk	  populations—elderly,	  pregnant	  women,	  and	  healthcare	  workers.	  One	  study	  showed	  that,	  although	  surveillance	  was	  extensive	  and	  preventative	   measures	   effective,	   better	   results	   could	   have	   been	   achieved	   by	   delaying	   school	   re-­‐openings,	   avoiding	   “epidemic	   rebound.”93	   The	  MOPH	   and	   the	  WHO	   did	   a	   joint	   study	   to	   evaluate	  lessons	   learned,	   mostly	   because	   they	   had	   received	   negative	   public	   feedback	   on	   pandemic	  management.	   Their	   results	   showed	   that	   the	   MOPH	   was	   transparent	   and	   handled	   the	   situations	  adequately.	   For	   future	   outbreaks,	   they	   recommended	   that	   more	   attention	   be	   placed	   on	  “surveillance,	   laboratory	  capacity,	  hospital	   infection	  control	  and	  surge	  capacity,	  coordination,	  and	  monitoring	   of	   guidelines	   for	   clinical	   management	   and	   non-­‐pharmaceutical	   interventions,	   risk	  communications,	  and	  addressing	  vulnerabilities	  of	  non-­‐Thai	  displaced	  and	  migrant	  populations.”94	  While	   there	   are	  many	   lessons	   to	   learn,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	  EID	   surveillance	  capabilities	   and	   strengths	   in	   developing	   countries	   vary	   from	   region	   to	   region.	   Because	   there	   are	  weak	  links	  in	  the	  system,	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  understand	  how	  competently	  one	  country	  can	  manage	  a	  pandemic.95	  There	  have	  been	  multiple	  studies	  assessing	  EID	  surveillance	  and	  national	  healthcare	  capacity,	   but	   little	   has	   been	   done	   to	   explain	   the	   complexity	   and	   constant	   change	   in	   pandemic	  policies.	  This	  report	   is	  unique	   in	  that	   it	  evaluates	  capacity	  as	  well	  as	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  encounters	  that	  can	  alter	  decisions	  in	  regards	  to	  disease	  surveillance.	  By	  examining	  lessons	  learned	  and	  evaluating	  key	  players,	  health	  experts	  can	  create	  surveillance	  systems	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  that	  are	  more	  effective	  and	  specific	  to	  host	  countries’	  needs.	  
	  
Methodology	  
	   The	   purpose	   of	   this	   report	   is	   to	   create	   a	   list	   of	   lessons	   learned	   and	   best	   practices	   for	  dissemination	   to	  other	  developing	  countries,	   so	   they	  can	   improve	   their	  EID	  surveillance	  systems.	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To	   prepare,	   we	   took	   insights	   from	   the	   literature	   review	   above	   and	   created	   a	   qualitative	  comparative	   case	   study	   that	   examines	   the	   state	   of	   diagnostic	   labs	   in	   Thailand.	   Moreover,	   we	  considered	   the	   political,	   economic,	   and	   cultural	   barriers	   that	   affect	   disease	   surveillance	   and	  evaluated	   the	   impact	   these	   factors	   had	   on	   relationships	   between	   government	   agencies,	   private	  institutions,	   and	   international	   organizations.	   The	   discussions	   were	   based	   on	   previous	   research	  examining	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  Naval	  Area	  Medical	  Research	  Unit	  2	  (NAMRU-­‐2)	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  the	  country’s	  declaration	  of	  viral	  sovereignty	  (viruses	  belong	  to	  the	  country	  in	  which	  they	  are	  found),	  the	  experience	  of	  Cambodia	  with	  respect	  to	  EID	  surveillance,	  and	  Mexico’s	  handling	  of	  A/H1N1	  in	  2009.	   The	   ultimate	   goal	   is	   to	   create	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   potential	   indicators	   for	   conflict	  (military	  and	   international),	  so	   that	   labs	  can	   improve	  systems	  and	  prevent	   future	  closures	  within	  host	  countries’	  governments.	  	  These	   interviews	  followed	  a	  semi-­‐structured	  format	  and	  were	  conducted	  with	  the	  help	  of	  two	   research	   assistants	   in	   June	   2012.	   The	   team	   interviewed	  nearly	   30	   public	   health	   experts	   and	  gathered	   more	   than	   100	   pages	   of	   notes	   in	   the	   span	   of	   a	   week.	   Moreover,	   since	   the	   author	   is	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School	  and	  the	  research	  is	  somewhat	  sensitive	  in	  nature,	  the	  majority	  of	  interviewees	  requested	  a	  proposal,	  a	  list	  of	  sample	  questions,	  and	  a	  CV	  in	  the	  preceding	  weeks	  for	  their	  superiors	  to	  review	  and	  approve.	  Additional	  background	  information	  was	  provided	  to	  ensure	  that	  interviewees	  understood	  that	  the	  goal	  was	  to	  assist	  developing	  countries	  struggling	  to	   build	   effective	   disease	   surveillance	   systems,	   and	   not	   to	   critique	   their	   organizations	   or	   host	  country.	  Building	   rapport	   increased	   the	   likelihood	  of	  honest	   responses	  and	  ensured	  an	  enhanced	  collaborative	  environment	  so	  that	  the	  report	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  the	  organizations	  involved.	  
	  
Results	  	  Throughout	   the	   study,	   several	   interviews	  were	   set	   up	   in	   Bangkok	   to	   identify	   economic,	   political,	  and	   cultural	   barriers	   that	   could	   potentially	   prohibit	   Thailand	   from	   implementing	   a	   strong	   EID	  surveillance	   system.	   In	   the	   end,	   the	   author	   conducted	   14	   individual	   interviews	   and	   four	   group	  interviews,	  meeting	  approximately	  30	  public	  health	  officials	   in	  government,	  non-­‐government,	  and	  donor	   agencies.	   Table	   3.1	   lists	   the	   most	   commonly	   identified	   barriers	   in	   the	   order	   of	   their	  importance	  by	  frequency	  across	  interviews.	  	  	  
Table	  3.1	  Thailand:	  Key	  Issues	  Identified	  in	  Bangkok	  Interviews	  
Political	  Barriers	  
Percent	  of	  Interviews	  That	  
Identified	  Barriers	  Miscommunication	  between	  health	  organizations	   10	  of	  18	  =	  55%	  Health	  organizations	  have	  overlapping	  missions	  and	  objectives/lack	  of	  collaboration	   9	  of	  18	  =	  50%	  International	  organizations	  looking	  out	  for	  self-­‐interests	  and	  not	  host-­‐country	  (e.g.:	  publishing)	   7	  of	  18	  =	  38%	  Government	  bureaucracies	  between	  AFRIMS	  and	  Thailand	   7	  of	  18	  =	  38%	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Centralized	  health	  care,	  moving	  to	  more	  decentralized	  approach	   2	  of	  18	  =	  11%	  
Economic	  Barriers	  
Percent	  of	  Interviews	  That	  
Identified	  Barriers	  Gap	  with	  border	  areas,	  primarily	  because	  of	  migration	   6	  of	  18	  =	  33%	  Difficult	  to	  keep	  trained	  technicians	  in	  rural	  areas	   5	  of	  18	  =	  28%	  Tourism	  and	  poultry	  industry	   5	  of	  18	  =	  28%	  Government/Political	  parties	  not	  seeing	  health	  as	  priority,	  budget	  goes	  to	  defense	  and	  education.	   4	  of	  18	  =	  22%	  
Cultural	  Barriers	  
Percent	  of	  Interviews	  That	  
Identified	  Barriers	  Mistrust	  in	  international	  community	  (suspicious	  of	  what	  happened	  in	  Indonesia)/data	  transfer	  difficult	   7	  of	  18	  =	  38%	  Superiority	  and	  age	   6	  of	  18	  =	  33%	  Rabies-­‐	  cannot	  get	  rid	  of	  dogs	   3	  of	  18	  =	  17%	  Thai	  experts	  non-­‐confrontational	   3	  of	  18	  =	  17%	  Traditional	  medicine	  often	  used	  first	   2	  of	  18	  =	  11%	  
Note:	  Some	  interviews	  included	  more	  than	  one	  expert.	  
Source:	  Analysis	  of	  interviews	  conducted.	  
	  
Specific	  Political	  Findings	  in	  Thailand	  
	   Thailand	  has	  contributed	  to	  funding	  and	  building	  human	  health	  programs,	  yet	   it	  still	   lacks	  the	  capacity	  to	  manage	  the	  economic,	  political,	  and	  cultural	  barriers	  that	  come	  from	  working	  with	  agencies	   with	   disparate	   interests.	   Unlike	   many	   developing	   countries,	   Thailand	   has	   an	   advanced	  ability	  to	  undertake	  disease	  surveillance.	  For	  example,	  when	  interviewers	  inquired	  about	  whether	  basic	   needs	   such	   as	   laboratory	   equipment,	   technology,	   human	   resources,	   and	   experienced	   staff	  were	  met,	  interviewees	  overwhelmingly	  stated	  that	  it	  was	  not	  a	  concern.	  As	  Health	  Expert	  4	  notes,	  “this	   is	   because	   of	   our	   extensive	   health	   care	   system;	   the	   skeleton	   already	   existed;”	   this	  infrastructure	  was	  implemented	  at	  the	  community	  level	  prior	  to	  any	  serious	  outbreak.	  	  Thailand’s	   focus	   on	   disaster	   management	   and	   human	   health	   has	   produced	   a	   superior	  network.	  Thailand	  was	  able	  to	  use	  its	  trained	  village	  health	  volunteers	  and	  request	  assistance	  from	  its	  natural	  disaster	  referral	  system	  to	  respond	  quickly	  to	  the	  Avian	  Flu	  outbreak.	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  Health	  Expert	  2,	   the	  majority	  of	  countries	   in	  Southeast	  Asia	  view	  Thailand	  as	  a	  regional	   leader	  and	  use	  it	  as	  a	  model	  for	  surveillance	  systems.	  From	  2006-­‐2009,	  the	  CDC’s	  Global	  Disease	  Detection	  (GDD)-­‐Thailand	  program	  responded	  to	  39	  outbreaks,	  established	  capacity	  for	  27	  pathogen-­‐specific	  tests,	   discovered	   12	   new	   pathogens	   in	   the	   region	   or	   the	   world,	   and	   trained	   7,421	   public	   health	  officials	   from	  over	  20	   countries.96	  Furthermore,	  Thailand	  has	  expanded	   its	   cross-­‐border	  program	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by	   evaluating	   frequency,	   creating	   new	   strategies	   to	   collaborate	   regionally,	   and	   by	   providing	  resources	  to	  less	  developed	  countries.	  	  	  
Overlapping	  Missions	  and	  Objectives	  
	   Staff	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  conduct	  surveillance,	  but	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  interviewees	  felt	  that	  Thailand	   struggles	   to	   effectively	   collaborate	   on	   interests	   between	   health	   sectors	   and	   bordering	  countries,	   especially	   when	   evaluating	   the	   ability	   to	   detect	   disease	   in	   animals	   before	   it	   reaches	  humans.	   Interviewees	  and	  donor	  agencies	   complained	  about	   the	   small	   amount	  of	  attention	  going	  towards	   zoonotic	   surveillance.	   They	   recommended	   that	   Thailand	   continue	   to	   restructure	   its	  programs	   to	   fit	   the	   One	   Health	   Concept,	   which	   links	   systems	   “…	   by	   enhancing	   cooperation	   and	  collaboration	   between	   physicians,	   veterinarians,	   other	   scientific	   health	   and	   environmental	  professionals	  and	  by	  promoting	  strengths	  in	  leadership	  and	  management	  to	  achieve	  these	  goals.”97	  	  The	   MOPH’s	   missions	   and	   objectives	   diverge	   from	   the	   missions	   and	   objectives	   of	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Agriculture	   or	   the	  Department	   of	  Wildlife,	   explains	  Donor	   Staff	   2:	   provinces	   and	   key	  internationals	   organizations	   are	  working	   autonomously	   to	   tackle	  EID	   surveillance	   systems.	   If	   the	  animal	  and	  human	  sector	  aligned	  their	  efforts,	  they	  could	  prevent	  duplication	  of	  tasks	  and	  reduce	  misunderstandings	   that	   come	   from	   assuming	   that	   one	   sector	  will	  manage	   a	   specific	   assignment.	  Health	  Expert	  3	  suggests	  that	  the	  government	  includes	  more	  experts	  when	  proposing	  a	  solution	  to	  handling	  an	  outbreak.	  Now,	   the	  MOPH	   is	   the	  primary	  actor,	  but	   it	  has	  had	   to	   reduce	  surveillance	  teams	   because	   of	   reduced	   government	   funding.	   To	   ensure	   funds	   are	   distributed	   correctly	   and	  farmers	   are	   properly	   compensated,	   “More	   money	   needs	   to	   go	   towards	   supervising	   the	   MOPH,”	  states	  Health	  Expert	  3.	  In	  the	  future,	  it	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  include	  provinces	  assessment	  because	  they	  may	  have	  ideas	  on	  ways	  to	  be	  resourceful,	  especially	  if	  areas	  that	  have	  dealt	  with	  emergencies.	  	  
	  
Miscommunications	  Between	  Health	  Organizations	  
	   Donor	   Staff	   3	   believes	   that	   Thailand’s	   main	   obstacle	   is	   managing	   miscommunication	  between	   actors,	   describing	   the	   situation	   as	   a	   “competitive	   relationship.”	   While	   many	   of	   the	  interviewees	   agreed	   miscommunication	   was	   a	   factor,	   the	   majority	   experienced	   the	   competitive	  environment	   in	   laboratories:	  every	  scientist	  wants	   to	  be	   the	   first	   to	  get	   the	  specimen	  so	   they	  can	  announce	   and	   publish	   results.	   For	   example,	   during	   the	   Avian	   Flu	   outbreak	   in	   2004,	   the	   Prime	  Minister	  and	  Director	  General	  agreed	  to	  let	  the	  Department	  of	  Agriculture	  be	  the	  first	  to	  announce	  that	  it	  had	  found	  human	  cases	  of	  Avian	  Flu	  in	  Thailand.	  However,	  for	  some	  reason,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	   declared	   it	   one	   hour	   prior.	   This	   action	   created	   tension	   between	   the	   two	   Ministries	   and	  instilled	  mistrust	  within	  the	  health	  community.	  Communications	  of	  outbreaks	  have	  been	  mishandled	  in	  the	  past.	  According	  to	  Donor	  Staff	  3,	  when	  a	  visiting	  group	  first	  contracted	  A/H1N1,	  the	  MOPH	  called	  a	  press	  conference	  in	  the	  interest	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of	   transparency,	   asking	   the	   CDC	   and	   WHO	   to	   join.	   The	   MOPH	   announced	   the	   outbreak,	   but,	   to	  protect	  the	  families,	  refused	  comment.	  The	  resulting	  media	  frenzy	  spiraled	  out	  of	  control;	  members	  of	   the	   press	   believed	   that	   they	   had	   a	   right	   to	   know	   if	   there	  was	   an	   actual	   outbreak.	   Had	   health	  experts	  and	   the	   international	   community	  generated	  an	  action	  plan	  before	   the	  announcement,	   the	  press	  would	  have	  not	  reacted	  so	  harshly.	  The	  good	  news	  is	  that	  the	  MOPH	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  come	  when	  various	  groups	  transmit	  conflicting	  information,	  and	  has	  put	  together	  a	  committee	  that	  controls	  messages	  to	  the	  public.	  Now,	  it	  tries	  to	  be	  proactive	  with	  the	  media	  and	  “bring	  people	  to	  talk	  about	  opinions	  and	  in	  the	  end	  have	  one	  person	  speak	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  committee,”	  says	  Local	  Donor	   Staff	   1.	   This	   has	   helped,	   but	   there	   are	   still	   a	   few	   groups	  which	   the	  MOPH	   cannot	   control.	  Local	  Donor	  1	  especially	  sees	  this	  with	  politicians:	  “We	  try	  to	  prep	  politicians	  …	  but	  cannot	  control	  what	  they	  say.”	  To	   lessen	  the	  competition,	  Donor	  Staff	  3	  recommends	   identifying	  comparative	  advantages	  and	  constraints	  when	  working	  with	  partners.	  International	  partners—ostensibly	  neutral	  parties—could	  leverage	  capacity	  and	  stimulate	  cooperation	  between	  conflicting	  health	  sectors.	  Local	  Donor	  Staff	   1	   felt	   that	   inconsistencies	   were	   rooted	   in	   the	   MOPH’s	   inability	   to	   officially	   meet	   with	   the	  secretary,	  steering	  committee,	  and	  technical	  committee	  to	  create	  common	  objectives.	  “We	  have	  not	  met	   formally	   for	   3-­‐4	   years,”	   states	   Local	   Donor	   Staff	   1.	   These	  meetings	   are	   often	   scheduled,	   but	  cancelled,	  because	  they	  consist	  of	  senior	  officials,	  who	  are	  focused	  on	  multiple	  initiatives.	  There	  are	  many	   informal	   meetings	   taking	   place	   between	   health	   organizations	   to	   mesh	   objectives,	   but	   the	  challenge	   is	   that	   new	   procedures	   cannot	   be	   initiated	   unless	   they	   are	   approved	   formally.	   Both	  technical	  and	  higher-­‐level	  MOPH	  staff	   should	  be	  more	  engaged	   in	   the	  process	   in	   the	  beginning	  of	  their	  employment,	  explains	  Local	  Donor	  Staff	  1.	  With	  the	  constant	  change	  of	  policies	  and	  American	  directors,	  and	  Thai	  counterparts	  always	  rotating,	  consensus	  is	  difficult.	  	  
	  
Bureaucracy	  between	  AFRIMS,	  International	  Organizations,	  and	  Thai	  Government	  	  
	  	   While	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   criticize	   the	  MOPH	   for	  miscommunication,	   it	   also	   should	  be	  noted	   that	  some	  of	  the	  challenges	  are	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  international	  organization	  and	  the	  Thai	   government.	   For	   instance,	   research	   funds	   are	   given	   for	   a	   short	   period	   of	   time	   and	   “from	  project	  to	  project,”	  explains	  Thai	  Government	  Official	  3.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  gap	  in	  funding	  or	  if	  AFRIMS	  has	  restrictions	  on	  how	  funds	  are	  used,	  the	  MOPH	  may	  prioritize	  tasks	  or	  manage	  projects	  differently.	  Even	  when	  research	   is	  approved	  and	   funds	  are	  guaranteed,	   there	  are	  still	  obstacles	   to	  overcome.	  U.S.	   Government	   Expert	   2	   sees	   this	  with	   veterinary	   surveillance.	   If	   animals	   are	   endangered	   or	   if	  they	   are	   being	   monitored	   in	   a	   certain	   area,	   permits	   can	   be	   blocked.	   The	   best	   way	   to	   deal	   with	  challenges	  is	  to	  maintain	  a	  positive	  attitude,	  says	  U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  2;	  “learn	  the	  culture,	  love	  the	  culture,	  but	  realize	  that	  you	  can	  only	  abide	  to	  certain	  practices.”	  	  Gaining	  approval	  for	  certain	  projects	  in	  AFRIMS	  can	  also	  be	  problematic.	  As	  Health	  Expert	  1	  remarks,	  AFRIMS	  staff	  cannot	  work	  outside	  their	  chain	  of	  command,	  and	  the	  finishing	  officer,	  who	  approves	   all	   projects,	   usually	   has	   no	   vested	   interest	   to	   complete	   the	   task.	   Vital	   processes	   are	  frequently	   being	   stopped	   for	   review,	  which	   prevents	   a	   quick	   response	   from	   health	   experts.	   This	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becomes	  especially	  difficult	  if	  Thai	  government	  and	  international	  institutions’	  rules	  and	  regulations	  are	  contradictory;	   for	  example,	  when	  the	  overseas	   Institutional	  Review	  Board	  (IRB)	  processes	  do	  not	  connect	  with	  in-­‐country	  IRBs,	  states	  U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  2.	  	  
	  
International	  Organizations	  Looking	  Out	  for	  Individual-­‐Interests	  
	   On	   a	   positive	   note,	   Thailand	   has	   the	   resources,	   laboratories,	   and	   equipment	   to	   ensure	  strong	   research	   capacity	   and	   infection	   control.	   Health	   Expert	   1	   agrees	   that	   the	   necessary	  infrastructure	   is	  available	  but	   is	  concerned	  because	   local	  diseases	  are	  not	  always	  prioritized.	  The	  diseases	  that	  are	  researched	  are	  usually	  of	  interest	  to	  internationals	  or	  the	  military,	  since	  they	  are	  the	  primary	  sponsors.	  The	  example	  given	  was	  Melioidosis,	  an	  emerging	  infectious	  disease	  that	  most	  commonly	  affects	  rice	  farmers	  in	  Thailand.	  According	  to	  Health	  Expert	  1,	  it	  kills	  more	  people	  than	  malaria	   in	   Cambodia,	   but	   it	   is	   unknown	   to	   the	  majority	   of	   people	   in	   Thailand	   because	   it	  mainly	  affects	   the	   poor	   and	   requires	   special,	   costly	   treatment.	   International	   organizations,	   like	   AFRIMS,	  could	   be	   useful	   in	   initiating	   programs	   that	   particularly	   affect	   rural	   areas.	   Host-­‐country	   focused	  disease	  research	  would	  highlight	  how	  AFRIMS	  and	  other	  international	  organizations	  contribute	  to	  improving	  surveillance	  programs.	  When	   international	   organizations	   emphasize	   their	   research	   interests,	   they	   are	   often	  perceived	  as	  burdens	  to	  a	  host	  country.	  As	  U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  4	  states,	  there	  must	  be	  buy-­‐in:	  the	  host	  country	  must	  want	  you	  there.	  Even	  though	  the	  majority	  of	  experts	  felt	  that	  the	  MOPH	  and	  AFRIMS	  had	  a	  positive	  relationship	  (and	  thought	  highly	  of	  the	  AFRIMS	  reference	  lab),	  there	  were	  a	  few	   health	   experts	   that	   mentioned	   challenges	   that	   caused	   conflict.	   The	   biggest	   criticism	   was	  AFRIMS	  officials	  wanting	  to	  be	  the	  main	  principal	  investigators	  (PIs)	  on	  the	  research	  project.	  When	  Thai	  experts	  expressed	  the	  concern	  that	  they	  were	  being	  exploited,	  AFRIMS	  was	  quick	  to	  change	  its	  model	   so	   that	   Thais	   received	   credit.	   While	   this	   has	   improved	   the	   relationship,	   Health	   Expert	   1	  states	   that	   research	   funding	   remains	   competitive	   between	   both	   parties.	   Donor	   Staff	   1	   has	   found	  that	  organizations	  deal	  with	  the	  bureaucracy	  by	  being	  more	  proactive;	  for	  example,	  one	  university	  has	   an	   agreement	  with	   national	   parks	   that	   reduces	   the	   redundancy	   of	   the	   approval	   process,	   yet	  assures	  national	  parks	  that	  they	  are	  meeting	  the	  appropriate	  standards.	  In	  addition,	  Thai	  Government	  Official	  3	  mentioned	  the	  emphasis	  on	  publishing	  from	  AFRIMS	  and	  other	  international	  organizations.	  Interviewees	  felt	  the	  pressure	  to	  publish,	  and	  this	  generated	  more	   division	   than	   partnership.	   U.S.	   Government	   Official	   2	   recommends	   that	   international	  organizations	  expect	  outside	  staff	  to	  stay	  for	  the	  long	  term	  so	  that	  they	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  feel	  pushed	  to	  publish	  and	  cut	  corners.	  Krumkamp	  and	  others	  agree	  that	  there	  is	  an	  “under-­‐representation	  of	  research	   in	   developing	   countries,	   ranging	   from	   poor	   research	   capacity	   to	   publication	   bias	   of	  journals	   against	   so-­‐called	   ‘disease	   of	   poverty.’”98	   More	   emphasis	   needs	   to	   be	   placed	   on	   actual	  surveillance	  in	  Thailand	  and	  less	  on	  clinical	  studies	  of	  the	  state	  of	  illnesses,	  says	  Health	  Expert	  1.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Krumkamp	  et	  al.,	  “Health	  Service	  Resources,”	  8.	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While	   the	   international	   community	   needs	   to	   assist	   host-­‐countries	   in	   building	   capacity,	   it	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  careful	  in	  giving	  too	  much	  support,	  especially	  in	  advanced	  technology.	  If	  the	  U.S.-­‐component	   of	   AFRIMS	   donates	   technology,	   it	   needs	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   host	   country	   has	   the	  capabilities	  for	  maintenance,	  explains	  U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  4.	  When	  asking	  if	  this	  was	  a	  problem	  in	  Thailand,	  the	  majority	  of	  experts	  said	  that	  Thai	  experts	  knew	  the	  risk	  of	  developing	  too	  quickly	  and	  were	  capable	  of	  maintaining	  their	  own	  laboratories	  and	  equipment.	  The	  other	  challenge	   is	   to	  build	   sustainable	   programs.	   “If	   you	   build	   programs	   without	   asking	   them	   if	   they	   want	   it,	   it	   will	  guarantee	   failure.	   The	   country	  will	   never	  want	   to	   take	   it	   over,”	   observes	   Local	  Donor	   Staff	   1.	   To	  create	  a	  successful	  program,	  Local	  Donor	  Staff	  1	  recommends	  building	  a	  system	  within	  the	  MOPH	  and	  collaborating	  with	  donors	  to	  ensure	  that	  there	  is	  mutual	  interest.	  
	  
Specific	  Economic	  Findings	  in	  Thailand	  	  
Money	  Matters	  
	   In	   the	   past,	   markets	   in	   Thailand	   had	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	   implementation	   of	   EID	  surveillance.	  Exporting	  poultry	  and	  tourism	  were	  two	  of	  Thailand’s	  main	  economic	  justifications	  for	  delaying	   the	   announcement	   of	   Avian	   Flu	   in	   2004.	   After	   interviewing	  multiple	   health	   experts,	  we	  found	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  interviewees	  expressed	  concern	  that	  budget	  constraints	  could	  potentially	  influence	  how	  policy	  makers	  react	   to	   future	  outbreaks.	  Foreign	   investment	   receives	  priority	  over	  public	   health	   initiatives	   because	   Thailand’s	   economy	   would	   crash	   without	   tourists	   and	   exports.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  MOPH	  did	  not	  learn	  from	  past	  events;	  most	  interviewees	  stated	  that	  the	  MOPH	  has	  taken	  significant	  steps	  to	  enhance	  transparency	  about	  new	  pathogens.	  The	  government	  realized	   its	   mistakes	   and	   took	   steps	   to	   improve	   emergency	   risk	   communications	   for	   senior	  representatives.	   However,	   recent	   situations	   such	   as	   the	   2011	   Chang	   Mai	   incident,	   during	   which	  multiple	  tourists	  died	  suddenly	  from	  a	  mysterious	  illness	  in	  the	  same	  hotel	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  few	  weeks,	   have	   shown	   that	   provinces	   may	   still	   be	   hesitant	   in	   speaking	   about	   the	   severity	   of	   an	  outbreak.	  Donor	  Staff	  3	  notes	  that	  continued	  efforts	  towards	  convincing	  local	  institutions	  to	  report	  unusual	   illnesses	   are	   important.	   Thailand’s	   commitment	   to	   open	   communications	   regarding	  potential	   outbreaks	  will	   be	  determined	  by	  political	   issues	  within	  Thailand	  and	   its	   ability	   to	   trust	  that	  the	  international	  community	  has	  its	  best	  interest	  at	  heart.	  The	  Thai	   government	   could	   have	   announced	  Avian	   Flu	   sooner,	   but	   experts	   did	   positively	  comment	  on	  how	  the	  government	  dealt	  with	  the	  poultry	  sector.	  The	  prime	  minister	  compensated	  approximately	  75%	  of	  market	  price	  to	   farmers,	  says	  Thai	  Government	  Official	  3.	  The	  government	  was	   active	   and	   decisive	   in	   choosing	   how	   to	   compensate	   farmers,	   which	   greatly	   improved	   field	  operations	   and	   response	   times.	   Additionally,	   the	   MOPH	   spent	   time	   speaking	   to	   individuals	   who	  resisted	  killing	  chickens	  so	   that	   locals	  understood	   the	  severity	  of	   the	  situation.	  According	   to	  Thai	  Government	   Official	   3,	   the	   key	   to	   dealing	  with	   a	   local	   outbreak	   is	   communication:	   “If	   neighbors	  recognize	   that	   killing	   chickens	   prevents	   their	   neighbors	   from	   getting	   it,	   they	   will	   do	   it.”	   Health	  Expert	   3	   agreed	   that	   poultry	   compensation	  was	  managed	   adequately,	   but	   felt	   that	  more	   funding	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should	  have	  gone	  to	  social	  services	  and	  spread	  to	  certain	  regions	  that	  received	  less	  assistance	  and	  financial	   compensation.	   Providing	   social	   services	   would	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   international	  community	  and	  the	  MOPH	  were	  looking	  out	  for	  the	  province’s	  best	  interest.	  
	  
Health	  As	  a	  Priority	  
	   Recently,	   there	   has	   been	   a	   push	   to	   provide	  more	   research	   and	   greater	   health	   resources.	  Creating	   EID	   sustainable	   surveillance	   infrastructure	   in	   Thailand	   is	   problematic	   because	   the	  government	  does	  not	  always	  prioritize	   surveillance;	   the	  majority	  of	   its	   funds	  go	   towards	  defense	  and	   education.	   Health	   Expert	   6,	   for	   example,	   states	   that	   the	   “government	   is	   trying	   to	   increase	  research	   and	   development	   to	   1%	   of	   GDP,	   but	   it	   is	   still	   only	   at	   0.4-­‐0.5%.”	   The	   private	   sector	   has	  contributed	   funding,	   significantly	   improving	   surveillance	   systems.	   Furthermore,	   policy	   makers	  need	   to	   emphasize	   the	   importance	   of	   EID	   surveillance.	  Having	   a	   health	   advocate	   is	   important	   to	  educating	  the	  public	  about	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  issue,	  explains	  Health	  Expert	  3:	  “we	  need	  to	  tell	  the	  public	  how	  the	  disease	  spreads,	  how	  to	  prevent	  it,	  and	  how	  to	  behave	  during	  an	  outbreak.”	  Health	  Expert	  6	  recommends	  funneling	  more	  funds	  towards	  the	  Department	  of	  Livestock	  to	  build	  capacity	  to	  conduct	  animal	  surveillance	  and	  detect	  diseases	  before	  they	  jump	  to	  humans.	  Thailand	   lacks	   funds,	   but	   it	   has	   many	   investments	   and	   is	   transparent	   regarding	   asset	  distribution.	  Corruption	   is	  not	  a	  problem	   from	  a	   technical	   level.	  There	   is	  a	   strict	  audit	  process;	   if	  projects	  are	  not	  accomplished,	  the	  bureau	  of	  administrative	  funds	  will	  not	  allocate	  the	  funds,	  says	  Health	   Expert	   3.	   Resource	   allocation	   decisions	   are	   currently	   centralized,	   but	   a	   few	   interviewees	  expressed	   doubts	   about	   pending	   decentralization.	   Giving	   more	   power	   and	   resources	   to	   local	  governments	  could	  potentially	  increase	  economic	  barriers	  to	  the	  health	  system	  in	  Thailand.	  Health	  expert	   4	   explains	   this	   further:	   “Since	  most	   locals	   lack	   experience	  with	   financial	   decision	  making,	  there	   is	   concern	   that	   less	   will	   go	   towards	   health	   and	   more	   towards	   infrastructure.”	   With	  infrastructure,	  there	  is	  more	  to	  gain	  financially	  for	  locals.	  Thailand’s	  construction	  companies	  would	  be	   able	   to	   profit	   immensely,	   improve	   employment	   opportunities,	   and	   provide	   business	   ventures	  with	   funds	   that	   are	   supposed	   to	   be	   specifically	   allocated	   towards	   disease	   surveillance	   projects.	  Health	  Expert	  4	  recommends	  that	  the	  central	  government	  take	  an	  advisory	  role	  and	  require	  a	  final	  assessment	  to	  ensure	  that	  funds	  are	  being	  distributed	  to	  the	  public	  health	  sector.	  Health	  Expert	  1	  agrees	  that	  surveillance	  is	  done	  best	  when	  leadership	  is	  at	  the	  top;	  however,	  to	  gather	  best	  results,	  the	   person	   leading	   initiatives	   should	   be	   someone	   with	   a	   political	   background	   and	   strong	  connections	  so	  that	  he	  or	  she	  can	  have	  some	  influence	  within	  government.	  	  
	  
Difficulty	  in	  Keeping	  Trained	  Technicians	  in	  Rural	  Areas	  
	   Compared	  to	  other	  developing	  countries,	  Thailand	  has	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  EID	  surveillance	  training	  programs.	  The	  majority	  of	  interviewees	  said	  that	  it	  was	  not	  difficult	  to	  keep	  Thai	  experts	  in	  the	  country	  because	  they	  are	  paid	  a	  decent	  wage.	  If	  individuals	  do	  leave,	  they	  usually	  go	  to	  the	  CDC	  or	  another	  international	  organization,	  says	  U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  1.	  Thailand	  continues	  to	  expand	  
[54]	  	  
its	   qualified	   staff	   by	   providing	   special	   funds	   for	   research	   and	   advanced	   education.	   Moreover,	  academics	  may	  be	  awarded	  a	  one-­‐time	  bonus	  if	  they	  receive	  a	  grant	  or	  publish.	  “By	  giving	  a	  grant,	  there	   is	  a	  salary	   incentive	   to	  stay	   in	  Thailand,”	  expresses	  Health	  Expert	  6.	  While	   there	  are	  grants	  available	  to	  Ph.D.	  students,	  Health	  Expert	  7	  said	  that	  it	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  access	  due	  to	  limitations.	  The	  MOPH	  also	  gives	  a	  10,000	  baht	  bonus	  to	  government	  workers.	  “The	  challenge	  is	  that	  people	  can	  make	  more	  money	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  the	  salary	  is	  double,”	  states	  Health	  Expert	  3.	  If	  individuals	  do	  work	  for	  the	  MOPH,	  they	  usually	  are	  doing	  contract	  work	  on	  the	  side.	  Rural	  areas	  are	  somewhat	  strong	   in	   regards	   to	   infrastructure,	   but	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   retain	   skilled	   staff,	   making	   it	   difficult	   to	  maintain	  the	  sustainability	  of	  surveillance	  systems.	  Staff	  need	  to	  be	  trained	  from	  the	  ground	  up,	  but	  generally	   do	   not	  want	   to	   stay	   in	   rural	   areas.	   “As	   soon	   as	   they	   receive	   training,	   they	   leave	   to	   the	  capital,”	  explains	  Health	  Expert	  1.	  It	  is	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  train	  individuals	  in	  rural	  areas	  to	  do	  veterinary	  surveillance	  because	  many	  vets	  prefer	  to	  work	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  with	  household	  pets.	  Every	  year,	   less	  attention	  is	  allocated	  for	  the	  animal	  sector	  and	  the	  shortage	  of	  trained	  veterinary	  specialists	  increases,	  says	  Health	  Expert	  4.	  The	  CDC	  and	  the	  MOPH	  are	  aware	  that	  vets	  lack	  capacity	  and	  have	  introduced	  a	  new	  program	  called	  “Field	  Epidemiology	  Training	  Program	  for	  Veterinarians	  (FETP-­‐V),	  which	  aims	  to	  increase	  expertise	  and	  capacity	  in	  zoonotic	  epidemiology.”99	  Migration	   from	   bordering	   countries	   can	   be	   a	   huge	   hurdle	   for	  most	   developing	   countries.	  Thailand	  is	  not	  an	  exception;	   it	  wants	  to	  attract	  migrants	  for	  the	  cheap	  labor,	  but	  is	  also	  aware	  of	  the	  difficulties	  that	  can	  occur	  when	  collaborating	  with	  neighbors.	  Migrants	  are	  particularly	  prone	  to	  emerging	   infectious	   diseases	   in	   the	   Mekong	   Basin	   Region	   because	   their	   living	   conditions	   are	  extremely	   difficult,	   says	   Donor	   Staff	   3.	   According	   to	   Coker,	   “Thailand	   is	   estimated	   to	   have	   1.5-­‐2	  million	  immigrants	  from	  neighboring	  countries,	  and	  about	  150,000	  refugees.	  Large-­‐scale	  migration	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  refugees,	  including	  the	  frequent	  movements	  of	  hill	  tribe	  populations	  along	  with	  their	  livestock,	  present[s]	  substantial	  challenges	  to	  cross-­‐border	  disease	  control	  in	  the	  Mekong	  Basin	   subregion.”100	   Diseases	   continue	   to	   spread	   through	   bordering	   areas,	   yet	   countries	   and	  regions	  will	  not	  come	  to	  a	  consensus	  or	  talk	  about	  important	  underlying	  issues.	  Additionally,	  rural	  locals	   often	   use	   traditional	   medicine	   when	   they	   first	   experience	   symptoms	   of	   illness,	   so	   health	  officials	  may	   be	   unaware	   of	   the	   initial	   outbreak	   until	   it	   spreads	   to	   another	   location.	   The	   lack	   of	  collaboration	   makes	   strategizing	   and	   sharing	   information	   particularly	   difficult	   between	   local,	  international,	  and	  regional	  groups	  working	  in	  rural	  areas.	  	  While	   Thailand	   struggles	   with	   providing	   services	   to	   migrants,	   the	   Joint	   Review	   on	  Preparedness	  and	  Response	   report	   states	   that	   the	   core	   challenges	  are	   cramped	   living	   conditions,	  limited	   resources	   for	   staff,	   training	   on	   clinical	   practice	   guidelines,	   and	   preventative	   health	  education.	  The	  study	  found	  that	  Thailand	  had	  sufficient	  capacity	  to	  conduct	  human	  surveillance.101	  Donor	  Staff	  3,	  who	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  study,	  said	  that	  communication	  was	  weak	  in	  assisting	  migrant	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camps,	  but	  “they	  found	  no	  evidence	  of	  people	  in	  need	  not	  getting	  care.”	  Thai	  and	  local	  experts	  are	  aware	   and	   are	   now	   trying	   to	   work	   side	   by	   side	   to	   educate	   the	   rural	   population	   about	   disease	  management	   so	   that	   provinces	   understand	   the	   symptoms	   and	   can	   be	   proactive	   in	   using	  preventative	   techniques.	   Significant	   actions	   have	   been	   taken	   by	   regional	   groups	   to	   build	   trust	   in	  human	   diseases	   since	   2005;	   however,	   Health	   Expert	   2	   states	   that	   it	   will	   take	   some	   time	   before	  partners	   are	   willing	   to	   cooperate	   on	   zoonotic	   diseases	   since	   veterinary	   surveillance	   still	   lacks	  capacity.	  	  There	   needs	   to	   be	   political	   commitment	   to	   improve	   EID	   surveillance.	   Bureaucratic	   and	  political	  arrangements	  keep	  countries	  from	  being	  open	  and	  honest:	  “Cambodia	  is	  willing	  to	  share,	  but	   Vietnam	   cannot	   because	   of	   it	   unilateral	   system,”	   explains	   Health	   Expert	   2.	   These	   political	  strains	  also	  occur	  within	  and	  between	  countries.	  Examples	  of	  these	  strains	  are	  the	  “lingering	  border	  dispute	   centered	   on	   Preah	   Vihear	   temple	   between	   Thailand	   and	   Cambodia,	   an	   ongoing	   ethnic	  separatist	   insurgency	   in	   the	   south	   of	   Thailand,	   recent	   violence	   associated	   with	   elections	   in	   the	  Philippines,	  and	  terrorist	  attacks	  on	  tourist	  areas	  in	  Indonesia,”	  write	  Coker	  and	  others.102	  Tensions	  in	  the	  Southeast	  Asia	  region	  can	  be	  managed	  by	  strong	  leaders	  to	  direct	  regional	  cohorts	  towards	  a	  solution.	  As	   security	   improves,	   countries	  will	   have	  more	   success	   in	   transporting	   samples,	   getting	  experts	  in	  the	  field,	  and	  gathering	  advice	  from	  regional	  and	  local	  partners.	  	  	  
Specific	  Cultural	  Findings	  in	  Thailand	  	  
Mistrust	  in	  the	  International	  Community	  
	  	   Interviewees	  felt	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  miscommunication	  errors	  stemmed	  from	  cultural	  cues	  between	   internationals	   and	   the	   Thai	   community.	   Health	   Expert	   6	   felt	   that	   Thai	   citizens	   in	   rural	  areas	  are	  accepting	  of	  most	  western	  practices:	   “They	  are	  more	   concerned	  with	   relationships	   and	  feelings,	   if	   they	   can	   trust	   you	   or	   not.”	   Donor	   Staff	   1	   says	   that	   a	   large	   amount	   of	   the	   mistrust	  originates	   from	  what	   occurred	   in	   Indonesia	  with	  NAMRU-­‐2	   and	   viral	   sovereignty;	   the	  MOPH	   are	  worried	   that	   someone	   may	   take	   the	   samples	   and	   publish	   in	   the	   U.S.	   before	   the	   disease	   is	  announced.	   Thailand	   is	   possessive	   of	   its	   viruses	   (and	   understands	   Indonesia’s	   viral	   sovereignty	  concerns)	  and	   fully	   supports	   Indonesia’s	  decision	   to	  assert	  more	   control.	  Health	  Expert	  5	  agrees,	  and	   further	  states	   that	   the	  Thai	  government	   is,	   “concerned	  with	  specimens	  being	  shipped	  abroad	  because	  of	  security	  issues.”	  	  Due	  to	  this	  mistrust,	  the	  majority	  of	  conversations	  with	  officials	  are	  informal.	  Thais	  will	  go	  to	   great	   lengths	   to	   keep	   information	   confidential.	   For	   example,	   Donor	   Staff	   3	   says	   that	   human	  resources	  will	  occasionally	  hide	  outbreaks	  on	  their	  webpages	  or	  put	  it	  in	  Thai	  language	  so	  that	  the	  diplomatic	   community	   cannot	   read	   updates	   or	   public	   warnings.	   Hiding	   documents	   will	   create	  tension	   in	   the	   future,	   especially	   with	   the	   power	   of	   social	   media	   and	   the	   likelihood	   of	   the	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international	  community	  discovering	  the	  outbreak.	  It	  is	  better	  to	  be	  truthful,	  explains	  Health	  Expert	  4:	  “if	  you	  are	  transparent,	  people	  will	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  help	  and	  it	  will	  be	  easier.”	  To	  improve	  partnerships	  and	  sustain	  results,	  donor	  funds	  should	  be	  utilized	  and	  developed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  accentuates	  the	  importance	  of	  building	  trust	  and	  relationships.	  Moreover,	  programs	  should	  be	  introduced	  autonomously	  by	  key	  members	  at	  the	  MOPH	  so	  that	  the	  Thai	  government	  can	  be	   perceived	   as	   a	   regional	   leader	   in	   EID	   surveillance.	   Thailand	   desires	   the	   resources	   and	  technology,	  but	  does	  not	  want	  to	  be	  “joined	  at	  the	  hip	  with	  the	  international	  community,”	  explains	  Donor	  Staff	  3.	  Thailand’s	  government	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  tackle	  difficult	  situations	  if	  it	  is	  able	  to	  profit	  from	  the	  success	  and	  make	  the	  project	  its	  own.	  	  Additionally,	   the	   government	   needs	   to	   create	   guidelines	   that	   will	   ensure	   a	   positive	  relationship	  and	  response	   from	  health	  networks.	  To	  do	  so,	   the	  Thai	  government	  has	  collaborated	  with	   international	   organizations	   and	   developed	   memorandums	   of	   agreement	   (MOAs)	   to	   outline	  roles	  and	  regulations,	   so	  both	  parties	  can	  meet	  upon	  a	   fixed	  objective.	  These	  MOAs	  are	   “strict	  on	  who	  gets	  the	  specimens,	  who	  is	  the	  owner,	  and	  who	  publishes	  the	  test	  results,”	  states	  Local	  Donor	  Staff	  1.	  This	  interviewee	  believes	  that	  a	  clear	  and	  transparent	  MOA	  will	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  that	  both	  parties	  will	  work	  together	  in	  a	  positive	  and	  open	  manner.	  The	  government	  has	  also	  created	  an	  Ethical	   Review	   Board	   that	   demands	   that	   a	   Thai	   PI	   is	   on	   the	   research	   project.	   This	   policy	   was	  implemented	  to	  ensure	  Thai	  experts	  are	  key	  players	  in	  developing	  new	  research.	  According	  to	  Local	  Donor	   Staff	   1,	   this	   guarantees	   that	   Thais	   “are	   the	   only	   ones	   that	   can	   sign	   a	   transfer	   of	   virus	  safeguard	  to	  ensure	  Thais	  are	  protected.”	  	  The	   majority	   of	   interviewees	   see	   the	   Thai	   Ethical	   Review	   Board	   (ERB)	   as	   a	   positive	  institution	   to	   instill	   trust	   in	   partnerships;	   however,	   there	   were	   a	   few	   academics	   concerned	   that	  bureaucracy	   could	   slow	  down	   research	   (or	   even	  bring	   it	   to	   a	  halt)	   if	   political	   officials	   decided	   to	  withhold	   information	  deemed	  not	   in	   the	  political	   or	   economic	   interest	  of	  Thailand.	  Donor	  Staff	  1	  observed	   government	   pressuring	   academia	   on	   the	   results	   of	   a	   surveillance	   study	   that	   placed	  hospitals	   in	   an	   unfavorable	   light.	   Academics	   get	   particularly	   frustrated	  when	   the	   ERB	  decides	   to	  destroy	  samples	  after	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time.	  “It	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  collect	  a	  sample	  bank,”	  explains	  Health	  Expert	  4.	  These	  types	  of	  actions	  indicate	  that	  the	  ERB	  can	  be	  an	  obstacle	  if	  it	  is	  not	  managed	  properly.	  Although	  formal	  documents	  and	  bureaucratic	  measures	  create	  more	  assurance,	  they	  are	  not	   the	  solution.	  Every	   time	  an	  official	   transfers	  or	   leaves	  his	  or	  her	   job,	  relationships	  need	  to	  be	  rebuilt	   and	   trust	   needs	   to	   be	   reinstated,	   says	   Health	   Expert	   5.	   Continuous	   strides	   need	   to	   go	  towards	  interlinking	  community	  efforts,	  gathering	  consent	  from	  the	  government,	  and	  building	  trust	  between	  partners.	  	  	  
Thai	  Experts	  Non-­‐Confrontational	  
	   Miscommunications	  can	  also	  occur	  when	  the	   international	  community	   is	  unaware	  of	   their	  cultural	   mishaps.	   A	   few	   of	   the	   interviewees	   stated	   that	   it	   is	   common	   for	   Thais	   to	   be	   non-­‐confrontational;	  “they	  may	  say	  yes,	  but	  they	  mean	  no,”	  says	  Local	  Donor	  Staff	  1.	  In	  addition,	  officials	  may	   ignore	   the	   international	   community’s	   recommendations	   and	   fix	   institutional	   inadequacies	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based	   on	   experts	   from	   Thai	   government.	   “They	  will	   not	   always	   take	   lessons	   learned	   from	   other	  countries,”	  notes	  Donor	  Staff	  3.	  This	  decision	  to	  stay	  Thai-­‐focused	  is	  cultural,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  political.	  “It	  is	  all	  about	  being	  the	  best	  in	  Thailand,”	  explains	  Health	  Expert	  1.	  Thailand	  wants	  to	  maintain	  its	  independence	   and	   regional	   leadership	   role.	   Using	   lessons	   learned	   from	   other	   countries	   and	  provinces	  could	  save	  Thailand	  a	  lot	  of	  time,	  money,	  and	  political	  capital.	  For	  example,	  countries	  or	  regions	   that	   have	   strong	   surveillance	   systems	  may	   have	   recommendations	   on	   how	   to	   deal	   with	  complex	  bureaucratic	  issues	  or	  economic	  barriers.	  If	  a	  region	  is	  struggling	  during	  an	  outbreak,	  the	  MOPH	   should	   consider	   consulting	   other	   nearby	   provinces	   to	   get	   new	   concepts	   and	   resources,	  explains	  Health	  Expert	  3.	  	  
Cultural	  Practices	  That	  Limit	  Effective	  Surveillance	  
	  
	   While	   there	   are	   not	   any	   cultural	   barriers	   that	   prohibit	   surveillance,	   there	   are	   constraints	  that	  prevent	  health	  experts	  from	  providing	  quick	  responses	  to	  epidemics.	  Almost	  all	  the	  interviews	  said	   that	   the	   Southeast	   Asia	   region	   struggles	   with	   deference	   to	   seniority	   and	   age.	   “There	   is	   a	  youngest	  to	  oldest	  problem.	  Younger	  people	  may	  have	  more	  technical	  experience	  or	  be	  safer	  than	  older	   people,	   yet	   they	   are	   taken	   less	   seriously,”	   observes	   Health	   Expert	   3.	   In	   some	   laboratories,	  Health	  Expert	  3	  said	  that	   it	  was	  still	  difficult	   to	  convince	  senior	  officials	   to	  wear	  masks	  or	  gloves.	  While	   this	   is	   disconcerting,	   most	   interviewees	   felt	   that	   disputes	   occurring	   in	   Thailand	   between	  counterparts	   have	   decreased	   significantly.	   “This	   generation	   is	   more	   educated;	   we	   are	   teaching	  younger	  employees	  to	  question	  elders	  or	  senior	  staff,”	  says	  Health	  Expert	  1.	  Challenges	  arise	  when	  health	  experts	  collaborate	  on	  cross-­‐border	   issues	  with	  other	  countries	  or	  when	  they	  are	  working	  with	  rural	  populations.	  Laboratories	  in	  different	  countries	  that	  seek	  regional	  advice	  or	  services	  may	  be	  unwilling	  to	  make	  a	  decision	  until	  gathering	  approval	  from	  their	  superior.	  “What	  happens	  when	  someone	   from	   Laos	   is	   out	   and	   junior	   officers	   cannot	   finish	   the	   project?”	   asks	   Donor	   Staff	   1.	  Education	   is	   the	   key	   to	   fixing	   hierarchical	   issues,	   says	  Health	   Expert	   6,	   “questioning	   superiors	   is	  improving	  as	  we	  work	  with	  international	  organizations.”	  	  
Rabies:	  Is	  it	  a	  Problem?	  	  	   Interviewees	  expressed	  mixed	  opinion	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  rabies	  is	  problematic	  in	  Thailand.	  Since	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  interviewees	  were	  not	  veterinarians,	  they	  could	  not	  accurately	  comment	  on	  this	  issue.	  Two	  of	  the	  interviewees,	  however,	  said	  that	  rabies	  was	  concerning	  in	  Thailand.	  Just	  as	  on	  the	  island	  of	  Bali,	  Indonesia,	  with	  its	  Hindu	  beliefs,	  Thailand’s	  Buddhist	  values	  make	  it	  culturally	  unacceptable	  to	  kill	  dogs	  (hence	  the	  phenomenon	  of	   the	  abandoned	  temple	  dogs	   in	  both	  Bali	  and	  Bangkok),	   observes	   U.S.	   Government	   Expert	   4.	   Furthermore,	   this	   interviewee	   states	   that,	   in	   this	  case,	  statistics	   from	  government	  are	  not	  always	  transparent.	   If	   there	  was	  an	  advisory	  warning	  on	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  website,	  it	  could	  impact	  whether	  or	  not	  tourists	  come	  to	  Thailand,	  explains	  U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  4.	  Donor	  Staff	  1	  disagreed	  and	  said	   that	   rabies	  was	  no	   longer	  a	   concern.	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This	   interviewee	   stated	   that	   there	  was	   already	   a	  plan	   in	  place	   to	   eradicate	   rabies	   in	  Thailand	  by	  2020.	  	  
Conclusion	  	   The	  primary	  challenges	  impeding	  surveillance	  in	  Thailand	  could	  be	  improved	  by	  increased	  collaboration	   and	   communications.	   Healthy	   competition	   can	   actually	   stimulate	  more	   change	   and	  build	  capacity,	  but	  (as	  in	  this	  case)	  it	  can	  also	  have	  the	  tendency	  to	  disconnect	  groups.	  International	  organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  CDC,	  the	  WHO,	  and	  AFRIMS,	  should	  use	  their	  neutral	  status	  to	  help	  link	  different	   networks	   in	   Thailand—and	   apply	   lessons	   learned—without	   compromising	   the	  independence	  of	  Thai	  surveillance	  capabilities	  or	  their	  leadership	  role	  in	  the	  region.	  As	  leadership	  strengthens	   networks,	   more	   efforts	   can	   go	   towards	   understanding	   government	   bureaucracies,	  improving	  economic	  markets,	  and	  assisting	  border	  areas	  where	  migration	  is	  common.	  	  The	   initial	   focus	   should	  be	  on	   assessment,	   especially	  when	  evaluating	  political,	   economic,	  and	  cultural	  indicators.	  For	  example,	  what	  does	  the	  host	  country	  want?	  How	  can	  we	  involve	  actors	  in	   the	   animal	   sector?	  What	   does	   Thailand	   need	   to	   do	   to	  maintain	   its	   role	   as	   a	   stronger	   regional	  actor?	  How	  can	  international	  organizations,	  like	  AFRIMS,	  assist	  Thailand,	  but	  also	  ensure	  that	  their	  research	   stays	   military	   focused?	   If	   organizations	   assess	   the	   situation	   together,	   they	   can	   find	   a	  solution	   which	   benefits	   both	   the	   host	   country	   and	   the	   actors	   involved.	   They	   can	   also	   create	  infrastructure	  and	  guidelines	  to	  ensure	  that	  programs	  stay	  Thai-­‐focused	  as	  well	  as	  allows	  Thailand	  its	  independence	  in	  building	  sustainable	  surveillance	  programs.	  As	  relationships	  develop	  internally,	  more	  emphasis	   can	   transfer	   towards	   regional	  partners,	   so	   that	   they	  can	  work	  with	  Thailand	  as	  a	  model	  for	  other	  developing	  countries.	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  Table	  3.2.	  Thailand:	  Date,	  Time	  of	  Interview,	  Generic	  Title	  and	  Code103	  
Date	  and	  Time	  of	  Interview	   Generic	  Title	  and	  Code	  5	  June	  2012	  1100	   Health	  Expert	  1	  6	  June	  2012	  1300	   Health	  Expert	  2	  6	  June	  2012	  1600	   Health	  Expert	  3	  7	  June	  2012	  0800	   Health	  Expert	  4	  7	  June	  2012	  0930	   Health	  Expert	  5	  7	  June	  2012	  1100	   Health	  Expert	  6	  7	  June	  2012	  1130	   Health	  Expert	  7	  5	  June	  2012	  1300	   U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  1	  5	  June	  2012	  1400	   U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  2	  5	  June	  2012	  1500	   U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  3	  5	  June	  2012	  1600	   U.S.	  Government	  Expert	  4	  6	  June	  2012	  1000	   Donor	  Staff	  1	  6	  June	  2012	  1000	   Donor	  Staff	  2	  8	  June	  2012	  1000	   Donor	  Staff	  3	  8	  June	  2012	  1130	   Local	  Donor	  Staff	  1	  8	  June	  2012	  1400	   Thai	  Government	  Official	  1	  8	  June	  2012	  1400	   Thailand	  Government	  Official	  2	  8	  June	  2012	  1400	   Thai	  Government	  official	  3	  25	  June	  2012	  1400	   Veterinary	  Health	  Expert	  1	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  To	  protect	  personally	  identifiable	  information.	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CASE	  STUDY	  4:	  U.S.	  MEXICO	  BORDER§	  	  
Introduction	  	   To	   better	   safeguard	   the	   homeland	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   September	   11,	   2001,	   the	   U.S.	  government	  increased	  emerging	  infectious	  disease	  (EID)	  surveillance	  programs	  on	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  and	  U.S.-­‐Canada	  borders.	  Policy	  makers	  began	  by	  assessing	  the	  most	  impoverished	  areas	  along	  the	  boundary	   lines	   and	   examining	   their	   respective	   health	   care	   infrastructures.	   Eventually,	   southern	  regions	  such	  as	  Arizona,	  Texas,	  Tijuana,	  Baja	  California	  Norte,	  and	  Ciudad	  Juarez,	  Chihuahua	  were	  deemed	   more	   susceptible	   to	   infectious	   diseases	   due	   to	   a	   history	   of	   HIV/AIDS	   and	   influenza	   A	  (H1N1).	   Focusing	   on	   these	   regions	   with	   higher	   risk	   of	   developing	   infectious	   diseases,	   the	   U.S.	  government	   implemented	   several	   programs	   to	   prevent	   the	   occurrence	   of	   harmful	   epidemics.	   By	  stationing	   these	  EID	   surveillance	   systems	   in	   these	   areas,	   scientists	   are	   able	   to	   research	   the	  most	  prevalent	  maladies	   along	   the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  border	   and	   “[develop]	   regional	   vaccination	   and	  disease	  prevention	  responses.”104	  The	  effort	   to	  prevent	   the	  spread	  of	   infectious	  diseases	  continues	  today;	   it	  aims	  to	  prevent	  the	   “spread	   of	   diseases	   such	   as	  H1N1	   influenza	   and	   SARS,	  which	   ignore	   geographic	   and	   political	  boundaries.”105	  President	  Obama	  instituted	  the	  National	  Strategy	  for	  Countering	  Biological	  Threats	  in	  December	  2009.	  This	  effort	  reinforced	  the	  use	  of	  modern	  technology	  and	  implemented	  policies	  that	  advocate	  stronger	  surveillance	  in	  less	  developed	  areas.	  With	  sustained	  effort,	  more	  competent	  EID	  surveillance	  systems	  can	  be	  employed	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  all	  citizens.	  This	  paper	  identifies	  EID	  surveillance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  border	  by	  examining	  programs	   such	   as	   Early	  Warning	   Infectious	   Disease	   Surveillance	   (EWIDS)	   and	   Border	   Infectious	  Disease	   Surveillance	   (BIDS)	   as	   case	   studies	   to	   emphasize	   the	   importance	   of	   national	   security	  against	  bioterrorism	  agents.	  Additionally,	  the	  report	  evaluates	  the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  barriers	   that	   currently	   prevent	   the	   implementation	   of	   effective	   EID	   surveillance	   systems.	   The	  ultimate	  purpose	   is	   to	  advocate	  a	  more	  promising	  methodology	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  EIDs	  that	   is	  applicable	  to	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  border.	  	  
Background	  and	  Context	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  §	  Inputs	  to	  this	  case	  study	  were	  provided	  by	  Angela	  Archambault	  and	  Taylor	  Tidwell	  (Literature	  Review)	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  Sophal	  Ear.	  104	  Kammerer	  et	  al.,	  “Influenza-­‐like	  illness	  surveillance	  on	  the	  California-­‐Mexico	  border,	  2004-­‐2009.	  Influenza	  and	  Other	  Respiratory	  Viruses,”	  358-­‐366.	  105	  National	  Security	  Council,	  “National	  Strategy	  for	  Countering	  Biological	  Threats,”	  1.	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Responding	  to	  a	  need	  for	  greater	  and	  qualitative	  epidemiological	  surveillance	  along	  the	  U.S.	  northern	  border	  with	  Canada	  and	  southern	  border	  with	  Mexico,	  the	  Centers	  for	  Disease	  Control	  and	  Prevention	   (CDC)	   and	   the	   Department	   of	   Health	   and	   Human	   Services	   Assistant	   Secretary	   for	  Preparedness	   and	   Response	   (HHS-­‐ASPR)	   implemented	   the	   EWIDS	   program	   in	   2003.	   Its	   primary	  purpose	  was	   to	   address	   the	   alarming	   spread	   of	   influenza	   in	   the	   general	   population	   and	   field	   an	  effective	   program	   to	   fight	   “potential	   bioterrorism	   agents.”106	   Since	   2003,	   EWIDS	   has	   “built	   a	  foundation	   for	  a	  coordinated	  bi-­‐national	   system	   for	   infectious	  disease	  epidemiology,	   surveillance,	  improved	   laboratory	   analyses,	   notifiable	   disease	   reporting,	   and	   collaborative	   health	   emergency	  response	  in	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  border	  region.”107	  	  In	  addition	  to	  EWIDS,	  the	  BIDS	  project,	  a	  “surveillance	  system	  for	  infectious	  diseases	  along	  the	   U.S.-­‐Mexico	   border,”	   was	   established	   in	   1997.	   108	   BIDS	   has	   been	   useful	   in	   improving	  geographical	   hurdles.	   The	   challenge	   with	   the	   U.S.-­‐Mexico	   region	   is	   that	   it	   borders	   cities,	   “which	  [serve]	  as	  corridors	  for	  bi-­‐national	  transmission	  of	  infectious	  diseases.”109	  To	  improve	  dysfunctions	  and	  instill	  more	  responsibility	  between	  countries,	  a	  system	  called	  BIDS	  was	  created.	  BIDS	  is	  capable	  of	  managing	  and	  mobilizing	  shared	  resources.	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  bridge	  the	  surveillance	  gap	  between	  epidemiological	   institutions	   in	   different	   countries.110	   Since	   its	   initiation,	   BIDS	   has	   earned	   a	  reputation	  as	  a	  potent	  force	  against	  the	  proliferation	  of	  viruses	  such	  as	  measles,	  rubella,	  hepatitis	  A,	  B,	   and	  E,	   and	   febrile	   exanthem.111	  Through	   the	   collaborative	   efforts	  of	   the	  Mexican	  Secretariat	   of	  Health,	  the	  CDC,	  and	  border	  health	  officials,	  a	  bi-­‐national	  team	  was	  established	  in	  13	  clinical	  centers	  to	  enact	  a	  “network	  [that]	  developed	  surveillance	  protocols,	  trained	  nine	  surveillance	  coordinators,	  established	  serologic	  testing	  at	  four	  Mexican	  border	  laboratories,	  and	  created	  agreements	  for	  data	  sharing	  and	  notification	  of	  selected	  diseases	  and	  outbreaks.”112	  	  
Literature	  Review	  
	  In	   recent	   years,	   there	   have	   been	   several	   significant	   outbreaks	   of	   infectious	   diseases	   that	  have	   demonstrated	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   programs	   such	   as	   EWIDS	   and	   BIDS.	   In	   April	   2009,	   the	  influenza	   A	   (H1N1)	   outbreak	   (declared	   a	   pandemic	   by	   the	   World	   Health	   Organization	   in	   June	  2009),	   was	   met	   by	   a	   “coordinated	   response	   among	   health	   authorities	   and	   healthcare	   services	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  interviews	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  6/27/12	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  “Early	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  Infectious	  Disease	  Surveillances	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  Program	  in	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  Border	  Region:	  Accomplishments	  and	  Capacity	  to	  Assist	  in	  the	  Implementation	  of	  International	  Health	  Strategies,”	  1.	  	  107	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  Weinberg	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providers	   located	   throughout	   the	   U.S.-­‐Mexico	   border	   region.”113	   This	   was	   made	   possible	   by	   the	  strategic	  methods	  utilized	  by	  EWIDS,	  which	  are:	  	  
• Establishing	  a	  database	  directory	  of	  laboratories	  
• Drafting	   Memoranda	   of	   Understanding	   (MOUs)	   to	   share	   data,	   personnel	   and	   equipment	  between	  jurisdictions	  during	  an	  infectious	  disease	  public	  health	  emergency	  
• Laboratory	  surveillance	  through	  PulseNet	  and	  FoodNet	  
• Working	  with	  tribes	  whose	  land	  is	  on	  the	  border	  and	  crosses	  into	  Mexico	  and	  Canada	  
• Expanding	  the	  Laboratory	  Response	  Network	  (LRN)	  into	  Canada	  and	  Mexico	  
• Conducting	  tabletop	  workshops	  to	  discuss	  binational	  communication	  strategies	  
• Developing	   binational	   communication	   strategy	   including	   binational	   crisis	   and	   emergency	  health	  alert	  communication,	  case	  reporting	  and	  notification	  protocols	  
• Expanding	  sentinel	  and	  active	  surveillance	  for	  infectious	  diseases114	  	   Under	  this	  guidance,	  epidemiological	  centers	  in	  Mexico	  transported	  their	  flu	  specimens	  for	  laboratory	  examination	   in	  California,	  Arizona,	  New	  Mexico,	  and	  Texas.115	  Such	  collaboration	   from	  both	  countries	  provided	  an	  important	  foundation	  for	  battling	  influenza	  A	  (H1N1)	  virus.	  According	  to	  experts,	  this	  quick	  and	  successful	  response	  was	  due	  to	  “emergency	  operation	  center	  activation,	  institutional	   based	   surveillance	   (schools,	   prisons,	   and	   nursing	   homes),	   year	   round	   surveillance,	  increased	   communication	   frequency,	   and	   expanded	   sentinel	   networks.”116	   Essentially,	   the	   H1N1	  influenza	   outbreak	   demonstrated	   that	   effective	   communications	   between	   countries	   produce	   the	  best	   results.	   However,	   this	   also	   highlighted	   the	  weaknesses	   in	   the	   EWIDs	   program.	   At	   the	   2009	  Pandemic	  H1N1	   Influenza	  workshop,	  M.C.	   Rita	   Flores	   Leon	  presented	  her	   thoughts	   on	   the	  H1N1	  response,	  “In	  general,	  activation	  of	  emergency	  protocols	  during	  the	  outbreak	  were	  very	  successful.	  […]	   Evaluation	   of	   the	   process	   did	   reveal	   some	   areas	   of	   improvement	   regarding	   diagnosis,	   data	  management,	  coordination	  and	  logistics,	  and	  coordination	  with	  the	  U.S.."117	  In	  addition	  to	  poor	  bi-­‐national	  coordination,	  Dr.	  McVay	  of	  the	  San	  Diego	  County	  Public	  Health	  Laboratory	  stressed	  that	  in	  order	   to	   address	   future	   pandemics	   completely,	   clinic	   staff	  must	   be	   trained	  more	   thoroughly	   and	  each	  laboratory	  should	  devise	  a	  strategy	  for	  communicating	  with	  the	  media.118	  Even	  though	  EWIDs	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  116	  California	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  of	  Public	  Health	  “2009	  Pandemic	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  Influenza	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  Case	  study	  in	  Border	  Response,”	  20.	  	  117	  Flores,	  Dirección	  General	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  Epidemiología	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  Referencia	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developed	   promising	   methodologies	   to	   maximize	   EID	   surveillance,	   training	   shortfalls	   and	  communication	  gaps	  still	  need	  to	  be	  resolved.	  	  	   According	  to	  Russell	  and	  others,	  there	  have	  been	  significant	  improvements	  since	  Fiscal	  year	  2009.119	  The	  primary	  reason	  for	  advancements	  was	  extensive	  training	  with	  laboratory	  staff,	  which	  facilitated	   the	   transfer	   of	   samples	   between	   the	   U.S.	   and	   Mexico.	   In	   addition,	   BIDS	   drastically	  renovated	   the	   communications	   protocols	   between	   countries,	   which	   reduced	   technical	   barriers;	  regular	  conference	  calls	  have	  become	  the	  standard	  method	  for	  information	  sharing.	  Strategies	  have	  ensured	   a	   strong	   correspondence	   between	   epidemiological	   labs	   and	   an	   efficient	   staff	   to	   ensure	  qualitative	   results.120	   Although	   BIDS	   has	   implemented	   an	   extremely	   competent	   system	   for	   EID	  surveillance,	  interagency	  problems	  still	  exist.	  As	  The	  Viral	  Storm:	  The	  Dawn	  of	  a	  New	  Pandemic	  Age	  by	   Nathaniel	   Wolfe	   notes,	   common	   issues	   met	   by	   most	   EID	   surveillance	   organizations	   are	  “bureaucracy,	  insufficient	  and	  ever-­‐shifting	  funding,	  and	  constantly	  changing	  objective	  from	  higher	  up	   the	   food	   chain…	   these	   organizations	   need	   to	   grow	   stronger	   and	   better	   equipped,	   and	   they	  desperately	  need	  more	  funding.”121	  	  In	   addition,	   geographical	   concerns	   require	   evolving	   approaches.	   PREDICT,	   a	   project	   of	  USAID’s	   Emerging	   Pandemic	   Threats	   Program,	   has	   introduced	   new	   strategies	   including	  mapping	  “hotspots.”122	  Evaluating	   these	  hotspots	  and	   improving	   laboratory	  capacity	  should	  provide	  health	  experts	   more	   time	   to	   catch	   pathogens	   before	   they	   jump	   from	   animals	   to	   humans.	   To	   deal	   with	  geographical	   concerns,	  Woolhouse	   suggests	   focusing	   on	  more	   qualitative	   predictions	   and	   asking	  practical	   questions	   such	   as:	   where	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   happen,	   and	  whether	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   represent	   a	  serious	   threat	   to	   human	   or	   animal	   health.123	   Being	   able	   to	   quantify	   terms	   is	   useful,	   yet	   difficult	  when	  unexpected	  factors	  are	  brought	  to	  bear.	  For	  example,	  Davis	  and	  Lederberg	  state	  that	  climate	  variability	   and	   natural	   disasters	   along	   borders	   often	   determine	   the	   severity	   and	   reach	   of	   an	  outbreak.124	   Moreover,	   poverty	   and	   poor	   health	   outcomes	   on	   the	   Mexican	   border	   increases	   the	  likelihood	   of	   EID	   proliferation.	   Further	   questions	   include:	   Who	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   outbreak?	  What	  about	  animals	  migrating	   to	   (or	   from)	  neutral	   zones?	   If	   it	   is	   a	  bordering	  area,	   can	  countries	  agree	  on	  how	  the	  outbreak	  should	  be	  managed	  while	  also	  adhering	  to	  locals’	  wishes?	  	  Therefore,	   programs	   such	   as	   BIDS	   and	   EWIDS	   have	  made	   tremendous	   progress	   towards	  more	  effective	  EID	  surveillance	  by	  increasing	  laboratory	  capacity,	  fostering	  a	  more	  integrated	  and	  communicative	  network,	   and	   improving	  health	   care	   infrastructure	   for	   communities	   located	  along	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  border.	  However,	  there	  is	  still	  much	  more	  to	  do;	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  understand	  policy	   maker’s	   roles	   in	   establishing	   effective	   EID	   surveillance	   systems	   in	   developing	   countries.	  Evaluating	  political	  and	  economic	  indicators	  is	  crucial—yet	  often	  overlooked—because	  it	  often	  lies	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outside	   of	   health	   experts	   and	   epidemiologists	   responsibilities.	   Having	   a	   strong	   institutional	   and	  legal	   framework	   is	   beneficial	   in	   reducing	   costs,	   managing	   bureaucracies,	   and	   diminishing	  overlapping	  objectives	  tasked	  by	  local,	  regional,	  and	  international	  programs.	  	  
	  
Methodology	  
	  The	  central	  purpose	  of	  this	  report	  is	  to	  identify	  and	  propagate	  EID	  surveillance	  systems	  for	  worldwide	   utilization	   for	   anticipating	   and	   mitigating	   the	   devastating	   effects	   of	   lethal	   diseases.	  Conclusions	   were	   derived	   from	   a	   close	   examination	   of	   the	   literature	   review	   above	   and	   resulted	  from	   a	   detailed	   comparison	   between	   BIDS	   and	   EWIDS.	   Additionally,	   this	   paper	   implements	  extensive	  notes	  and	  analysis	  of	  governmental,	  economic,	  and	  political	  environments	  along	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	   border	   territories.	   The	   main	   objective	   in	   each	   interview	   was	   to	   evaluate	   institutional	  constraints,	  which	  inhibit	  regional	  surveillance	  systems	  from	  collaborating	  effectively	  and	  provide	  recommendations	  and	  lessons	  learned	  for	  developing	  countries.	  	  Six	  group	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  and	  organized	  in	  a	  semi-­‐structured	  format	  to	  ensure	  capture	  of	  both	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  points	  from	  U.S.	  and	  Mexican	  experts.	  Insights	  from	  the	  interviews	  came	   from	  both	  government	  and	   international	   institutions.	  To	  ensure	  openness,	   trust,	  and	  transparency,	  the	  author	  sent	  a	  summary	  list	  of	  questions	  and	  his	  CV	  so	  that	  participants	  had	  time	   to	   evaluate	   each	   situation	   and	   ask	   questions	   if	   needed	   before	   interviews.	   All	   interviewees	  were	  aware	  that	  the	  report	  would	  be	  published	  and	  hoped	  to	  use	  the	  results	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  improve	  their	  own	  surveillance	  programs.	  	  
	  
Results	  	   	  Within	   the	   span	   of	   a	  week,	   the	   author	   and	   his	   research	   assistant	   spoke	  with	   21	  U.S.	   and	  Mexican	   public	   health	   officials	   who	   were	   either	   connected	   with	   or	   assigned	   to	   EWIDS-­‐related	  projects.	  Since	  the	  six	  interviews	  occurred	  in	  four	  states,	  each	  expert	  faced	  different	  challenges	  and	  provided	   diverse	   recommendations.	   Mixed	   opinions	   on	   the	   state	   of	   diagnostic	   labs	   in	   Mexico	  stemmed	  from	  how	  each	  region	  organizes	  and	  prioritizes	  EWIDS	  programs,	  their	  relationship	  with	  Mexican	   counterparts,	   security	   concerns,	   and	   the	   amount	   of	   federally	  mandated	   funding	   in	   each	  area.	   Each	   state	   had	   different	   recommendations	   and	   concerns,	   but	   the	   report	   found	   similar	  underlying	   themes	   that	   altered	   Mexican	   EID	   surveillance	   systems.	   The	   main	   difference	   was	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  an	  identified	  obstacle	  could	  affect	  Mexican	  states;	  the	  areas	  of	  most	  concern	  were	  those	  regions	  that	  may	  not	  be	  as	  economically	  or	  politically	  strong.	  Interview	  subjects	  from	  Texas,	  Arizona,	  New	  Mexico,	  and	  California	  described	  in	  Table	  4.1	  the	  key	  barriers	  to	  EID	  surveillance	  on	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  border.	  These	  political,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	   issues	  are	   listed	  by	   importance	  via	  frequency	  across	  interviews.	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Table	  4.1.	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  Border:	  Key	  Issues	  Identified	  in	  AZ,	  CA,	  NM,	  and	  TX	  Interviews	  
Political	  Barriers	   Percent	  of	  Interviews	  That	  Identified	  
Barriers	  Insecurity	  in	  Texas	  and	  California	  	   6	  of	  6	  =	  100%	  Difficult	  transferring	  resources	  across	  borders	   5	  of	  6	  =	  83%	  Political	  instability	  in	  Mexico-­‐	  especially	  during	  elections	   4	  of	  6	  =	  67%	  Political	  fragmentation	  	   2	  of	  6	  =	  33%	  	  
Economic	  Barriers	   Percent	  of	  Interviews	  That	  Identified	  
Barriers	  Loss	  of	  EWIDS	  funding	   6	  of	  6	  =	  100%	  Mexico	  laboratories	  not	  up	  to	  standards	  	   5	  of	  6	  =	  83%	  Funding	  inadequately	  dispersed	  to	  bordering	  states	   5	  of	  6	  =	  83%	  Surveillance	  systems	  lacking,	  especially	  veterinary	   5	  of	  6	  =	  83%	  Difficult	  to	  keep	  trained	  Mexican	  staff	   3	  of	  6	  =	  50%	  Technology	  capabilities	  vary	  from	  region	  to	  region	   3	  of	  6	  =	  50%	  
Cultural	  Barriers	   Percent	  of	  Interviews	  That	  Identified	  
Barriers	  Surveillance	  measured	  differently	  across	  borders	   4	  of	  6	  =67%	  Strong	  partnerships	  between	  regions	   4	  of	  6	  =67%	  Mercury	  poison	  for	  skin	  cream	   3	  of	  6	  =50%	  Immigration	  can	  alter	  data	   3	  of	  6	  =50%	  
Note:	   All	   interviews	   included	  more	   than	   one	   expert.	   AZ,	   CA,	   NM,	   and	   TX	   are	   Arizona,	   California,	  New	  Mexico,	  and	  Texas,	  respectively.	  
Source:	  Analysis	  of	  interviews	  conducted.	  
	  
Specific	  Political	  Findings	  on	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  Border	  
	  
Security	  Issues	  
	  	   After	   reviewing	   all	   the	   interview	   remarks,	   it	   became	   apparent	   that	   drug	   violence	   near	  border	  areas	  was	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  challenges	  to	  implementing	  effective	  surveillance.	  Interviewees	  recommended	   focusing	   on	  Texas	   and	  California	  where	   a	   large	   portion	   of	   the	   drug	   cartels	   reside.	  Violence	   is	   a	   serious	   issue	   and	   continues	   to	   increase;	   “when	  Calderon’s	   six-­‐year	   term	  draws	   to	   a	  close	   late	   in	   2012,	   an	   average	   of	   10,000	   crime-­‐related	  murders	   per	   year	  will	   have	   taken	   place,”	  explains	  Beittel.125	  Despite	  the	  insecurity,	  Mexican	  health	  officers	  are	  capable	  of	  assisting	  patients	  and	  getting	  in	  the	  field.	  The	  drug	  cartel	  is	  “taking	  over	  health	  facilities	  and	  streets,	  but	  not	  the	  actual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  Beittel,	  “Mexico's	  Drug	  Trafficking	  Organizations:	  Source	  and	  Scope	  of	  the	  Rising	  Violence,”	  1.	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health	  department	  or	  hospitals,”	  states	  Health	  Expert	  5.	  If	  the	  drug	  cartel	  gained	  more	  control	  in	  the	  future,	  surveillance	  could	  be	  potentially	  halted.	  	   For	   the	   last	   three	   years,	   due	   to	   safety	  precautions,	  U.S.	   government	  officials	   in	  Texas	   and	  California	   have	   been	   denied	   clearance	   to	   travel	   to	   adjoining	   Mexican	   states.	   Face-­‐to-­‐face	  communication	   only	   occurs	   if	  Mexican	   officials	   travel	   to	   the	   U.S.	  When	  Mexican	   counterparts	   do	  travel	   to	  Texas	  or	  California,	   they	  usually	  prefer	   to	   fly	   in	  order	   to	   avoid	   roadblocks	   and	  violence	  from	  drug	   cartels.	   “Cartels	   are	   fighting	  among	   themselves.	  Physicians	  have	  been	   told	  not	   to	   treat	  people	  if	  injured	  because	  they	  could	  get	  shot	  because	  they	  are	  seen	  helping	  the	  enemy.	  …	  There	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  if	  the	  enemy	  cannot	  seek	  medical	  care,	  they	  will	  die”	  explains	  Health	  Expert	  1.	  	  Mexican	  experts	  stressed	  the	  importance	  of	  maintaining	  good	  relationships.	  Conversations	  generally	  occur	  through	  teleconference.	  “We	  can’t	  Skype	  because	  of	  security	  and	  confidentiality	  of	  patients,”	  says	  Health	  Expert	  2.	  Health	  professionals	  who	  are	  unable	  to	  fully	  assess	  the	  situation	  or	  to	  actually	   see	   the	  outbreak	   is	   a	  huge	  barrier.	  Although	  U.S.	   officials	   expect	   that	   laboratories	  and	  field	   sites	   are	   managed	   correctly,	   they	   cannot	   officially	   visit	   the	   locations	   themselves.	   Other	  communication	   networks	   need	   to	   be	   utilized	   to	   ensure	   both	   sides	   are	   active	   and	   responsive.	  California	   has	   dealt	  with	   security-­‐related	   issues	   by	   hiring	   contract	   employees	  who	   are	  willing	   to	  travel	  to	  Mexico	  and	  do	  not	  require	  travel	  clearances.	  According	  to	  Health	  Expert	  18,	  laboratories	  in	  Mexico	   are	   evaluated	   by	   California	   health	   officials	   on	   a	  monthly	   basis.	   Contract	   employees	   have	  improved	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  relationship,	  but	  there	  still	  are	  barriers	  when	  trying	  to	  collaborate	  with	  state	   or	   government	   officials.	   Because	   state	   and	   government	   officials	   are	   not	   granted	   travel	  clearance	  to	  Mexico,	  EWIDS	  has	  to	  hold	  conferences	  in	  San	  Diego	  or	  Baja,	  explains	  Health	  Expert	  17.	  Hosting	   conferences	   in	   the	   U.S.	   prevents	   Mexican	   counterparts	   from	   organizing	   or	   leading	   U.S.-­‐Mexico	  events.	  Both	  countries	  realize	  how	  severe	  conflict	  can	  disrupt	  communications	  and	  they	  attempt	  to	  find	   ways	   to	   improve	   networking	   and	   collaborate	   with	   security	   officers.	   The	   U.S.	   and	   Mexican	  health	  departments	  aim	  to	  maintain	  neutrality	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  participating	  in	  security	  matters.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  disease	  and	  assist	  everyone,	  even	  members	  of	  the	  drug	  cartels,	  according	   to	   Mexican	   Counterpart	   1.	   Additionally,	   the	   Mexican	   health	   department	   is	   trying	   to	  collaborate	  with	  police	  and	  army	  officials	  to	  ensure	  tasks	  are	  accomplished	  and	  medical	  doctors	  are	  safe.	  “If	  the	  army	  finds	  TB	  patients,	  they	  will	  report	  it	  to	  the	  health	  department	  and	  bring	  them	  in,”	  explains	  the	  Mexican	  Counterpart	  1.	  Connecting	  outside	  networks	  and	  private	  industries	  has	  been	  useful	   in	   improving	   weak	   systems.	   Lastly,	   providing	   Mexicans	   opportunities	   to	   influence	   the	  surveillance	   conducted	   in	   the	   U.S.	   improved	   communication.	   “When	   doing	   trainings	   and	  conferences,	  we	  try	  to	  have	  opening	  remarks	  from	  both	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Mexico.	  We	  want	  them	  to	  still	  be	  key	  contributors,	  even	   though	  we	  cannot	  have	   the	  conference	   in	  Mexico,”	  notes	  Health	  Expert	  17.	  Providing	  opportunities	  like	  the	  example	  above	  is	  vital	  because	  it	  creates	  a	  team	  environment	  and	  allows	  both	  sides	  to	  take	  ownership	  of	  new	  programs	  and	  ideas.	  
[67]	  	  
Managing	  Political	  Bureaucracies	  Across	  Borders	  
	   One	  of	  the	  biggest	  bureaucratic	  challenges	  was	  the	  transferring	  of	  reagents,	  specimens,	  and	  small	   equipment.	   Not	   only	   are	  materials	   costly,	   but	   it	   can	   also	   take	   up	   to	   six	  months	   to	   receive	  resources	   across	   borders.	   “Sometimes	   we	   have	   to	   send	   medicines	   via	   contraband	   because	   of	  bureaucracy.	   The	   U.S.	   and	   Mexican	   customs	   do	   not	   speak	   the	   same	   language,”	   explains	   Health	  Expert	   8;	   interviewees	   said	   that	   these	   communication	   difficulties	   are	   a	   severe	   impediment	   to	  response	   times.	   The	  permit	   process	   is	   extremely	   lengthy	   and	   tedious	  which	   causes	   reagents	   and	  medications	   to	   often	   arrive	   expired.	  As	   a	   result,	   “people	   are	   smuggling	   reagents	   across	   borders,”	  said	   Health	   Expert	   12.	   At	   the	   moment,	   the	   interviewees	   did	   not	   have	   suggestions	   on	   ways	   to	  improve	   the	   permit	   process.	   “They	   (border	   officials	   and	   policy	   makers)	   admit	   that	   there	   is	   a	  problem	  but	   there	   is	  not	   a	   solution	   to	  be	  offered,”	   says	  Health	  Expert	  15.	  Another	   challenge	   that	  occurs	   at	   border	   areas	   is	   illegal	   animal	   trade.	   If	   animals	   cross	  without	   epidemiologists	   knowing,	  there	   is	   increased	   risk	   of	   disease	   and	   little	   knowledge	   of	   where	   it	   originated.	   To	   expedite	  transportation	  and	  monitor	  illegal	  industries,	  time	  and	  effort	  is	  needed	  in	  connecting	  with	  Border	  Control	  and	  partnering	  on	  projects.	  Their	  assistance	  is	  crucial	  in	  creating	  a	  more	  organized	  system	  with	   quick	   response	   times.	   Projects	   will	   be	   at	   a	   standstill	   if	   they	   do	   not	   have	   the	   necessary	  resources	  to	  detect	  disease.	  	  
Political	  Instability	  
	   In	   addition	   to	   drug	   violence,	   political	   instability	   alters	   how	   EID	   surveillance	   systems	  function.	   Elections	   play	   a	   considerable	   role,	   especially	   in	   Mexico	   City.	   Some	   interviewees	  questioned	  whether	  the	  end	  of	   the	  EWIDS	  program	  came	  from	  political	  demands.	  While	  elections	  can	   be	   problematic,	   many	   have	   observed	   little	   interference	   at	   the	   mid	   and	   lower	   levels.	   Junior	  officials	  from	  Mexico	  can	  stay	  in	  office	  for	  many	  years	  and	  have	  strong	  relationships	  with	  their	  U.S.	  counterparts,	   notes	   Health	   Expert	   8.	   A	   sizeable	   portion	   of	   the	   interviewees	   felt	   the	   closure	   of	  EWIDS	  was	  due	  to	  the	  political	  dynamics	  between	  the	  state	  and	  federal	  level.	  Others,	  such	  as	  Health	  Expert	  19,	  wondered	  if	  the	  closure	  meant	  decreased	  political	  interest,	  since	  the	  influenza	  A	  (H1N1)	  virus	  was	  not	  as	  deadly	  as	  first	  thought.	  Health	  Expert	  8	  noticed	  many	  new	  initiatives	  and	  missions	  instilled	   in	   border	   surveillance	   during	   the	   election	   season.	   Instead	   of	   building	   onto	   old	   health	  systems	  and	  making	  them	  stronger,	  politicians	  prefer	  to	  initiate	  new	  programs	  to	  show	  action,	  even	  if	   existing	  programs	  accomplished	   the	  same	  goal,	   explains	  Health	  Expert	  12.	  Once	  elections	  start,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  continuation	  in	  assessing	  official	  guidelines,	  asserts	  Mexican	  Counterpart	  1.	  	  There	  are	  many	  difficulties	  posed	  by	  U.S.	  federalism	  and	  the	  diverse	  policies	  and	  guidelines	  in	   both	   countries.	   There	   are	   two	   different	   countries	   with	   two	   different	   health	   systems,	   and	  representation	  from	  the	  federal	  and	  local	  level,	  says	  Health	  Expert	  8.	  “Everything	  of	  value	  is	  swept	  away	   during	   the	   election	   season.	   Party	   loyalists	   come	   in	   and	   then	   there	   are	   six	  months	   of	   dead	  work,”	   notes	   Health	   Expert	   12.	   Official	   guidelines	   between	  Mexico	   and	   the	   U.S.	   are	   finally	   being	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recognized	   by	   both	   governments,	   but	   this	   is	   occurring	   as	   policy	   makers	   cut	   EWIDS	   funding.	   If	  change	   does	   not	   occur	   quickly,	   the	   effort	   and	   time	   taken	   to	   join	   government’s	   policies	   and	  guidelines	  could	  be	  for	  naught.	  New	  policies	  during	  election	  season	  can	  also	  determine	  how	  collaborative	  the	  relationship	  is	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Mexican	  leaders.	  Disagreements	  between	  governments	  occur	  when	  citizens	  are	  directly	  affected	  by	  an	  initiative,	  for	  example,	  with	  immigration	  laws.	  Health	  Expert	  15	  recently	  saw	  this	  in	  Arizona,	  when	  they	  were	  temporarily	  boycotted	  from	  the	  Nogales	  Port	  of	  Entry	  because	  of	  a	  U.S.	   immigration	  law	  that	  was	  introduced	  during	  an	  election.	  These	  state-­‐interest	   initiatives	  delay	  the	  implementation	  of	  new	  guidelines	  that	  would	  strengthen	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  relationship.	  	  	  
Specific	  Economic	  Findings	  on	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  Border	  
	  
Funding	  Inadequately	  Dispersed	  Across	  Borders	  	  
	   Political	  fragmentation	  also	  complicates	  how	  money	  is	  transferred	  across	  borders.	  BIDS	  and	  EWIDS	  provide	  the	  majority	  of	  EID	  border	  surveillance	  funding;	  however,	  their	  roles	  vary	  state	  to	  state.	  For	  example,	  in	  California,	  they	  are	  completely	  autonomous.	  The	  difference	  between	  BIDS	  and	  EWIDS	   in	  California	   is	   “BIDS	   focuses	  on	   acute	   respiratory	   and	   influenza	  while	  EWIDS	   focuses	  on	  communication,	   lab	   capacity,	   training,	   and	   health	   security.	   EWIDS	   is	   much	   broader	   than	   BIDS,”	  explains	  Health	  Expert	   18.	  Moreover,	   the	   formula	   that	   stipulates	  how	  much	  EWIDS	   funding	   each	  state	   receives	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	   number	   of	   individuals	   who	   cross	   the	   borders.	   There	   is	   a	  significant	   disparity	   in	   resource	   distribution	   when	   comparing	   California	   (with	   approximately	  300,000	   crossings	   a	   day)	   to	   New	   Mexico	   (approximately	   10,000	   crossings	   a	   day).126	   Texas	   and	  California	  receive	  the	   largest	  portion	  of	   funding	  and	  supervise	  a	  variety	  of	  projects,	  whereas	  New	  Mexico	  supervises	  smaller	  short-­‐term	  projects.	  In	  fact,	  Health	  Expert	  12	  said	  that	  the	  New	  Mexico	  funding	   situation	   caused	   them	   to	   rely	   on	   other	   CDC-­‐funded	  programs	   to	   accomplish	   surveillance	  tasks.	  When	  New	  Mexico	  officials	  contribute,	   it	   is	  expected	  that	  a	  portion	  of	   their	   labor	  will	  come	  from	  EWIDS	  and	  BIDS	  funds.	  	  While	   California’s	   EWIDS	  program	  has	   had	   a	   stronger	   role	   in	   improving	   surveillance,	   “So	  much	  of	  EWIDS	  was	  a	   function	  of	   the	  CDC	  …	  The	  state	  wants	  us	   to	  do	  a	  certain	  role,	  while	  other	  organizations	   feel	   that	   the	  CDC	   should	   be	  doing	   the	  work,”	   explains	  Health	  Expert	   18.	   Currently,	  funds	  are	  distributed	  at	  the	  state	  level	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  national	  level	  in	  Mexico.	  According	  to	  Health	  Expert	   1,	   Mexico	   uses	   its	   money	   to	   evaluate	   and	   create	   unified	   surveillance	   while	   the	   U.S.	   has	  allocated	   funds	   towards	   building	   laboratory	   capacity.	   Health	   Expert	   17	   prefers	   funds	   to	   be	  dispersed	  at	   the	  state	   level	  because	  health	  organizations	  can	  have	  more	  control	  of	  how	  items	  are	  distributed.	  Health	  Expert	  12	  disagrees	  and	  thinks	  that	   it	   is	  best	  to	  have	  “a	  system	  that	  spans	  the	  border	   rather	   than	   have	   individual	   state	   programs.	   This	   type	   of	   work	   needs	   to	   come	   from	   the	  federal	   level	   in	   the	   U.S.”	   In	   Health	   Expert	   12’s	   opinion	   it	   would	   ensure	   that	   decisions	   are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  PowerPoint	  presentation	  on	  6/26/2012	  and	  6/25/2012,	  respectively.	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centralized,	  resources	  are	  disseminated	  adequately,	  and	  that	  organizations	  stick	  to	  their	  designated	  roles.	  	   	  
Difficulty	  to	  Keep	  Trained	  Staff	  
	   Many	   interviewees	  expressed	  concern	  about	  maintaining	  quality	  personnel	  during	  violent	  times.	   Instability	   often	   keeps	   epidemiologists	   from	   doing	   research.	   They	   may	   quit	   working	   or	  transfer	   to	   a	   new	   location	   if	   they	   feel	   their	   safety	   is	   in	   jeopardy.	   Health	   Expert	   1	   was	   told	   that	  kidnapping	  is	  an	  issue;	  in	  fact,	  one	  student	  quit	  doing	  research	  because	  the	  drug	  cartel	  stole	  all	  of	  his	   equipment	   and	   held	   him	   against	   his	   will.	   Drug	   violence	   in	   Mexico	   has	   particularly	   affected	  wildlife	  surveillance,	  since	  it	  occurs	  in	  rural	  areas	  are	  where	  criminals	  often	  reside.	  “We	  used	  to	  go	  to	   the	  river,	  on	  the	  border	  of	   the	  U.S.	  side,	  and	  collect	  mosquitos	  and	  ticks,	  but	  why	  risk	   it	  now?”	  says	  Health	  Expert	  4.	  Veterinarians	  and	  epidemiologist	  also	  leave	  rural	  and	  insecure	  areas	  because	  of	  low	  wages.	  Those	  who	  reside	  in	  rural	  areas	  are	  often	  overworked.	  According	  to	  Mexican	  Counterpart	  1,	  in	  one	  region,	   200	   private	   doctors	   as	   well	   as	   several	   pharmacies	   closed	   due	   to	   violence	   from	   the	   drug	  cartels.	   Many	   buses,	   restaurants,	   tourist	   agencies,	   and	   pharmacies	   are	   transitioning	   their	   offices	  and	  services	  to	  the	  U.S..	  Moreover,	  public	  hospitals	  are	  now	  understaffed	  because	  they	  have	  to	  care	  for	  patients	  who	  previously	  went	  to	  private	  hospitals,	  stresses	  Mexican	  Counterpart	  1.	  According	  to	  Health	  Expert	  12,	  a	  few	  surveillance	  sites	  established	  in	  Texas	  were	  reported	  to	  be	  severely	  lacking	  and	   in	  danger	  of	  being	  shut	  down	  because	  officials	  were	  unable	  to	  give	  them	  enough	  attention.	   If	  they	   do	   not	   have	   the	   capacity	   to	   collect	   samples,	   they	   risk	   missing	   an	   opportunity	   to	   detect	   an	  outbreak.	  “You	  have	  to	  coddle	  surveillance	  sites	  because	  they	  are	  doing	  the	  work	  for	  free,”	  explains	  Health	   Expert	   12.	   Both	   sides	   increased	   manpower	   and	   provide	   incentives	   for	   continuing	  surveillance	  in	  rural	  areas.	  	  
Improving	  Laboratories	  in	  Mexico	  
	   In	  most	   regions,	  Mexico	   is	   capable	  of	   implementing	  EID	  surveillance.	  Although	   laboratory	  manpower,	   training,	   and	   consumables	   vary	   from	   region	   to	   region,	   both	   Mexican	   Counterparts	  assured	   the	   author	   that	   health	   officials	   could	   access	   resources	   and	   equipment	   if	   necessary.	   Even	  though	   some	   regions	   lack	   skill,	   interviewees	   were	   impressed	   with	   the	   safety	   education	   and	  measures	  that	  had	  been	  introduced	  within	  the	  last	  five	  years.	  “With	  anthrax,	  I	  now	  know	  how	  to	  use	  protection.	   I	  will	   not	   go	   out	   in	   the	   field	  without	   it.	   I	  will	   not	   risk	  my	   family	   or	  myself,”	   says	   the	  Mexican	   Counterpart	   2.	   The	   interviewees	   presented	   two	   main	   concerns	   in	   Mexico:	   most	  laboratories	   lack	   capacity	   and	   there	   is	  misallocation	   of	   resources	  meant	   for	   surveillance.	   A	   high	  portion	   of	   the	   money	   is	   spent	   on	   phones	   and	   technology,	   but	   it	   then	   disappears	   once	   new	  leaderships	  arrive,	  explains	  Health	  Expert	  1.	  More	  efforts	  need	  to	  go	  towards	   funding	  sustainable	  resources	  and	  infrastructure.	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The	  majority	  of	  interviewees	  felt	  that	  Mexico’s	  veterinary	  surveillance	  is	  substandard.	  They	  are	  able	  to	  manage	  domestic	  pets,	  but	  not	  wildlife.	  They	  need	  more	  zoonosis	  control	  veterinarians,	  explains	  Health	   Expert	   4.	   The	   lack	   of	   clinical	   testing	   in	  Mexico	   also	  makes	   it	   difficult	   to	   do	   early	  warning	  detection	   in	   animals.	   For	   example,	  when	   trying	   to	   detect	   Lyme	  disease,	  Health	  Expert	   4	  says	   they	   struggle	   “because	  of	   cross-­‐reactivity	   and	   little	   clinical	   testing,	  we	  don’t	   know	   the	   exact	  disease	  …	  if	  it	  is	  not	  a	  reportable	  condition,	  labs	  are	  not	  required	  to	  respond.”	  The	   good	   news	   is	   that	   Mexico	   has	   strong	   networks	   and	   is	   capable	   of	   managing	   most	  outbreaks.	  Areas	  with	   less	   violence	   (i.e.	   bordering	  Arizona),	   are	   even	  more	   resilient	   and	  efficient	  because	   they	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   evaluate	   laboratories	   before	   providing	   skill-­‐based	   training	   and	  funds.	  As	  Health	  Expert	  15	  notes,	   training	   is	  accomplished	  at	   the	  Sonora	  Laboratory,	  a	  model	   lab.	  When	  assessed,	  this	  expert	  said	  the	  laboratory	  passed	  with	  a	  score	  of	  92%.	  	  Mexico’s	  biggest	  strength	  is	  that	  country’s	  information	  technology.	  Currently,	  California	  and	  Arizona	  are	  working	  with	  their	  neighboring	  Mexican	  states	  to	  obtain	  a	  declaration	  of	  cooperation	  from	  the	  state	  governments.	  This	  will	  allow	  the	  four	  states	  to	  work	  together	  and	  share	  information	  on	  a	  secure	  web-­‐based	  platform.	  Arizona	  is	  currently	  using	  Medical	  Electronic	  Disease	  Surveillance	  Intelligence	   System	   (MEDSIS),	   a	   secure	   portal.	   It	   has	   a	   shared	   library,	   secure	   email,	   and	   a	  Wikipedia-­‐like	   page	   that	   the	   entire	   agency	   can	   utilize.	   This	   is	   extremely	   useful	   because	   it	   tracks	  data	   instantly,	   and	   both	   sides	   have	   instant	   access	   to	   reports.	   MEDSIS	   also	   has	   the	   capability	   to	  maintain	  confidentiality	   if	  needed.	  For	  example,	   “the	  Mexican	  side	  can	  only	  see	  things	  marked	  bi-­‐national,”	   explains	   Health	   Expert	   15.	   Now,	   experts	   are	   improving	   the	   portal	   by	   translating	  enhancements	  into	  Spanish	  and	  fixing	  small	  system	  errors.	  Health	  Expert	  17	  and	  Health	  Expert	  18	  feel	  this	  is	  a	  huge	  next	  step.	  	  	  
Specific	  Cultural	  Findings	  on	  the	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  Border	  
	  
Strong	  Partnerships	  Between	  Regions	  
	   While	  Mexico	  may	  have	   lower	   standards	   in	   some	   areas,	   it	   is	   open	   and	   transparent	   about	  sample	  sharing.	  In	  all	  the	  interviews,	  health	  experts	  stated	  that	  both	  parties	  share	  daily	  and	  weekly	  reports	  and	  engage	  in	  networking	  between	  cities.	  The	  majority	  of	  interviewees	  expressed	  a	  strong	  partnership	  with	  Mexican	  health	  officials	  and	  agreed	  that	  there	  was	  a	  willingness	  to	  solve	  problems	  quickly.	   Health	   Expert	   1	   explains	   why	   transparency	   has	   improved	   over	   the	   past	   20	   years;	  “employees	  have	  stayed	  long	  term	  and	  are	  willing	  to	  stick	  their	  neck	  out	  to	  get	  things	  done.”	  When	  working	  with	  developing	  countries,	  this	  interviewee	  recommended	  not	  being	  too	  pushy,	  because	  it	  takes	  time,	  patience,	  and	  trust	   to	  network	  between	   leaders	  and	  epidemiologists.	  There	   is	  concern	  that	   the	  closure	  of	  EWIDS	  could	  hurt	  partnerships,	  especially	   if	   counterparts	  are	   lost	  due	   to	  a	  bi-­‐national	   case.	   “You	   really	  need	   to	  know	  who	  key	  players	   are	  on	  both	   side	  of	   the	  border	   to	  make	  things	  sustainable,”	  notes	  Health	  Expert	  15.	  Because	  Mexico	   is	  centralized,	  health	  officials	  are	  not	  supposed	  to	  publicize	  disease	  reports	  without	  permission	  from	  the	  federal	  government.	  They	  need	  to	  know	  we	  will	  honor	  this	  arrangement	  and	  not	  publish	  before	  them,	  explains	  Health	  Expert	  1.	  If	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someone	  asks,	  parties	  involved	  can	  give	  generalizations,	  but	  not	  actual	  numbers.	  This	  arrangement	  is	  crucial	  to	  ensuring	  open	  and	  transparent	  reports.	  “We	  don’t	  want	  to	  go	  back	  to	  small	  projects	  and	  basic	  conversations,”	  said	  Mexican	  Counterpart	  1.	  Mexican	  Counterpart	  2	  agreed.	  While	   there	   are	   strong	  partnerships	   across	  borders,	  Health	  Expert	  4	   found	   that	   there	  are	  occasionally	  miscommunications	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  information	  sharing	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Mexican	  states	  when	  political	  interests	  do	  not	  align.	  To	  improve	  relationships,	  health	  networks	  have	  come	  together	  and	  created	  15	  border	  bi-­‐national	  councils	  (eight	  of	  which	  are	   in	  Mexico)	  to	   inform	  each	  other	  of	  new	  health	  initiatives,	  tackle	  regional	  dilemmas,	  and	  exchange	  lessons	  learned	  regarding	  outbreaks.	  These	  regional	  partnerships	  were	  introduced	  because	  of	  the	  One	  Health-­‐One	  Border	  Program,	  the	  mission	   of	   which	   is	   to	   improve	   early	   detection	   of	   the	   transmission	   from	   animal	   to	   human	   by	  networking.	   When	   evaluating	   the	   U.S.-­‐Mexico	   Border,	   there	   was	   a	   lack	   of	   infrastructure	   and	  integration	   between	   all	   states,	   explains	   Health	   Expert	   17;	   therefore,	   an	   integrated	   system	   was	  introduced	   to	   manage	   challenges	   as	   a	   whole.	   As	   a	   result,	   EWIDS	   attempted	   to	   engage	   more	  collaboratively	   with	   the	   CDC,	   the	   academic	   community,	   and	   volunteers.	   Interviewees	   from	  California	  and	  Arizona	  expressed	  how	  valuable	  it	  was	  to	  have	  the	  four	  corners	  regional	  program,	  “a	  communication	   channel	   where	   bi-­‐national	   information	   interest	   cases	   are	   collected	   for	   the	   four	  corners	   [California,	   Baja,	   Sonora,	   and	   Arizona],	   providing	   confidentiality,	   immediate	   notification,	  and	  georeferencing	  of	  epidemiological	  cases.”127	  Communication	  is	  enhanced	  when	  representatives	  from	  each	  state	  unite	  to	  tackle	  official	  political	  issues.	  “It	  formalizes	  things	  so	  that	  we	  are	  going	  to	  speak	  with	  a	  position	  and	  not	  lean	  on	  one	  person	  to	  get	  all	  our	  answers,”	  says	  Health	  Expert	  17.	  	  
	  
Immigration	  Can	  Alter	  Data	  
	   Additionally,	   interviewees	  said	  that	  tracking	  certain	  patients	   is	  difficult.	  Discrepancies	   like	  these	  are	  important,	  because	  the	  inability	  to	  track	  patients	  can	  lengthen	  outbreak	  response	  times.	  If	  medical	  officers	  do	  not	  know	  where	  an	  outbreak	  originated,	  they	  cannot	  stop	  it	  from	  spreading.	  For	  instance,	  Health	  Expert	  8	  gave	  the	  example	  of	  conducting	  surveillance	  in	  schools.	  Data	  was	  missing	  because	   students	   chose	   to	   see	   medical	   doctors	   in	   Mexico	   instead	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   While	  crossing	   borders	   to	   get	   inexpensive	   check-­‐ups	   is	   a	   challenge,	  Mexican	  Counterpart	   1	   and	  Mexico	  counterpart	  2	  said	  this	  concern	  has	  significantly	  decreased.	  Because	  of	  the	  potential	  risk	  from	  drug	  cartels,	  fewer	  U.S.	  citizens	  and	  immigrants	  without	  health	  insurance	  prefer	  to	  travel	  to	  Mexico.	  	  Additionally,	   Mexican	   officials	   found	   inconsistencies	   when	   evaluating	   pregnant	   patients.	  Many	   would	   try	   to	   cross	   the	   border	   in	   hopes	   of	   gaining	   U.S.	   citizenship	   for	   their	   children.	   To	  manage	  pregnancy	  transfers,	  a	  protocol	  that	  has	  been	  put	  in	  place	  to	  only	  allow	  extreme	  cases	  into	  the	  U.S.;	   “they	  won’t	   let	   pregnant	  women	   from	  Mexico	   go	   into	   the	  U.S.	  without	   a	  note	   from	   their	  healthcare	   provider,”	   says	   Mexican	   Counterpart	   1.	   Even	   though	   U.S.	   Border	   Patrol	   carefully	  monitored	  who	  they	  let	  cross	  borders,	  U.S.	  officials	  were	  mindful	  in	  helping	  Mexican	  patients	  with	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severe	  illnesses.	  “If	  Mexican	  patients	  are	  denied	  treatment,	  we	  offer	  them	  assistance	  and	  oftentimes	  help	  them	  get	  across	  the	  border,”	  states	  Health	  Expert	  1.	  
	  
Surveillance	  Measured	  Differently	  Across	  Borders	  
	   After	   evaluating	   capabilities,	   interviewees	   found	   that	   a	   large	   number	   of	   laboratories	   had	  inadequate	  standards	  and	  were	  incapable	  of	  performing	  clinical	  testing.	  This	  is	  partially	  due	  to	  how	  they	  conduct	  surveillance.	  Epidemiologists	  in	  Mexico	  and	  the	  U.S.	  collect	  data	  differently;	  instead	  of	  obtaining	   two	  samples,	   they	   just	  use	  one.	  The	  U.S.	  does	  not	   report	  a	  disease	  unless	   it	  has	  clinical	  confirmation;	  however,	  Mexico	  confirms	  data	  based	  on	  a	  patient’s	  symptoms.	  These	  two	  conflicting	  types	  of	  surveillance	  lead	  to	  different	  results	  and	  case	  definitions.	  “Mexico	  says	  we	  under	  diagnose	  while	   we	   say	   they	   over	   diagnose,”	   says	   Health	   Expert	   1.	   One	   of	   the	   reasons	   why	   syndromic	  surveillance	   is	  done	   is	  because	   it	   is	   significantly	  quicker	  and	  cheaper.	  The	  majority	  of	   the	  clinical	  testing	  done	   in	  Mexico	   is	   at	   secured	   laboratory	   in	  Mexico	  City.	  Many	   interviewees	   reported	   slow	  response	   times	  when	  doing	   clinical	   surveillance.	   “Sometimes	  we	   [Americans]	   get	   responses	   back	  before	  they	  do	  which	  can	  upset	  them,”	  says	  Health	  Expert	  1.	  	  The	   challenge	   with	   syndromic	   surveillance	   is	   that	   diseases	   can	   have	   similar	   symptoms.	  Without	  clinical	   testing,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   identify	  emerging	  diseases.	  A	   few	  o	   interviewees	   felt	   that	  Mexico	   chooses	   to	  use	   syndromic	   surveillance	  because	   it	   lacks	   skilled	   staff	   and	   resources.	  Health	  Expert	   2	   found	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   individuals	   working	   as	   epidemiologists	   were	   previously	  physicians.	  Many	  struggle	  to	  understand	  the	  U.S.	  methodology	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  a	  statistical	  background.	   To	   fix	   this	   discrepancy,	   Health	   Expert	   2	   suggests	   that	   more	   efforts	   go	   towards	  improving	   bi-­‐national	   case	   definitions	   across	   borders;	   creating	   these	   case	   definitions	   is	   useful	   in	  ensuring	   that	   data	   is	   accurate	   and	   evaluated	   correctly.	   If	   data	   is	  misinterpreted,	   it	   could	   change	  how	  policy	  makers	  react	  to	  health	  events,	  or	  more	  importantly,	  an	  outbreak.	  Even	  though	  both	  countries	  use	  different	   techniques,	  Mexico	   is	  equally	  as	  stringent	  as	   the	  U.S.	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  managing	  outbreaks.	  Health	  Expert	  1	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  a	  natural	  disaster	  that	  happened	   in	   the	  past.	  The	  U.S.	   just	  provided	   tetanus	   shots	  while	  Mexico	   sprayed	   city	  blocks	  and	   set	   up	   clinics	   for	   citizens.	  Mexican	   health	   officials	   took	   extra	  measures	   to	   ensure	   the	   public	  knew	  it	  was	  safe.	  Officials’	  desire	  to	  be	  strong	  and	  independent	  has	  been	  positive;	  Mexico	  is	  more	  participatory	   when	   evaluating	   surveillance	   policy.	   However,	   it	   occasionally	   causes	   challenges	  between	  partners.	   It	   is	   important	   that	   relationships	  are	  built	  horizontally;	   “we	  do	  not	  want	   to	  be	  seen	   as	   a	  Malinche,”	   says	  Health	   Expert	   12.	   If	   the	  U.S.	   takes	   action	  without	   consulting	  Mexico,	   it	  could	  signal	   that	   they	  are	   inferior.128	  Decisions	  are	  not	  always	  done	  realistically,	  but	  rather,	  what	  Mexico	  feels	  will	  make	  them	  more	  powerful.	  This	  is	  mostly	  seen	  when	  they	  request	  technology	  or	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  and	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  Nation	  and	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  4,	  argue:	  “It	  is	  a	  traditional	  Mexican	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  that	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  Malinche-­‐	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  and	  mistress	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  new	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  is	  said	  that	  La	  Malinche	  bore	  a	  son	  by	  Cortes,	  the	  first	  mestizo	  of	  Aztec	  and	  Spanish	  blood,	  whom	  she	  later	  sacrificed	  when	  Cortes	  threatened	  to	  take	  the	  boy	  to	  Spain.”	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elaborate	   equipment.	   High	   tech	   equipment	   is	   useless	   if	   it	   cannot	   be	   operated	   or	   repaired,	   says	  Health	   Expert	   2.	   Many	   Mexican	   officials	   would	   like	   to	   have	   Biosafety	   Level	   (BSL)	   3	   laboratory	  capability,	   but	   there	   are	   mixed	   opinions	   on	   whether	   or	   not	   more	   advanced	   is	   always	   better.	  Approximately	  half	  of	  the	  interviewees	  felt	  that	  Mexico	  would	  be	  more	  successful	  if	  they	  focused	  on	  improving	  manpower	   and	   strengthening	   lab	   capacity	   before	  building	  BSL3	   labs.	   “Many	   countries	  want	   new	   medical	   technology	   but	   it	   would	   be	   in	   their	   best	   interest	   to	   do	   things	   that	   are	  sustainable,”	  says	  Health	  Expert	  1.	  Maintaining	  equipment	  is	  still	  extremely	  difficult	  in	  laboratories	  and	  it	  could	  cause	  further	  problems	  in	  the	  long	  run	  says	  Health	  Expert	  12.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
	  The	  U.S.	  and	  Mexico	  have	  introduced	  many	  beneficial	  techniques	  for	  developing	  countries.	  As	   a	   case	   study,	   it	   provides	   interesting	   insight	   because	   Mexico	   has	   areas	   which	   have	   either	  succeeded	  enormously	  or	  struggled,	  depending	  on	  the	  location	  and	  drug	  cartel	  violence.	  While	  both	  countries	  struggle	  with	  dealing	  with	  political	  bureaucracy,	  they	  have	  developed	  regional	  networks	  to	   work	   more	   collaboratively	   and	   efficiently.	   Advanced	   technology	   ensures	   both	   parties	  communicate	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis	  and	  has	  made	  outside	  networking	  more	  attainable.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  both	  countries	  have	  been	  successful	  is	  because	  they	  fully	  assessed	  border	  capacity	  and	  identified	   key	   leaders	  who	  were	   influential	   in	   building	   EID	   surveillance	   programs.	   In	   the	   future,	  more	  attention	  needs	  to	  go	  towards	  improving	  wildlife	  surveillance,	  managing	  funding	  constraints,	  and	   expanding	   laboratory	   capacity.	   In	   addition,	   focus	   needs	   to	   be	   directed	   on	   rural	   areas	   that	  receive	  less	  attention	  because	  of	  security	  constraints.	  Both	  countries	  have	  had	  successes,	  but	  policy	  makers	  cannot	  truly	  understand	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Mexico’s	  border	  surveillance	  capacity	  until	  EWIDS	  shuts	  down.	  Many	  of	  the	  interviewed	  experts	  are	  concerned	   that	   detection	   capabilities	   and	   leadership	   will	   decrease	   if	   EIDs	   are	   not	   continually	  prioritized	  politically.	  By	   closing	  EWIDS,	   officials	   are	   shortening	   the	   life	   span	  of	   current	  projects.	  “EWIDS	  is	  ending	  when	  programs	  are	  finally	  being	  put	  in	  place”	  says	  Health	  Expert	  12.	  Rather	  than	  starting	   from	   scratch,	   higher	   officials	   and	   funders	   should	   assess	   existing	   policies	   and	   revamp	  systems	  based	  on	  public	  need,	  to	  ensure	  they	  are	  sustainable.	  These	  political	  moves	  just	  counteract	  the	  mission	   of	   creating	   a	   strong	   relationship	   between	   the	  U.S.	   and	  Mexico	   and,	   in	   effect,	  make	   it	  more	  difficult	  for	  Mexicans	  to	  take	  ownership	  of	  their	  EID	  surveillance	  activities.	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  Table	  4.2.	  U.S.-­‐Mexico	  Border:	  Date,	  Time	  of	  Interview,	  Generic	  Title	  and	  Code129	  
Date	  and	  Time	  of	  Interview	   Generic	  Title	  and	  Code	  06/25/12	  1000	   Health	  Expert	  1	  06/25/12	  1000	   Health	  Expert	  2	  06/25/12	  1000	   Health	  Expert	  3	  06/25/12	  1200	   Health	  Expert	  4	  6/26/12	  0800	   Health	  Expert	  5	  6/26/12	  0800	   Health	  Expert	  6	  6/26/12	  0800	   Health	  Expert	  7	  6/26/12	  0800	   Health	  Expert	  8	  6/26/12	  0800	   Health	  Expert	  9	  6/26/12	  0800	   Health	  Expert	  10	  6/26/12	  1400	   Health	  Expert	  11	  6/26/12	  1400	   Health	  Expert	  12	  6/26/12	  1400	   Health	  Expert	  13	  6/26/12	  1400	   Health	  Expert	  14	  06/27/12	  0800	   Health	  Expert	  15	  06/27/12	  0800	   Health	  Expert	  16	  6/27/12	  1400	   Health	  Expert	  17	  6/27/12	  1400	   Health	  Expert	  18	  6/27/12	  1400	   Health	  Expert	  19	  6/26/12	  0800	   Mexican	  Counterpart	  1	  6/26/12	  0800	   Mexican	  Counterpart	  2	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  To	  protect	  personally	  identifiable	  information.	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Kenya:	   Decentralization;	   lack	   of	   infrastructure	   and	   manpower;	   Ministry	   of	   Public	   Health	   and	  Sanitation	   prioritizes	   diagnostics	   over	   research;	   international	   organizations	   provide	   funding	  without	  following	  through.	  
	  
Peru:	   Overlapping	   government	   functions;	   decentralization;	   lack	   of	   rural	   infrastructure;	   western	  medicine	  and	  cultural	  practices	  at	  odds	  with	  each	  other.	  
	  
Thailand:	   Miscommunication	   and	   overlapping	   missions	   among	   health	   organizations;	   mistrust	  between	  host	  and	  international	  community.	  
U.S.-­‐Mexico	  border:	  Drug	  cartels	  in	  Mexico;	  difficulty	  transferring	  resources	  across	  borders;	  loss	  of	  Early	   Warning	   Infectious	   Diseases	   Surveillance	   program	   funding;	   poor	   laboratory	   capacity	   in	  Mexico.	  
Recommendations:	  
• Involve	  local	  experts	  in	  EID	  surveillance.	  
• Support	  technology	  that	  facilitates	  communication	  (e.g.	  U.S.-­‐Mexico).	  
• Develop	  projects	  in	  a	  way	  that	  benefits	  both	  parties	  (e.g.	  host	  country	  Principal	  Investigator	  instead	  of	  a	  foreign	  PI).	  
• Centralize	   health	   networks,	   and	   separate	   civilian	   and	   military	   sector	   influence	   in	   EID	  surveillance	  so	  functions	  do	  not	  overlap.	  
• To	  improve	  outcomes,	  use	  lessons	  from	  other	  regions	  that	  have	  experienced	  outbreaks.	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